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RETHINKING RATIONALITY: THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN LIGHT OF PROFOUND COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT, 
RELATIONALITY, EMBODIMENT AND PERSONHOOD 
ANTONY KANIARU 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink the question of rationality as the defining mark of what it is to 
be human in light of profoundly cognitively impaired individuals. We attempt to hold a 
conversation between theologians who traditionally emphasized rationality, and those who stress 
relationality as the sine qua non of human beings in order to demonstrate that both have 
traditionally marginalized individuals who are cognitively impaired. Finally following Karl 
Barth, we attempt to retrieve the theme of embodiment to augment relationality in theological 
anthropology.  In Part I (chapter 2 and 3) we analyse the historical understanding of the imago 
Dei from a Christian West perspective. We trace the tradition from Joseph Fletcher back to 
Irenaeus through Aquinas and Augustine, and examine how their notions of the imago Dei have 
traditionally marginalized intellectually impaired persons. By equating the imago with ‘rational 
souls’, the tradition perpetuates the exclusion and stigmatization of cognitively impaired persons. 
Chapter 3 analyses the rationality-relationality turn, i.e., the effort by Christian theology to 
overcome the traditional overemphasis of rationality. Here we engage with Eastern Orthodox 
theologians John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras who can be considered paradigmatic examples 
for a relational anthropology and thus are of particular importance in the popularization of the 
‘relational turn’. In Part II (chapter 4, 5 and 6), we offer an alternative to the rationality-
relationality turn by following Karl Barth. Here we push against a Cartesian dualistic ‘criterion 
of personhood’, and argue that the belief there is a polar opposition between body and soul 
(mind) is a category mistake. Thus we attempt to retrieve the theme of embodiment in light of 
profound cognitive impairment. In chapter 5, we engage with John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum 
to show that most theories of justice are also culpable of marginalizing intellectually impaired 
individuals. Here we attempt to show why secular theories of justice do not work, and so finally 
suggest a theistic grounding of justice. Chapter 6 examines the practical issue of care for fellow 
human beings who are cognitively impaired. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
Curiosity … it evokes ‘concern’; it evokes the care one takes for what exists and could exist; a 
readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us; a certain relentlessness to break up our 
familiarities and to regard otherwise the same things; a fervor to grasp what is happening and what 
passes; a casualness in regard to the traditional hierarchies of the important and essential. I dream 
of a new age of curiosity. 
-- Michel Foucault, ‘The Masked Philosopher’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth  
  
1. Personal Background 
 
This thesis is a theological and practical reflection on profound cognitive impairment and its 
associated opportunistic debilitating diseases. It arises from a feeling of curiosity that was 
triggered by a seminary class. A few years ago I was attached to a ‘treatment team’ at a large 
State hospital in a Southern State of the United States. The facility caters for, among others, 
persons with ‘decreased cognitive functions’. I was tasked with assisting the counselor and 
chaplain at the hospital campus, where I had the opportunity to visit with residents who were at 
different levels of cognitive dysfunction. Of the residents I encountered, the most challenging, 
and those who presented most questions for me were those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or 
other advanced dementias, and from profound cognitive impairment.  
On our numerous visits to the group home, I remember meeting many interesting 
residents and their carers. However, I vividly recall one particular resident, whom we will call 
‘John’. On a good summer day, we would find John, a man in his mid to late 60s, sitting outside 
basking in the morning sun. Our rare conversations revolved around John thinking of us as his 
relatives or sometimes as ‘intruders’ into his ‘home’ (the psycho-geriatric ward). But the visits 
which disturbed me were those in which we would find John sitting outside, wearing a ‘vacant’ 
stare on his face which to me did not communicate ‘presence’. During such visits, John and the 
other residents did not engage in much conversation, and so it was not unusual for our team to 
leave having engaged in one-way conversations only. In my frustration, and perhaps ignorance, I 
started to question the need for attending to these residents and the benefit of spiritual care given 
to them since to me they were unresponsive. This was the beginning of my curiosity in the 
profound question of being human: what is it to be and remain human? who and whose am I? 
and are cognitively impaired people persons? 
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As I was struggling with these questions, I often was uncomfortable to notice that my 
superiors and the care givers went about their business with a surprising normality. But what was 
their secret? On one occasion, after visiting some residents, I plucked up the courage and asked 
the chaplain why he believed it was necessary for the pastoral team to offer such services.  
Instead of an answer, I received a smile and an encouraging pat on the back. However, at the end 
of the attachment, during the review, the chaplain offered to answer the question I had asked 
several weeks earlier: He said: “Tony, these people are people like you and I, only their sense of 
the past, present and future is declining”. Did I doubt these individuals’ humanity? This question 
only spurred more disturbing questions. My idea of a human being ‘proper’ was that of an 
individual who could ‘do something’. For me, sitting for hours on end, staring vacantly at 
‘nothing’ did not meet the threshold of ‘doing something’. But people around me were going 
about their task as if these individuals were ‘doing something’! Was something amiss with my 
concept of what it is to be human? 
These questions have engaged me to the present, and in my attempt to sort through them, 
I have found silence and worse. For example when I have looked for contemporary discourse 
about cognitively impaired persons, some of the references I find are in discussions of animal 
rights, and in the case of some who are severely intellectually impaired, they are invoked to 
illustrate examples of speciesism. This has been most troubling for me.  
The first works I encountered that seemed to present a different portrait are those by 
Stanley Hauerwas and Hans S. Reinders. I recognize my debt to their passionate commitment to 
expose what they think is the wrong question in the face of a silenced profoundly other. My 
excitement at finding a theological home in their pages where I can make sense of theology’s and 
philosophy’s treatment of cognitive impairment is still fresh. Moving beyond their analysis, I 
wish to forge a path forward by rethinking persons in light of the primacy of their relationality 
and embodiment such that the rethinking of personhood in theological anthropology comes to the 
fore.  
2. Defining Moral Personhood: What is at Stake? 
 
The claim to a common humanity is the foundation for the marginalized and victimized to stake 
their claim in the moral universe. The special accord and moral status attributed to humans is 
hinged on human dignity, which in philosophical accounts is usually taken to be grounded on 
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reason. It is to humans, then, that we extend moral goods such as equality, dignity, justice, 
responsibility, and moral fellowship. But there exists what may be called ‘hard cases’: amongst 
them, people with cognitive impairments, that is, individuals with a diminishing (or diminished) 
capacity for rational deliberation. But they are human. How should we think about these 
individuals who challenge some of theology’s and philosophy’s most coveted notions, for 
example personhood and agency, citizenship and responsibility, equality and the scope of justice, 
and human connection?  
Some philosophers think some of these individuals are nonpersons and therefore that 
their termination is of no consequence. For example philosopher Jeff McMahan argues in The 
Ethics of Killing that neither the death nor the killing of those falling below the threshold carries 
the same moral significance as the death or killing of ‘us’, who are above the threshold.1 Further, 
he argues that those with (congenital) severe cognitive impairments fall below the threshold and 
are not subject to the dignity extended to all other persons or to other moral goods like just ice.
2
 
Such strong conclusions may have potentially serious consequences for those who are 
cognitively impaired. Indeed, what gives these controversies urgency are the real-life stakes for 
personhood, as Eva Feder Kittay says, ‘marks the moral threshold above which equal respect for 
the inherent value of an individual’s life is required and the requirements of dignity are operative 
and below which only relative interest has moral weight’.3 An anxiety about the danger posed by 
such positions spurs me to search for theological and philosophical answers that contest the 
supposed logic of those who think these individuals are nonpersons. 
This thesis, then, asks the question: ‘how might a distinctive theological understanding of 
persons contribute to understanding the ‘hardest cases’ concerning fellow human beings who are 
severely cognitively impaired?’ In posing philosophical questions about cognitive impairment, 
philosophers focus on numerous ethical problems. Thus, underlying the central thesis question 
are issues relating to what it is to be and remain human: What is the significance of the concepts 
of ‘relationality’ and ‘embodiment’ to personhood, and what is the relationship of ‘self’ and 
‘body’? What are the boundaries of personal identity, and do the grounds of our moral obligation 
change when an individual lacks certain cognitive faculties that are often taken to be the basis for 
moral personhood? Are those with significant cognitive impairment moral persons and are they 
                                               
1Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
2 Jeff McMahan, ‘Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996), 3-35.    
3 Eva F. Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics 116 (2005), 100-131.  
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due the same justice which is given to those who are cognitively able? And how might society 
include cognitively impaired persons in its understanding of justice and foster enabling 
conditions of care that would enable these persons to develop a flourishing life? These are 
questions about what it is to be human, and I intend to emphasize on the embodiment and 
relationality of human beings in the quest for a theological understanding of severely 
intellectually impaired human beings. 
3. The Bible and the Body: To Be and to Have a Living Body 
 
The Christian community has traditionally been characterized by great ambivalence toward the 
human body. Indeed, Christianity has struggled to make sense of the body as both benefit and 
burden. However, Christians have always tried to make sense of their embodied existence in the 
context of scripture. Yet one will be hard pressed to find in the Bible a systematic account of the 
body or of the soul or of the relation of body and soul of the kind one finds in, for example, 
Aristotle’s de Anima or Plato’s Phaedo. Furthermore the authors of scripture do not show an 
interest in reacting to Greek philosophy’s efforts to make sense of the self as body and soul. In 
this section, I will sketch a brief account of Scripture on the body. Brian Wren penned a hymn 
about the ‘goodness of the flesh’ that is profoundly orthodox, but also perhaps offensive to some 
early and modern Christian listeners.
4
 But can the latter be blamed, for is it not ‘the flesh’ what 
apostle Paul says human beings struggle against? As we shall see, a ‘Yes!’ answer is only 
possible to the latter if Paul is misread.  
Marcion who came to Rome around 140 is known in tradition to have misread Paul. Thus 
a good account of scripture concerning the body should not omit Marcion’s rejection by the 
Christian community. Marcion’s anthropology is based on a misreading of Paul’s contrast 
between the ‘flesh’ and the ‘body’, and thus only ends up rejecting the body.5 It is helpful to 
remember the genesis of Christian proclamation is in the Hebrew scripture which were translated 
into Greek. We find then that where the Greek language has two words for ‘body’ (soma, sarx), 
the Hebrew has one (basar). Basar is more commonly translated as Greek sarx or ‘flesh’. The 
origin of the different Greek vocabulary is based on the Greek distinction between ‘form’ and 
‘matter’. The ‘body’, then, results when a certain form is given to a certain matter, the ‘flesh’ 
                                               
4 Brian Wren, ‘Good is the Flesh’ in Bringing Many Names: 35 New Hymns (Carol Stream, IL: Hope, 1989), no. 16. 
5 Marcion was excommunicated in 144. See E. C. Blackman, Marcion and His Influence (London: SPCK, 1948); F. 
F. Bruce, The Spreading Flame (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1958). 
5 
 
(sarx). In the Hebrew, although basar is the ‘flesh’, yet it is not regarded as the material out of 
which a body is formed, nor therefore contrasted with ‘body’.6 The term basar can be used to 
refer to the flesh of a body and even contrasted with ‘bone’ or ‘skin’ or ‘blood’. However, as 
Allen Verhey says, Basar is not ‘merely a part of the whole’. This is because it can also be used 
to refer to not only ‘the whole body’, but indeed to ‘the whole self’, and even to the ‘living 
being’.7 We shall shortly return to this important point. 
The apostle Paul shows great interest in the body. When Paul speaks regarding the body, 
he may be read to mean that the sarx (flesh) is what we war against. Indeed, in the epistles to the 
Romans and Galatians, Paul sharply contrasts flesh with spirit, associating the former with death 
and the latter with life in the new creation of God’s reign. At first glance, then, it seems like Paul 
is emphasizing that the real life is not lived in the body. This, however, is a misreading of Paul, 
because for him the body is God’s creation and the theater of God’s redemptive activity. Instead, 
Paul is only critical of the way the body is lived. Actually, Paul thought highly enough of the 
body to use it as a metaphor for the gathered Christian community (Romans 12; 1 Cor. 12). In his 
letter to the church at Corinth, Paul dwells on the body and concludes with a reflection of the 
body glorified in resurrection (1 Cor. 15).  
Again, Paul’s language in 2 Cor. 5.1-10, might lead one to conclude that he is in fact 
against the physical body. For example He says: ‘this earthly tent will be taken down’ (v. 1). ‘We 
will leave these bodies when we die’ (v. 1). ‘We grow weary in the present bodies’ and ‘we long 
to put on the heavenly bodies’ (v. 2). Furthermore, he says, ‘[these] dying bodies make us groan 
and sigh’ (v. 3). Again, however, this is a misreading of Paul. Paul is here only lamenting the 
perishable nature of this present body and so longs to receive his immortal body which will 
clothe his ‘naked’ soul and make him fully human, body and soul, once more (5.1-4). Paul 
recognizes the importance of the body when he says that ‘it’s not that we want to die and have no 
bodies at all’ (v. 4). Instead, contrary to Gnostic thought, which taught that the body was a prison 
which would be discarded to allow the disembodied soul to return to its home, Paul longed to 
have an imperishable body, to allow him to dwell as a whole person, body and soul as was 
intended at creation in Genesis 2.7. 
                                               
6 Allen Verhey, ‘The Body and the Bible: Life in the Flesh According to the Spirit’ in eds. Lisa S. Cahill and 
Margaret A. Farley, Embodiment, Morality, and Medicine (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1995), 10.  
7 Ibid.  
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Speaking of Gen. 2.7, Paul, previously a student of the Torah, knew the teaching that 
God’s basic attitude to creation, including bodies made in God’s image, was to say that it was 
very good (Gen. 1.31). Paul knew that the body can never be said to be a place of autonomy or a 
prison of the soul, for he, like we, read the theologically dense and poetically brilliant verse: 
“Then the Lord God formed man of the dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life; and man became a living being” (Gen. 2.7). Recall we have just mentioned the 
different ways in which the Hebrew word basar can be used. Genesis 2.7 clearly demonstrates 
this use for us. This verse does not say that humans are made up of body and soul. The verse is 
clear: God did not make a body and put a soul into it. Instead, the verse says that God formed a 
human of the dust of the earth and then breathed His breath into it. Thus God made the dust 
come alive. The body, then, did not embody a soul, but it became a soul. The body does not 
simply house the soul, it is the person herself. For Paul, both body and flesh, like the Hebrew 
soul, signify relationship. In short, Paul understood and taught that bodies do not live except in 
relationship to other bodies.  
Not long after Gen. 2.7, we encounter another account of creation in which the man is 
first introduced to the woman and exclaims, ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my 
flesh’ (Gen. 2.23). The man’s words here do not simply demonstrate a simple recognition of an 
opposite sex. Instead, through the woman, man (ha adam) is allowed to discover his own 
humanity. Before this occasion, man had encountered the animal world. Not only was he able to 
distinguish himself from them, but also the animals were incapable of providing man with a 
positive recognition of his own nature. Such recognition could only be provided by bone and 
flesh of another kind. Thus, it is precisely as bodily beings that humans experience mutual 
dependency. To the disappointment of the modern mind, the Bible shows little interest in 
individual autonomy. The point of this linguistic exercise is to dispel the mistaken assumption 
that Christian tradition teaches we are souls trapped in bodies, longing to break free. In this study 
I will argue that the most complete and sufficient way to understand persons, and particularly 
those who are intellectually impaired, should not depend on conceptions of psychological 
capacities associated with the human ability to reason, but in addition, to their capacity for 
relationality, and their embodiment. The section that follows attempts to demonstrate that 
cognitive impairment has been neglected in the general conversation on disability.  
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4. Historical Trajectories of Theological and Philosophical Debates in Disability Discourse: 
 What Is Missing?    
 
Human beings manifest a preoccupation with deviations from the human form. Both physical 
and cognitive impairments are frequent in the natural world, as a result of accident, disease, or 
birth defect. Gershon Berkson argues that with regard to our contemporary understanding of 
cognitive impairment, ‘it is likely that cases of at least mild mental retardation have always been 
a part of human history’.8 However, the treatment of cognitive impairment in any systematic 
manner in the history of theology and philosophy in general is scarce. Furthermore, apart from 
not mentioning cognitive disability in any systematic way, there is a blanket silence on what we 
would consider to be the hardest question, that is, those persons who are severely cognitively 
impaired. This silence is scandalous and unacceptable. But why the scarcity? Is it because these 
persons have least been understood by theologians, and are a philosopher’s ‘nightmare’? And 
more recently, is it because of the narrow aims of disability discourse? Let us look at the 
historical trajectories of the philosophical and theological debate and within the more recent 
disability movement discourse, if only to roughly demonstrate that cognitive impairment has 
been neglected. 
4.1 Cognitive Impairment in Theology: The Theologian’s Challenge  
 
The overview of the history of theological attitudes to cognitive impairment can be sketched 
under a few general headings. The Biblical narratives are silent on what we today call cognitive 
impairment/intellectual disability.
9
 The Bible has a paucity of references to cognitive 
impairment, an absence which is replayed throughout the history of the church.
10
 Instead the 
Bible refers to catalogues of various motor-sensory conditions that are recognizably disabling.
11
  
More specifically, in the gospel accounts people with what we today call ‘disabilities’ are 
marginalized through their portrayal as dependent on God’s healing power, through the 
                                               
8 Gershon Berkson, ‘Intellectual and Physical Disabilities in Prehistory and Early Civilization’, Mental Retardation 
42 (2004), 195-208.  
9 There is one text that is often cited as indicative of cognitive disability: Paul’s exhortation to ‘comfort the 
feebleminded’ (1 Thess. 5:14) However, a better translation of oligopsuchous is ‘timid’ or ‘fainthearted’ rather than 
‘feebleminded’. See Martin W. Barr, Mental Defectives: Their History, Treatment, and Training (Philadelphia, PA: 
P. Blakiston’s Sons, [1904]), 25. 
10 R.C. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation: A Quarter Century of Promise (Baltimore, MD: Paul H. 
Bookes, 1983).  For example this standard history of mental retardation does not mention anything about the first 
millennium. 
11 See generally Lynn Holden, Forms of Deformity (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1991).  
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continuation of the idea that ‘disability’ is related to sin, and through a new association between 
‘disability’ and evil spirits.12 Regarding Ancient Israel, Mary Douglas argues that the concern 
was less with what we today would call discrimination against people with disabilities and more 
concerned with ordering an impure world through proper rituals, a recognizable symbol system, 
bodily hygiene, and social practices.
13
 In the Early Church, the blind, the deaf, and the lame were 
‘almost romanticized, because their future is ultimately secured by God, and indeed, by God 
alone’.14 The biblical narratives helped to shape the dialectical interaction between ‘biblical’ and 
other societal notions of ‘disability’ and their attitudes, beliefs, and practices regarding the blind, 
deaf, and lame in the Western world and in the history of Christianity.  
In particular, looking at the representative cultures of ancient Greece and Rome, we note 
some positive and negative attitudes. Positively the Greeks held disability to be a family and 
civic matter with city-states making financial provisions for the aged and ‘disabled’.15 However, 
persons with any kind of deformity and disability were typically disparaged and scorned, even in 
ancient Greek philosophy and art. In art, for example, disabled persons were represented in a 
manner that signified fear, loathing, contempt, and pity. And in the philosophical tradition, for 
example, Aristotle, in his Generation of Animals, argues that monstrosities – he names extra feet 
or extra heads, were examples of unfulfilled potential.
16
  
In the patristic and medieval periods, the Bible’s silence on cognitive impairment is 
almost replicated. However, if ancient philosophers like Aristotle argued that deformities did not 
violate the natural causes of the world, representative theologians like Augustine argued that the 
sovereign ordering of God did not ignore these deformities. For ancient Greeks and Romans, 
these events were called ‘monsters’ and ‘prodigies’. However, for Augustine they were miracles 
which ought to show that ‘God will do with bodies … what He foretold’.17 Furthermore, no 
                                               
12 Amos Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimaging Disability in Late Modernity (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2007), 27. (Hereafter Theology and DS). 
13 See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Routledge, 
1991), chap. 3; See also Ibid., 22-24.  
14
 See John S. Roth, ‘The Blind, the Lame, and the Poor: Character Types in Luke-Acts’. Journal for the Study of 
the New Testament 144 (1997), 141. As cited in Yong, Theology and DS, 25. 
15 See David Jeffreys and John Tait, ‘Disability, Madness, and Social Exclusion in Dynastic Egypt’, in Jane Hubert, 
ed., Madness, and Social Exclusion: The Archeology and Anthropology of ‘Difference’ (London: Routledge, 2000), 
87-95. As cited in Yong, ibid., 28. 
16 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, IV.4. 
17 Augustine, City of God 21:8. 
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difficulty or laws of nature would impede or forbid Him from so doing.
18
 Augustine held 
‘monstrous races’ to be in some respect human. He says: ‘But anyone who is born anywhere as a 
man
19
 (that is rational and mortal animal), no matter how unusual he may be to our bodily senses 
in shape, colour, motion, sound, or in any natural power or part or quality, derives from the 
original and first-created man.
20
 Yet, as we will see in chapter 2, Augustine does not escape the 
trap of defining human beings as rational creatures, a criterion that would formally exclude 
people with cognitive impairment from the family tree for the next millennium.
21
 Yong says that 
while Augustine’s theological schema is inclusive of people with ‘disabilities’, Augustine is still 
driven less by issues of ‘inclusion and equality than by a theological vision of God as omnipotent 
creator’.22 In the Reformation and early modern period, advances on the medical front resulted in 
more focused discussion of cognitive impairment. Taking Luther to be representative, it is his 
suggestion to drown a misshapen boy that has drawn the most attention in histories of mental 
retardation.
23
 The advances on the legal and medical front were accompanied by changes in the 
philosophical and theological climate.  
Until recently, Christian theologians and ethicists researching and writing on disability 
addressed almost exclusively the concerns of those with physical disabilities, and little attention 
was given to the status of those with cognitive impairments. Some theologians have since started 
to remedy Christian theology’s historical failure to address the concerns of people with 
intellectual impairments, by arguing against the dehumanization and diminished status accorded 
to persons with cognitive impairment. For example, writing from a liberatory theology of 
disability perspective, Nancy Eiesland acknowledges a trend that is prevalent in theology as she 
writes: ‘the paucity of theological exploration of social, emotional, and intellectual disabilities is 
                                               
18 Ibid.  
19 Compare with Aristotle, Physics, II.1.193b8. ‘Moreover, men come from men, but beds do not come from beds.  
That is why people say that the wood, not the shape, is the bed’s nature, because any offshoot that occurred would 
be wood, not a bed; but if wood is its nature, the fact that [man is born of man] show that form too is nature’.   
20 Augustine, City of God, 16:8. 
21 However, in his De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione (On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins) Augustine 
describes a simpleton (moriones) ‘of so highly meritorious a character as to entitle him to a preference in the award 
of the grace of Christ over many men of the acutest intellect’, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15011.htm 
(retrieved 27th October 2011). 
22 Yong, Theology and DS, 31. For a further explication of medieval saints who illuminate the church’s beliefs and 
practices regarding ‘disability’, see id., 31-3. 
23 Martin Luther, Table Talk, ed., Theodore G. Tappert and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1967), 396-7. 
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scandalous’.24 This is despite the fact that the Scriptures reveal that Jesus was very interested in 
the plight of disabled individuals in general. While Eiesland’s intention in her book is to develop 
an understanding of God that is relevant exclusively to the concerns of those with physical 
disabilities, she encourages her readers to explore theological questions that address the unique 
concerns of a broad spectrum of disability. Theologians are advocates of a peculiar kind: 
representing God to the world on the one hand, and the world to God in the other. Thus 
theologians can and must be the gatekeepers of the knowledge about cognitive impairment. In 
this thesis, I respond to this challenge.  
4.2 Cognitive Impairment in Philosophy: A Philosopher’s Nightmare?  
 
If the discussion of cognitive impairment has not been satisfactory among theologians, 
philosophers have not done any better. Thus, in the course of this study, I have become acutely 
aware of the deficient manner in which moral philosophers speak about cognitive impairment. 
Certain general tendencies become apparent if one looks at the place of cognitive impairment in 
philosophical discourse. In general, the presence of disability in philosophy and other academic 
disciplines is notably greater than in theology. Even so, in the history of philosophical discourse, 
the question of cognitive impairment still remains somewhat in the periphery, though there are 
historical precedents to a discussion of the subject. People with cognitive impairment rarely 
appear in historical philosophical texts. When they appear, they do so in the context of being 
discounted as irrelevant, or as exceptions that prove the rule. For example, Aristotle posited a 
hierarchy of the human species based on the degree to which individuals possessed rationality. 
And as early as Plato’s Republic references can be found to the abandonment of ‘defective 
infants’.25 Further, when they appear on the philosophical stage today, they do so as a backdrop 
to interrogate concerns about justice for other groups.
26
  
In the Enlightenment period, we find that John Locke, one of its most influential thinkers, 
influenced the discussion of cognitive impairment in subsequent disciplines and practices.
27
 For 
example in his Two Treatises of Government, a foundational work in modern political 
                                               
24 Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville, TN: Abingdon 
Press, 1994), 28. 
25 Plato, The Republic, V.460c.  
26 I will return to this point in chapter 2. 
27 Here I rely on C. F. Goodey, ‘John Locke’s Idiots in the Natural History of Mind’, History of Psychiatry 5 (1994), 
215-250. For an exposition of Locke’s main texts on ‘Ideots’/cognitive impairment, see idem.  
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philosophy, he explains that what makes one a ‘Free Man’ is maturity, but he also notes that ‘[i]f 
through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of Nature, any one comes not to such 
a degree of Reason, wherein he might be supposed incapable to know the Law … he is never 
capable of being a Free Man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own Will …. And so 
Lunaticks and Ideots are never set free from the Government of their Parents’.28 Not being ‘Free 
Men’, those ‘Ideots’ are never citizens and some moral goods, e.g. justice, are thus not available 
to them, only charity. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke like Aristotle, 
Augustine, and even Descartes defined human beings as rational creatures. However, he 
specified that he meant the ability to think in abstractions.
29
  
For Locke, those unable to do so are unreasonable creatures;
30
 they do not have innate 
ideas/knowledge and only give the appearance of being human. Thus, to Locke, if we assume 
bodily deformities make monsters (as all his contemporaries held), the more reason we have to 
hold that rational impairment excludes one from being considered human.
31
 The rationally 
impaired were not moral nor soulish creatures,
32
 and consequently, infanticide was justified to 
prevent the devil gaining a foothold.
33
 The view that persons with cognitive impairments are not 
subject to the same moral goods may also be inferred in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. Kant, a 
major influence at the end of the 18
th
 century Enlightenment, is generally considered to be the 
locus classicus of the trinity of personhood, dignity, and autonomy. He writes: ‘Autonomy is 
therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature’.34 Only 
‘persons’ are capable of making autonomous decisions and thus ought not to be treated 
paternalistically. This view of autonomy, however, suggests that those persons with cognitive 
impairments have no autonomy that needs protection.
35
 
Turning to the twentieth century, it emerges that vocal and robust parental and self-
advocacy movements of the 1960s and 1970s ensured that cognitive disability emerged as an 
                                               
28 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1824, II§60. 
29 See John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), II.11.§10; II.11.§11. (ed., Peter Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). 
30 Ibid., 2.11.§13. 
31 See ibid., 4.4.§16.  
32
 ‘Idiots’ were not, hence, expected to take part in eternal life since this follows not the bodily shape but the 
reasonable soul (ibid., 4.4.§14-15).  
33 Ibid., 3.6. §26, 39.  
34 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:436.  
35 See for example Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, 100-131; Onora O’Neill, ‘Paternalism and Partial 
Autonomy’, Journal of Medical Ethics 10 (1984), 173-8; Daniel Wikler, ‘Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979), 377-92. 
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object of philosophical inquiry and ethical discourse in its own right. Thus philosophers in 
different traditions engaged the nature and moral status of individuals with cognitive disabilities, 
addressing both theoretical and practical questions. Within philosophy, ethicists and bioethicists 
can be found grappling with issues of justice, respect, personhood, and autonomy, and with 
concerns regarding the treatment of persons with cognitive impairments in a variety of 
philosophical contexts.
36
 More recently there has been a significant shift in the fields of medical 
practice and philosophical discourse surrounding cognitive impairment. In the former, prenatal 
testing for Down syndrome and other genetic and chromosomal abnormalities linked with 
cognitive impairment is now standard practice.  
The increasing intersection between bioethics and clinical practice is offering 
philosophers and theologians a platform for speaking about and making concrete 
recommendations with regard to intellectually impaired persons. However, the category 
‘cognitive disability’ itself has begun to be problematized by a number of philosophers who are 
raising critical questions regarding the nature, status, and treatment of persons with disabilities. 
Kittay says this is happening in both political contexts and in academic and philosophical 
scholarship. This shift in the mode of inquiry and scope of analysis is a result of broader changes 
on the disability landscape over the past few decades, exemplified in the disability rights 
movement. Kittay reckons that new philosophical questions are emerging against the backdrop 
of the social model of disability, according to which it is not so much the person who needs 
fixing but the environment that needs changing if cognitively impaired persons are to flourish.
37
 
Some philosophers and disability scholars question whether cognitive impairment, or its various 
instantiations such as the category of ‘mental retardation’, is a self-evident and unproblematic 
                                               
36 See for example Helga Khuse and Peter Singer, eds., Bioethics: An Anthology 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1999). 
37 This is a very rough statement on the social model. For rich discussion of this model see Michael Oliver, The 
Politics of Disablement (London: MacMillan, 1990); Harlan Lane, ‘Constructions of Deafness’. Disability and 
Society, 10 (1995), 171-89; Lennard J. Davis, The Disability Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1997); Rosemarie 
G. Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997). This list is hardly complete, as there are far too many discussions of the social 
model to include in this list. But note that most of the work is about physical disability and little or nothing is said 
about the social model and cognitive impairment. For a combination of the social model and cognitive impairment, 
see Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2008) (hereafter RGF); Shelley Tremain, ‘On the Subject of Impairment’, in 
Disability/Postmodernity, eds., Marian Corker and Tom Shakespeare (London: Continuum, 2002); Licia Carlson, 
The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010).  
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natural kind, and they problematize the very notion of ‘normalcy’.38 Rather than take an 
ahistorical approach to the topic, many are exploring the sociopolitical foundations of the 
oppression of persons with cognitive impairments, both now and in the past.
39
 Finally, 
philosophers are unmasking the discriminatory and erroneous assumptions that underlie certain 
philosophical treatments of disability. This growing body of work has emerged from multiple 
philosophical sites, including ethics and political philosophy,
40
 philosophy of science, 
bioethics,
41
 and postmodern theory.
42
  
However, even though this new critical philosophical orientation is with us, the general 
issue of disability sometimes overshadows the particularity of cognitive impairment within both 
critical disability theory and traditional moral theory. Why so? We might gain some insight into 
this question when we consider Georgina Kleege’s critique of how Hollywood represents blind 
characters. In her fascinating exploration of blindness, Sight Unseen, Kleege says:  
While Hollywood did not invent these stereotypes, the repetition and intricacy of these images 
seems to reveal something disturbing about filmmakers’ vision of the world. The blind are a 
filmmaker’s worst nightmare. They can never be viewers; can never be enlightened and dazzled 
by the filmmaker’s artistry. So filmmakers treat the blind the way we all deal with nightmares: 
they belittle them, expose their weakness, make them at best pitiable, at worst somewhat 
unsavory.43   
Although some moral philosophers have long taken reason and other aspects of cognition as 
central to their very project, it is cognitive impairment that is ‘the philosopher’s nightmare’.44  
Thus as Licia Carlson says, instead of promoting assimilation and normalization, many 
philosophers who attempt to bring intellectual disability into the fold mark these persons out 
according to their departure from the normal and highlight their profound otherness, and their 
                                               
38 See Carlson, The Faces of Intellectual Disability, 12; see also id., ‘Rethinking Normalcy, Normalization, and 
Cognitive Disability’, in Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, eds. Robert 
Figueroa and Sandra Harding (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003); Davis, The Disability Studies Reader, 1997; 
Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, 100-131. 
39 See Carlson, The Faces of Intellectual Disability, 2010; Anna Stubblefied, ‘“Beyond the Pale’: Tainted 
Whiteness, Cognitive Disability, and Eugenic Sterilization’, Hypatia 22 (2007), 162-81. 
40 See Reinders, RGF, 2000; Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 
(London: Belknap Press, 2006); Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999); Anita Silvers, ‘Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (f)or Justice for 
People with Disabilities’, Hypatia 10 (1995), 30-55.  
41 See Hans S. Reinders, The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society: An Ethical Analysis (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). 
42 See Tremain, ‘On the Subject of Impairment’, 32-47. 
43 Georgina Kleege, Sight Unseen (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 57. As cited in Carlson, The 
Faces of Intellectual Disability, 4. 
44 Carlson, ibid., 4. 
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alterity.
45
 So some philosophers examining the question of cognitive impairment query the 
personhood of persons with cognitive disability, including whether they are owed any moral 
goods, for example: respect, dignity, justice etc. Furthermore, it seems fashionable morally 
speaking to question whether we can we tell them apart from animals.   
When the moral status of animals is discussed, then, it is common to find indirect 
references to cognitive impairment as a tactical move in an unrelated philosophical argument as 
part of certain arguments addressing the moral status of nonhuman animals, and particularly in 
reference to critiques of speciesism. In chapter 2, I will push against this point. Suffice it to say 
here that Peter Singer’s discussion of nonhuman animals is a good example. Singer invokes 
‘severely intellectually disabled’ largely to challenge what he views as the commonplace 
assumption that ‘species membership is crucial to moral status, and that all human life is of equal 
value’.46 For me, human lives of any kind are more valuable than animal lives, simply by virtue 
of being human. If we consider what Hans Reinders calls our ‘moral taxonomies’,47 a number of 
questions arise: what definitions of cognitive impaired do philosophers provide? Are they 
explicit, or simply assumed to be self-evident? How do philosophers and bioethicists perpetuate 
certain prototypes of cognitive impairment? How does this discourse shape the ways of speaking 
and thinking about intellectual disability? Furthermore, how does any adjective, quality, or 
characteristic enter into our ways of defining persons, or a class of persons, thereby limiting our 
field of vision and what we see? In general, cognitive impairment is a challenge to moral 
philosophy and is the philosopher’s nightmare.  
Our very brief overview of theological and philosophical and of disability discourse 
material in light of cognitive impairment no doubt is highly glossed over. However, the purpose 
is not to provide an exhaustive coverage of these matters, but to get some sense of what has gone 
before so that we can better discern the task that lies ahead in the coming chapters of this study. 
Let us now turn to this particular task.   
 
 
                                               
45 Ibid. 
46 See Peter Singer, ‘Speciesism and Moral Status’, in eds., Eva F. Kittay and Licia Carlson, Cognitive Disability 
and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (West Sussex, UK: Wiley and Sons, 2007), 331-344. 
47 See Reinders, RGF, 33- 36, 119, 195, 196, 213.   
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5. Scope and Argument  
 
A significant problem persists. From our overview of the theology, philosophy and disability 
studies, it is evident that most of the systematic exploration of the issue of disability has been 
largely confined to the exploration of physical disabilities and little has been said of cognitive 
impairment let alone the ‘hard cases’. Again, when cognitive impairment is mentioned, it is from 
the periphery. In this thesis I argue that far from being incidental to society in general, and 
particularly to the life of the Christian community, people with cognitive impairments should be 
at the core of theological reflection. Thus, those relegated to the margins of moral personhood 
should in fact be at the core. I will attempt to make these claims plausible. However, unlike the 
burgeoning disability rights movement, and other policies that have provided a stage upon which 
the issue of disability can be addressed, I will take a different path by turning to Christology, that 
is, the person and work of Jesus Christ. It is clear that these different platforms of disability have 
made meaningful strides towards understanding the social and political aspects of disability, but I 
suggest that their achievements are in serious need of expansion in a direction that considers the 
personhood of intellectually impaired people.  
In a society facing growing challenges of advances in biology and biotechnology, 
cognitively impaired persons (and their caretakers) have reason to be concerned with what 
Reinders calls the ‘liberal convention’.48 It is vital, then, for the Christian community to 
rediscover an authentically theological anthropology. Thus I take up the concerns of people with 
profound intellectual impairment, and argue that they have intrinsic value, and like all other 
persons, they are of inestimable worth and none is dispensable or interchangeable. In short, that 
they are persons like other persons. Boethius’s Fifth Tractate49 seems to have set the foundation 
on which every philosophical article on the concept of ‘person’ begins. In the fifth century, he 
famously identified the person as naturae rationabilis individualis substantia (‘an individual 
substance of a rational nature’).50 Ever since this definition of person, and Augustine emphasized 
                                               
48 The ‘liberal convention’ encompasses ‘the views to which many in society subscribe in the public debate on 
genetics and the prevention of disability’ (Reinders, The Future of the Disabled, 22). For an account of the most 
important views of the liberal convention, see id. 21-36. Compare Reinders use of the term ‘convention’ with how 
David Hume uses it. See id., A Treatise of Human Nature.  2d ed., trans. and ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978), 484-501.  
49 Boethius, Theological Treatise V: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius. 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/boethius/tracts.iv.v.html.    
50 Boethius, Contra Eutychus et Nestorius 3. as cited in John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (London: T. & 
T. Clark, 2006). 
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the importance of consciousness and self-consciousness in the understanding of personhood,
51
 
Western thought has never ceased to build its pillars upon this foundation. Indeed Western 
culture seems to subscribe to this view in many ways, and that may perhaps be the genesis of the 
tendency to exclude some in Western society as ‘Other’, a tendency which finds its logical 
terminus in J. P. Sartre’s saying that the other is my enemy and my ‘original sin’.52  
In this study, I argue that human embodiment cannot be relegated to secondary status in 
any theological anthropology. This is true not only with regard to how physical and intellectual 
disabilities shape human identity and self-understanding, but also with regard to the fact that we 
cannot use cognitive impairment as the sole standard to determine the personhood and intrinsic 
value of such persons. Thus cognitively impaired persons must, at least, be understood to be 
embodied, even if their spiritual and cognitive capacities are less manifest phenomenologically. 
Again, in this study, I argue that human identity is not exclusively determined by cognitive 
capacity but also by our affective relationality which is connected to our body. To reach such a 
conclusion demands a good understanding about God, cognitively impaired persons and how 
they relate to one another.  
The argument will be developed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a historical background 
to the main arguments. Here, we shall briefly examine the historical understanding of the imago 
Dei from a Christian West perspective as unnecessarily limited at best and a perpetuation, albeit 
perhaps unknowingly, of the exclusion and stigmatization of persons with cognitive impairment 
at worst by equating the imago with ‘rational souls’. Today’s textbooks on ethics tell us that 
human beings have dignity because of their capacity for reason. A mistake would be to think that 
these textbooks say so because they are contemporary. In fact, the same view is found in all 
major Western thinkers, from, for example, Joseph Fletcher back to Thomas Aquinas, St. 
Augustine, Aristotle and Irenaeus to name just a few. We need only substitute ‘rational soul’ for 
‘human being’, and we will find proof for this claim. In this chapter, we will in particular, trace 
the effects of the Christian West’s anthropological theory about the imago Dei as manifest in the 
work of Irenaeus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Fletcher. By reflecting upon and evaluating the 
answers given by these theologians, we anticipate chapter 3 and chapter 4 in which we shall 
deliberately choose an alternative theological approach to this general trend. Furthermore, in 
                                               
51 See Augustine’s Confessions. 
52 J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans., H. E. Barnes  (London: 
Methuen, 1958).   
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underlining a few episodes of the history of the doctrine we will suggest that what we mean by 
human beings created in God’s image is determined by what we think about God’s being.   
I address the theology of Irenaeus, largely considered to have been one of the first 
Western thinkers to reflect upon the subject of the image of God in humans, because he holds 
that the imago Dei is a capacity for rationality and freedom to choose. St Augustine attempts to 
correct the thought of Irenaeus and continues with the distinction between ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’. Contrary to the concept of ‘immaturity’ which Irenaeus posits for Adam, Augustine 
affirms an original state of perfection. Here, Augustine attempts to overcome the dualism 
implicit in Irenaeus’s thought but does not escape the ‘rational soul’ label accorded to humans. 
Aquinas and Scholastic theology in general did not introduce any radical shift in the doctrine as 
put forward by Irenaeus and Augustine. Aquinas draws upon Aristotelian concepts of human 
nature, and adopts Boethius’ definition of person but does not add significant elaborations.53 He 
holds that the imago is a capacity for understanding and loving God, finding the imago primarily 
in humanity’s intellect or reason. Furthermore, he says, only intelligent creatures can, properly 
speaking, be said to image God.
54
 In the twentieth century Joseph Fletcher follows in their 
footsteps, but bases his argument on Lockean principles. Indeed, he sums up an influential 
understanding of the human person that has become the common grammar in contemporary 
bioethics. In this chapter, then, I hope to demonstrate that much of the theological work on the 
image of God shares a bias toward the conception of the self as having the intellectual capacity 
to understand God or to choose obedience to God’s commands. However, it is not very 
productive to criticize a tradition, especially one that is fertile and deeply entrenched, without 
offering an alternative. I will therefore propose an alternative reading of the imago Dei when I 
examine the Barth-Brunner debate in chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 will examine the great efforts directed toward overcoming the limits of the 
imago Dei as traditionally conceived. Here I will examine the relational approach to theological 
anthropology in which being human is not defined in terms of some capacity a person may or 
may not possess, but by an affective relational capacity. I intend to demonstrate that the 
advocates of this proposal hold what it is to be human as not located internal to the self but rather 
is located in a person’s relation to God, others, self and the world. This method of approaching 
                                               
53 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.29.1. (All translations by The Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947-1948)).   
54 Ibid., I.93.2. 
18 
 
theological anthropology has seen an increase in recent years, with many of these approaches 
basing their understanding on a perichoretic understanding of God as Trinity and by 
emphasizing the continuities between divine and human personhood. However, I will argue that 
many contemporary approaches to theological anthropology which derive their understanding of 
human personhood primarily from divine personhood and intra-trinitarian relations tend to 
emphasize relationality at the expense of human embodiment, a doctrine of sin, and the 
discontinuity between divine and human persons. Why are these significant to theological 
anthropology? (1) A strong doctrine of sin is crucial for theological anthropology, for it insures a 
proper systematic relation to other doctrines and enables an understanding of human embodiment 
in the world. (2) By focusing on continuities between divine and human personhood most 
relational anthropologies risk under-emphasizing the human side of the equation, which may 
lead to an idealized understanding of relationality, and the loss of the uniqueness of human 
personhood. (3) Many relational anthropologies neglect socio-historical factors and human 
embodiment by overemphasizing the divine/human relationship. Following Colin Gunton, I will 
argue that ‘we take our distinct personal character from the world of which we are a part: genes, 
dispositions, nourishment, culture…’.55 In other words human persons are embodied beings. 
As major exponents of a relational approach to anthropology, Eastern Greek Orthodox 
theologians John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras serve as excellent starting points to consider 
the issue of relationality as critical to understanding what is to be human. My analysis of their 
work will fall into two main sections. The first section will summarize their thoughts in so far as 
it impinges on their anthropology, and the second part will offer a critical analysis of aspects of 
their anthropology. I address both their anthropologies because they can generally be considered 
paradigmatic examples of a relational anthropology. In particular Zizioulas’s is Christological, 
and it is considered by many to be one of the most significant of recent times. Additionally, I 
address Yannaras’s theology because of his significant contribution and influence within the 
Orthodox world in recent years. Drawing heavily from the thought of Heidegger, Yannaras’s 
central concern is to establish that the relation of God to humans is personal and reciprocal, a 
relation of communion, a ‘real’ relation. I will argue that, while it is proper to argue for a 
relational anthropology, and while it seems that relational anthropologies emphasize the 
                                               
55 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1998), 208-9. 
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relational dimensions of personhood, some significant facets have not received sufficient 
attention.  
Chapter 4 concludes our fundamental theological work started in chapter 3. Here, I 
respond to chapter 2 and chapter 3 by developing a theological anthropology which emphasizes a 
relational and embodied approach to persons, is sensitive to the work of the Holy Spirit in 
theological anthropology, and builds upon the vantage point provided by a Christological 
paradigm. In this chapter then, and in response to the task Karl Barth identified for theology as 
‘the energetic revision of its anthropology…in the light of its eschatology’,56 I seek to refocus 
our theoretical re-visioning of personhood in cognitive impairment, to encourage the treatment of 
the body as active and intentional rather than passive. Thus following Barth, who argued and 
undertook such a revision against dualism of much of the Christian tradition and against the 
reductionisms of both spiritualism (or idealism) and materialism, I echo his call in insisting that 
the person be reduced neither to ‘soul’ nor to ‘material’ but honored as embodied soul or 
ensouled body.  
Systematic explorations of the meaning of ‘embodiment’ can be found not only in 
philosophical and theological anthropologies of the past but in twentieth century writings. For 
example, Friedrich Oetinger proposed that ‘embodiment is the end of all God’s works’.57 
However, from its earliest beginnings, the history of Western anthropology shows a tendency to 
make the soul supreme over the body. The body is seen as something one can detach from, 
something to be disciplined, and made the instrument of the soul. Technological advances do not 
help the situation, for the ability to technologically produce artificial organs makes parts of the 
body interchangeable, replaceable, and to some extent superfluous. If ‘embodiment’ is the end of 
all God’s works, then the human body cannot be viewed as a lower form of life, or as a means to 
an end, and certainly not as something that has to be overcome. For if embodiment is the end of 
God’s works, it must correspondingly be the supreme goal of the human being too, and the end 
of all his works.  To be human, then, for Barth, is to be free to engage in vertical and horizontal 
relationship. As we shall see, Barth by contrast with Zizioulas, pays close attention to the 
doctrine of sin, by strongly affirming the person as not only simul iustus et peccator (at the same 
                                               
56 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. III/2, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. Harold Knight et al. 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), 390. (Hereafter by volume, part and page number). 
57 See E. Zinn, Die Theologie des Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Gütersloh 1932, 118ff. as cited in Jürgen 
Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM Press, 1985),  244.  
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time righteous and a sinner) but as totus iustus et totus peccator (totally justified and totally 
sinner).
58
 This move helps to maintain a balance between future and realized eschatology. And 
unlike Yannaras, Barth offers a unique approach to the place of Spirit and human ontology in 
anthropology. For him the Spirit is essential as the bond which seals the body-soul relation and 
thus resolves their tensions and contradictions. Unfortunately there has been relatively little work 
published that connects theological understandings of embodiment with cognitive impairment. 
This study takes up this task.  
Chapter 5 will consider the place of intellectually disabled people in contemporary 
liberal society. Having suggested a theological reading of what it is to be human in chapter 3 and 
chapter 4, we will now be ready to consider some issues which lie at the interface of human 
dignity and justice. The alternative conception of humans, as embodied beings, suggested in 
chapter 4 should lead the Christian theological community to seriously consider some working 
framework of how to pursue the question of justice. Here the discussion will be in light of one of 
the three unresolved problems of justice whose neglect in existing theories seems especially 
problematic: the problem of doing justice to people with physical and cognitive impairments. As 
Nussbaum says, these people are people, but wider society has not as yet included them on a 
basis of equality with other citizens.
59
 
In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that, as long as the current situation prevails, 
people with cognitive impairments and their families have reasons to worry about their future in 
liberal society. So how can cognitively impaired persons be ‘included’ society? That will be our 
major task in this chapter. Here I will engage with the social contract theory of John Rawls and 
the ‘capabilities approach’ of Martha Nussbaum who attempts to expand Rawls 
Contractarianism. At the end I will suggest that these two well argued theories fall short of 
including cognitively impaired persons, and recognising their dignity respectively. I will then 
introduce Nicholas Wolterstorff, who proposes a theistic grounding of the worth of human 
beings in ‘attachment love’. However, although better placed to include people with intellectual 
disabilities than Rawls’s social contract theory and Nussbaum’s capability approach combined, I 
will argue that Wolterstorff’s proposal of ‘attachment love’, also needs to be expanded to 
adequately include cognitively impaired persons as equal citizens of the polis. I will suggest that 
                                               
58 CD IV/1, 517, 596, 602. 
59 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 1-2. 
21 
 
Wolterstorff’s proposal can be expanded by following Barth’s doctrine of election, but not as 
understood in the Augustinian-Calvinistic sense, against which Barth issued a massive 
correction. 
Chapter 6 will bring the study to an end. The larger section of this chapter will be 
dedicated to consider the issue of caring for cognitively impaired individuals. In this section I 
will investigate what is required for good care in a society that treats all its citizens with justice. 
The form of care I will propose is one that Hilde Lindemann calls ‘holding one in personhood’, 
and one that is practiced among many cultures, but especially among those found in Africa. The 
form of care practiced in some African cultures is undergirded by the philosophy known as 
‘ubuntu’. I will seek to expand Lindemann’s proposal of ‘person-to-person’ holding to include 
what I am calling ‘society-to-person holding’ anchored on the ubuntu philosophy of ‘I am 
because you are’. Following Reinders, I will propose that ‘holding’ each other in friendship is 
the embodied action that the Gospels recurrently stress in Jesus’ healing ministry. To set the 
foundation, I shall focus on Aristotle’s account of friendship, then consider Aquinas’s attempt at 
articulating Christian friendship and then settle on the Johannine account. 
6. A Note on Language and Citations  
 
The reader will detect a wide range of language reflecting the sources from many time periods 
and different disciplinary perspectives I have used. This is our reminder that no one 
nomenclature captures the full extent of the complexity of the phenomenon of cognitive 
impairment, disability, intellectual disability, or dementia. To break monotony, and to refer to the 
general conditions traditionally associated with ‘mental retardation’, I have chosen to use the 
terms ‘cognitive impairment’ and ‘intellectual impairment’ interchangeably. I prefer these more 
general terms, in part because they reflect the recent shift (both professional and political) away 
from the term ‘mental retardation’. However, I will preserve such terms as ‘mental retardation’ 
‘ideots’, ‘lunaticks’ etc where I wish to speak about these categories specifically (for example in 
the context of a particular argument, professional use, or historical period). In the same manner, 
when I use other terminology from the past, it should be understood that I am referring to 
historically defined conditions (e.g., idiocy, feeblemindedness, mental deficiency). When 
speaking about actual individuals, I will use the phrases ‘cognitively impaired 
persons/individuals’, and ‘intellectually impaired individuals/persons’ interchangeably. When 
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appropriate, I will maintain the terminology used in specific contexts, (e.g., idiots, imbeciles, 
morons, the feebleminded, the mentally retarded, the intellectually disabled). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theological Anthropology and Ontology: Rethinking the Imago Dei  
 
 [I]f our anthropologies – whether philosophical or theological, I would add – cannot include Sesha 
they are at best incomplete, at worst faulty. And this is not because Sesha is so different from us, we 
are so much like her. 
-- Eva F. Kittay and Leo Kittay
1  
  
1. Introduction: Some Problems of Theological Anthropology 
 
When I began this study it seemed obvious to me, as a student of theological ethics, that the 
answer to how cognitive impairment encroaches on an individual’s identity in society can easily 
be answered with the doctrine of the imago Dei. I was wrong. Upon further investigation, it 
became apparent that the Christian tradition might in fact have been one of the major sources of 
what we shall see is the substantial view. It was humbling to discover that the Christian tradition 
has perhaps unknowingly perpetuated the marginalization of cognitively impaired persons. I am 
conscious, then, that this study goes against the grain of what is popularly held, which is an 
unattractive prospect both in philosophical ethics and in theology.  
Two major issues are connected to theological anthropology: the ontological question of 
what it is to be human, which has traditionally been answered in terms of duality (matter and 
spirit, body and soul etc.), and the question of what constitutes the imago Dei. In other words, 
what makes human beings distinct from God and other non-human creation? Throughout the 
history of the church, when Christians have examined theological anthropology, they have turned 
to a particular concept from the first chapters of Genesis traditionally rendered the imago Dei. 
This theological understanding of what it is to be a human being created in the image of God 
may appear natural but it becomes increasingly disappointing when we consider what the Church 
in the Western tradition has done with it.  
Although the Western tradition and the Christian community have traditionally agreed 
that human persons occupy a special place in creation, both have marginalized and caricatured 
                                               
1Eva F. Kittay, ‘On the Expressivity and Ethics of Selective Abortion for Disability: Conversations with my Son’, in 
The Ethics of Prenatal Testing and Selective Abortion: A Report from the Hastings Center, ed. Adrienne Asch and 
Eric Parens (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000). 
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cognitive impaired persons.
2
 Why so? The church like the rest of society has perhaps historically 
understood little of these impairments and so has been inclined to either elevate these persons to 
saintly status, or denigrate them as sinners suffering the consequences of sin. Consequently, 
individuals with any cognitive impairment had additional stigmas attached to them because their 
impairments were and are still least understood. The idea, then, that cognitive impairment 
denotes an unusual relationship with God, positive or negative, is problematic and does not 
represent who intellectually impaired persons are. These individuals are fellow human beings 
and must have their basic humanity recognized and reinforced.  
The interpretation of the imago Dei motif within the history of Christian thought in the 
West has resulted in some immensely rich insights. However, perhaps the most important and 
influential discussion of the issue can be found in the tradition which employs an understanding 
of the human as based on a capacity, in this case the capacity for reason anchored in the concept 
of the imago Dei. Thus the bulk of theorizing on the imago Dei has traditionally conceived the 
self as having a certain kind of intellectual ability. Also known as the substantive view, about 
which I will say more shortly, it means that the image of God can be described by any one or 
more of its essential parts, but particularly human rationality.  
                                               
2 For some of the work which seeks to remedy Christian theology’s historical failure to address the concerns of 
people with cognitive impairments, see Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Christian Care of the Retarded’, Theology Today 30 
(1973), 130-37; Id., ‘The Church and the Mentally Handicapped: A Continuing Challenge to the Imagination’, in 
Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); 
Id., Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Id., ‘Timeful Friends: Living with the Handicapped’, in Sanctify 
Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1998); Id., et al., Truthfulness and Traged : 
Further Investigations in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).  See also John 
Swinton, ed., Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas' Theology of Disability: Disabling Society, Enabling 
Theology (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound 
Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008); Id., The Future of the 
Disabled in Liberal Society: An Ethical Analysis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000); Id., ‘The 
Virtue of Writing Appropriately. Or: is Stanley Hauerwas Right in Thinking He Should Not Write Anymore on the 
Mentally Handicapped?’ in Stanley Hauerwas et al., God, Truth, and Witness: Engaging Stanley Hauerwas (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2005), 53-70; Id., ‘Human Dignity in the Absence of Agency’, in R. Kendall Soulen and 
Linda Woodhead, God and Human Dignity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 121-39; Id., ed., The Paradox of 
Disability: Responses to Jean Vanier and L’Arche Communities from Theology and the Sciences (Grand Rapid, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2010); Brian Brock, ‘Praise: The Prophetic Public Presence of the Mentally Disabled’, in eds., Stanley 
Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics 2nd edition (London: Blackwell, 2011), 
139-151; Bernd Wannenwetsch, ‘Angels with Clipped Wings: The Disabled as Key to the Recognition of 
Personhood’, in Theology, Disability and the New Genetics: Why Science Needs the Church, eds., John Swinton and 
Brian Brock (London: T. & T. Clark, 2007), 182-200; Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of 
Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008); Amos Yong, Theology and Down Syndrom : 
Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007); For a good discussion on 
Biblical and historical trajectories of disability in general, see Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 19-42.  
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Historically, the roots of this view, as we shall see, can be found in the anthropology of 
Irenaeus. When Irenaeus famously made a distinction between image and likeness, he triggered a 
process of making reason both a chief ontological characteristic and a criterion of difference 
between human and non-human.
3
 The element in human beings which imaged the divine was 
said to be their rational nature; and other nonhuman creatures, no matter how much intelligence 
they might appear to portray, lack this nature. The idea is prominent in Augustine, especially in 
his de Trinitate,
4
 and is further developed in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and has been 
popular with Luther and Calvin.   
It does not matter whether the image is spoken of in terms of rationality or some other 
intrinsic capacity, relationality, or a moral functionality that images God. What is disturbing, but 
not surprising, is that when it comes to discussing the imago, intellectually impaired individuals 
are often marginalized. Indeed, the first question that confronts all such persons is one of 
acceptability and the genuineness of their humanity. For example some people in our culture 
refer to a person with a profound intellectual impairment (e.g. a micro-encephalic) as a 
‘vegetable’. This is because society holds that to count as truly ‘human’, one must be able to ‘do 
something’ and be sentient. The existence of persons with intellectual impairments, then, calls 
for a rethinking of the doctrine of the imago Dei. My particular aim in this chapter is to expose 
the underlying cracks in the foundation of classical theological anthropology, based as it is on a 
substantial view of human beings. This task sets itself in opposition to most models for the 
imago Dei, from classical to contemporary. Now that we will reject the view that the image is to 
be found in reason, or any merely internal capacity the individual may possess, there seem two 
contenders for the title, and both draw their support upon readings of the first two chapters of 
Genesis. The first locates the image in the human stewardship of the creation.
5
 However, I will 
suggest the answer to our dilemma lies in locating the imago Dei in relationality, a condition 
shared among all human beings. If God is a communion of persons, as we will argue, inseparably 
related, then it is in our relatedness to others that our being human consists.   
I will specifically examine the traditional construals of the imago in both classical and 
contemporary Christian theologians from the second century A.D. to the present time. By 
                                               
3 See Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, A Christian Anthropology, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth, 1939), 504.  
4 Augustine, de Trinitate XVI.iv.6; See also John Sullivan, The Image of God: The Doctrine of St Augustine and  
Its Influence (Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1963).  
5 See for example Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 
1974), ch. 28.  
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reflecting upon the contribution of this select group of theologians (Irenaeus, St Augustine, St 
Thomas Aquinas, and Joseph Fletcher), we anticipate chapter three and four where I will present 
a theological anthropology that pushes back against a dualism present in the thought of Christian 
theologians through history. Thus we hope to acquire a better understanding of what it is to be 
what has traditionally been rendered a ‘substance of a rational nature’ but yet be hindered 
cognitively. Furthermore, we will suggest that what we mean by human being created in God’s 
image is determined by what we think about God’s being. All attempts to ground uniqueness in 
some quality to be found only in humans will sooner or later fail because scientists have 
persistently demonstrated that all the proposed qualities are in some form or to some degree 
found in the animal world as well.
6
  
The Christian theologians mentioned are selected for their development of imago Dei 
themes and because they are representative of broader traditions. Irenaeus, widely considered to 
have been one of the first Christian theologians to reflect upon the subject of the imago in 
humans, argues that the image is equivalent to rationality and freedom to choose. Augustine 
seeks to correct Irenaeus’ thought, but continues with the distinction between ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’. He wants to overcome the dualism implicit in Irenaeus’ thought, but does not escape 
the ‘rational soul’ label accorded to humans. Thomas Aquinas did not introduce any radical shift 
in the doctrine as propounded by Irenaeus and Augustine. However, as we shall see, drawing 
upon Aristotelian concepts of human nature, he did add significant elaborations. Finally Joseph 
Fletcher, follows in their footsteps, but bases his argument on Lockean principles, thus summing 
up the prevalent understanding of the person widespread in contemporary bioethics.
7
  
I will claim that academic theology has yet to fully acknowledge the ramifications of its 
bias toward this rational conception of the self. I state this claim because the capacity to set ends 
and the capacity to reason instrumentally are possessed by different human persons to different 
degrees. In fact, some human beings (e.g., irreversibly comatose individuals and severely 
defective human neonates) do not have the capacity at all to act on this basis of reason. In the 
end, I propose that maintaining that the intrinsic value of human persons is human rationality 
                                               
6
 See Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals:Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: 
Duckworth, 1999).  
7 Many prominent bioethicists distinguish sharply between being a human being and a human person. See for 
example James Rachels, who distinguishes between ‘biological’ and ‘biographical life’. Rachels argues that only the 
second of these is of any value to a person. For Rachels, biological life has instrumental value, since minus it there is 
no possibility of realizing biographical life. However, Rachels thinks that biological life without the benefit of self-
consciousness and self-control can be of no value and a life which is at that stage should not be preserved. 
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betrays what I will call ‘intellectualism’,8 and risks inspiring prejudicial attitudes towards 
individuals who are cognitively impaired.  
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will sketch a modern 
critique of the theology of the imago Dei and a brief summary of various interpretations given to 
the phrase imago Dei, from which we will discover the history of Christian thought has 
concentrated on only one. Here I want to pinpoint that the prominence the defining moral tenet 
(based on the equal worth of all members of the species Homo sapiens created in the imago Dei) 
of Western culture had in anthropology such that the theme could withstand all sorts of isolated 
critiques. However, in the modern period, with sustained and systematic critique, commentators 
have differed widely. The second section will sketch the limits of the imago Dei doctrine as 
traditionally conceived in the thought of select church theologians in Latin West. Their popular 
stand propounded an unacceptable individualist and dualistic approach to the human being that 
posits a great chasm between body and soul. Thus it gives little, if any, meaning to relationality 
and embodiment which constitute human persons in their own particular being. The third 
section attempts to push against animalizing cognitive impairment, and then begins to point 
toward my own preferred approach. 
2. The Imago Dei: An Historical Overview   
 
The proper narration of the history of views on the imago is itself widely controverted. However 
two things have been generally accepted. Firstly, creation of human beings in the imago Dei 
means that they are in some way like God, and thus possess greater intrinsic value than 
nonhuman animals. Secondly, human beings are not God, but are a creation of God, and thus are 
under his authority. In other words, an image is not the same as the one imaged. In their attempt 
to be more specific about what it exactly means to be an image of God, theologians differ 
widely. Thus the various interpretations regarding the common ways which may classify the 
manner in which humans exist in imago Dei fall into different categories. Let us briefly 
summarize some of these views, before we concentrate on one of them.  
The substantial view focuses on something within individuals, some capacity or faculty 
that human beings possess and which distinguishes them from other animals. As we will see 
Irenaeus was the first to put forward a distinctive difference between image and likeness. 
                                               
8 More on this shortly. 
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However, it is possible to reach back to the ancient Stoics for a similar idea. The ancient Stoics 
held that humans (but not animals) carried a divine spark within, which they equated with 
reason. Paul Ramsey thinks that the Stoic idea of a divine spark present in every individual gave 
rise to today’s conceptions of the innate natural sacredness of human personality more than did 
Christianity.
9
 Staying with ancient Greek philosophers, we see that Aristotle’s animale rationale, 
stands out as the example of how to define human beings in a manner that isolates some innate 
capacity, some substantial part of human nature, as the essence of what it means to be in the 
image of God.
10
 It seems that Christians who have followed Aristotle simply substitute 
Aristotle’s thought with their religious label - the imago Dei. That imago in a human being is, 
then, seen as that person’s inner capacity of mind, soul or will, making her a rational animal.11 A 
somewhat minority view is personalistic idealism, modeled after Kant’s dictum that ‘nothing can 
possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without 
qualification, except a good will’.12 Thus instead of reason other aspects of human nature, such 
as imagination and artistic creativity may be defined as the imago.
13
 These views, save for 
relational, have in common the definition of the image of God as some capacity native to human 
beings or some part of the substantial form of their nature.   
The relational view singles out relationality (with God and other human beings) as the 
mark of being in the image of God. Thus one must be in relationship with God to bear his image. 
Theologians, such as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner who hold this position do not deny the ability 
of humans to reason as a substantive trait.
14
 However they maintain that it is being in relation 
with God that the true imago is made evident. We shall return to Barth and Brunner later in this 
study. For now let us quickly note three aspects of Barth’s anthropology: first, for Barth, ‘real 
humanity’ stands in relationship to God, self, and others.15 Second, human relationality is most 
prominently featured in the biblical text in God’s covenantal creation of ha adam ‘in our image’ 
                                               
9 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1950), 250.. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sect. I, trans. Thomas K. Abbott (Seaside, 
OR: Merchant Books, 2009).  
13
 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 251. 
14 See CD III/1§41, 98, 110, 157, 164, 168, 178, and especially 183 ff, 218, 289, 311, 322; Brunner, Man in Revolt, 
91-112; 503-05.  Barth rejected both substantive and functional views, and proposed a novel interpretation of the 
image of God as the capacity to enter into relationship with God, others, and self according to Genesis 1:20, 27 (CD 
III/1, 183-206). 
15 See generally Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology: In Light of Modern Thought, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2002). 
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as male and female (Gen. 1.26-27).
16
 And finally, Jesus Christ is the image of the invisible God, 
and, as the consummate ‘man for others’,17 is also the prototypical image of what it means for 
human beings to be created in the image of God.
18
  
The functional view holds that being in the image of God declares the primary function 
of being human. Thus human beings who are created in the imago Dei are not distinguished by 
what they are but by what they can do. Dominion is the key word in this view. Thus, as God is 
Lord over the universe, human beings as the image of God lord it over the earth. This idea 
comprised part of Calvin’s interpretation and it has recently gained renewed interest. The 
physical view dominated Old Testament studies in the middle decades of this century.
19
 
Proponents of this view argue that humans reflect the image of God by their physical bodies that 
are of upright posture. 
The phrase ‘image of God’ appears very infrequently in the Scriptures. However, this has 
not stopped theologians throughout history from focusing on it as the centerpiece of reflection 
concerning the Christian understanding of the human person. Although throughout the Christian 
tradition the doctrine concerning the human imaging of God has experienced repeated revision, 
many studies indicate the imago Dei has frequently been linked to a disembodied rationality.
20
 
And while many early Christian theologians differ in nuance and terminology Cairns summarizes 
it well when he says, ‘in all Christian writers up to Aquinas we find the image of God conceived 
of as man’s power of reason.’21 We now turn and examine the imago in tradition through the 
positions of select representative theologians.  
 
 
 
                                               
16 See Wolf Krötke, ‘The Humanity of the Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology’, trans. Philip G. Ziegler, in 
ed., John Webster, The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 168-
69; CD III/1, 288-90. 
17
 CD III/2, 203-22. 
18 Ibid., 222-84. 
19 Most notably as proposed by H. Gunkel, P. Humbert and G. von Rad. See D. J. A. Clines, ‘The Image of God in 
Man’, Tyndale Bulletin  19 (1968), 56. 
20 Leron Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2003). 
21 David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (London: SCM Press, 1953), 110. 
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3. The Imago Dei: Against Tradition 
3.1 St Irenaeus on the Imago Dei: The Double Portrait of Man 
 
Colin Gunton argued that today’s theological anthropology is weighed down by a weakness of 
what he calls errors of both ‘method and content’.22 Historically, he says, the genesis of the 
syndrome can be traced back to Irenaeus, whose anthropology took a completely different turn 
when he made his famous distinction between image and likeness. Thus taking into consideration 
the current scientific understanding of what it is to be human and how humans historically 
evolved, were Irenaeus our contemporary, he would not think the doctrine of the imago Dei is 
irrelevant to our practical secular lives. Instead, Irenaeus gloried in its realism and was convinced 
of its centrality to God’s act of creation and so of his actions in salvific history. Historically 
Irenaeus is widely considered to have laid the foundation and framework which the church 
would later recognise as the ‘standard’ for dealing with the imago Dei doctrine.23  
Irenaeus was faced with a problem that threatened to reverse the gains achieved by a 
fledgling church. The problem went thus: the body, which is part and parcel of human beings is 
evil in and of itself. Consequently, the imago Dei cannot be reflected by that which is human, but 
by that which is spiritual - in short the divine ‘spark’ or ‘seed’. This false teaching was prevalent 
among the Gnostics who were his contemporaries. It was against their false teaching that 
Irenaeus directed his chief work, Against Heresies. This work is a thorough defense and 
examination of the truth that human beings were created in the image and likeness of God. 
Although Gnosticism comes in various forms, a common thread that runs through all its various 
formulations is that a conflict exists between the ‘evil world of matter’ and the ‘divine world of 
spirit’. The arena of this conflict is the human being, for human beings (at least the spiritual elite) 
are a mixture of a spark of divine being and a material body.  
Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulatio was a crucial tool to counter the teaching that Gnosis 
(salvific knowledge) was knowing how to extract one’s true self, the divine spark, from the 
imprisonment of the body which is evil material in nature, in order ascend to God and thus to 
obtain the spiritual and divine freedom.
24
 Irenaeus rejected this anti-materialism of the Gnostic 
teachings by claiming that the ‘fleshly nature’ was the location of the divine image. For him, this 
                                               
22 Colin Gunton and Christoph Schwöbel eds., Persons, Divine and Human: Kings College Essays in Theological 
Anthropology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 48. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Thomas G. Weinandy, ‘St Irenaeus and the Imago Dei: The Importance of Being Human’,  Logos 6 (2003), 15-34. 
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meant the whole person, body and soul, present in each individual is expressed in free will and in 
the power of reason. Sinfulness, then, contrary to the Gnostic teachings, was the consequence of 
human freedom.
25
 For Irenaeus, such anthropology was divergent from the Christian faith and 
thus contrary to the dignity that human beings possess. By contrast he held that God created 
human beings in his image and after his likeness but, at the Fall, human beings lost their likeness 
to God whereas the image of God was retained. The salvific process was crucial, then, to restore 
the lost likeness of God. Thus Irenaeus: ‘But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such 
is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing 
indeed the image [of God] in his formation (in plasmate - body), but not receiving the similitude 
through the Spirit’.26 For Irenaeus, fallen human beings still possess the imago Dei but need to be 
restored back to the likeness (or similitude) of God by the work of the Spirit. Christ, then, came 
to show human beings the true imago, and to also restore the lost likeness of God in those who 
are his.  
Irenaeus maintained a twofold interpretation for the image based on a distinction between 
the words tselem (image) and demuth (likeness). Indeed, he was the first
27
 to introduce the 
distinction between the image and likeness, according to which ‘image’ indicates an ontological 
participation (methexis) and ‘likeness’ (mimêsis) a moral transformation.28 Thus his doctrine of 
the imago-similitudo (‘image’ and ‘likeness’) triggered the process of making reason both a chief 
ontological characteristic and a criterion of difference between human and non-human.  
Irenaeus’ anthropology maintained this rationalistic idea of the imago and combined it with a 
second idea derived from what some think was a dubious exegesis of Gen. 1.26.
29
 Although 
Irenaeus might be called the ‘fundamentalist’ among the early Fathers, yet he does not escape the 
grasp of the rationalism of the classical Greek philosophers (the Stoics, Plato, Aristotle) who 
taught that an individual’s reason was his/her highest and most distinctive characteristic and 
which is something wholly ‘intelligible in itself – not something which is actually related to 
                                               
25 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV.37, 38, 41. Irenaeus criticizes the Gnostic teachings of the creation of three kinds 
of humans, of whom those created in the spirit, the Gnostics themselves, are beyond good and evil (see V-VI). 
26 Ibid., V.6.1. 
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 For other Early Church fathers see Ambrose (Hexaemeron, VI, 7) who maintained ‘at once that since the divine 
likeness is not to be found directly in the body of man it is to be identified with the soul’ as cited in Barth, Church 
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28 Against Heresies, V, 6, 1; 8, 1; 16, 2.   
29 For example see Brunner, Man in Revolt, 505. Brunner says that Irenaeus’ reading of the Genesis passage is a 
‘complete distortion of the meaning of the passage’.  
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God’.30 Here we see Irenaeus fall back to an Aristotelian starting point which distinguishes 
between human beings and the creatures which do not possess reason. Human beings, then, are 
seen as gifted with reason and thus are like God, are free in their will and masters unto 
themselves.
31
    
Irenaeus maintained the concept of the Divine Reason, in which human beings as the 
animal rationale, have a share, through the imago Dei, and this was not lost at the Fall. This is 
evident when we glance at Irenaeus’ answer to his critics in Against Heresies. Here Irenaeus is 
answering those who questioned the goodness of God if Jerusalem, God’s own city is destroyed. 
On his part Irenaeus argues that both Jerusalem and wicked men are destroyed without God 
becoming unjust by His act of punishment:  
 
… The wheat and the chaff, being inanimate and irrational, have been made such by  nature. But 
man, being endowed with reason, and in this respect like to God, having been made free in his 
will, and with power over himself, is himself the cause to himself, that sometimes he becomes 
wheat, and sometimes chaff. Wherefore also he shall be justly condemned because, having been 
created a rational being, he lost the true rationality, and, living irrationally, opposed the 
righteousness of God…32 
 
Irenaeus’ answer here demonstrates that for him a human being’s freedom and rationality are at 
least a dominant part of the image of God which cannot be lost by sin. Thus for Irenaeus the 
imago is the human nature which cannot be lost, while the similitudo is the human being’s 
original relation to God which may be lost and later restored through the Spirit.  
Irenaeus also lays emphasis on the body in speaking of the imago Dei in humans. He 
records his thoughts on this issue in several places, however the most prominent is the long 
passage in Against Heresies, V, 6, 1, already partly quoted above, where he argues that God’s 
salvific work is for the whole person, body, soul and spirit. Irenaeus makes the point with regard 
to humans and presents the locus classicus for the distinction. He says: 
 
For if anyone take away the substance of flesh, that is, of the handiwork [of God], and understand 
that which is purely spiritual, such then would not be a spiritual man, but would be the spirit of a 
man, or the Spirit of God. But when the spirit here blended with the soul is united to [God's] 
handiwork, the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit, and 
this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God.  But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, 
he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, 
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possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation (in plasmate - in his fleshly nature), but not 
receiving the similitude through the Spirit.33 
 
For Irenaeus, the imperfect being, wholly in body and soul, retains before God the divine image. 
Here we see Irenaeus take an interest in the element of body in speaking of the imago Dei in 
humans. Irenaeus is even more overt when he says:  
 
And then, again, this Word was manifested when the Word of God was made man, assimilating 
Himself to man, and man to Himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the Son, man might 
become precious to the Father. For in times long past, it was said that man was created after the 
image of God, but it was not [actually] shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose 
image man was created. Wherefore also he did easily lose the similitude. When, however, the 
Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both these: for He both showed forth the image truly, 
since He became Himself what was His image; and He established the similitude after a sure 
manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the visible Word.34 
 
It is clear that Irenaeus’ line of thought is here directed to his anti-Gnostic polemic. Although we 
cannot exclude other aspects of human beings, the emphasis here is on the tangible body that 
Christ took upon himself. Irenaeus is putting a strong physical emphasis on the image. The 
question of the body is a theme which will be picked up throughout this thesis, and especially in 
chapter four where we will argue that if the marginalization of persons with profound intellectual 
disability is to be rejected, personhood must be defined as a capacity for both relationality and 
human embodiment.  
While Irenaeus’ double portrait of humankind was an important theological achievement 
which became a standard for Christian anthropology in the subsequent years, Irenaeus was 
wrong to distinguish between an aspect of the image of God that human beings retained after the 
Fall and an aspect that was lost and is gained through Christ. In other words, Irenaeus erred in 
associating these two concepts of image and likeness. In essence, Irenaeus’ anthropology seems 
like ‘Gnosticism purified by Scripture, with a strong element of general Greek philosophy’.35 
The decisive element in Irenaeus’ doctrine is the conception of the image of God as a human 
being’s natural endowment of reason. For Irenaeus, ‘God Himself is Reason proper’ thus the 
rational nature of man is ‘a participatio Dei’.36 Again, this is an idea that is influenced by the 
Stoic idea of rationality. As this study seeks to demonstrate, and contrary to many theologians 
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after Irenaeus who echoed him, rationality is not the core of the imago Dei. To say so is to 
elevate one aspect of human beings above all others, a move which is detrimental when applied 
to people with cognitive impairment.  
3.1.1 Criticism 
 
Such in brief is a sketch of Irenaeus’ thought on the imago. Let us now consider some blindspots 
inherent in Irenaeus’ position.37 The prominence Irenaeus gives to the body demands that we 
think of human beings as created in the image of Christ incarnate. While I say more about this 
issue in chapter 4, notice now that Karl Barth picks up this line of thought and maintains that 
Jesus Christ ‘is the whole man’,38 and as with Jesus, so also (mutatis mutandis) with us. Thus we 
conclude here that Irenaeus was in error to locate the imago Dei as clearly in a human being’s 
physical formation. In chapter four I will return to pick up Irenaeus’ emphasis on the body, and 
admit with Calvin and Aquinas that there are traces of the image, in all of a person’s being, 
including the physical side of it. However, for now, let us centre the image differently from 
Irenaeus. To support the different stand taken here, I suggest that Irenaeus’ exegesis of Gen 1.26 
is in error for he introduces a ‘double sense’ to a passage where there is none. Studies done 
elsewhere indicate that these two words are used as synonyms.
39
 Indeed parallelism, a 
fundamental law in Hebrew poetry, commonly occurs in the Psalms and Proverbs although it can 
be found in any poetic passage. We must credit Irenaeus with pointing out ‘the cleavage’ that 
exists in the concept imago Dei,
40
 but object to his trichotomous view of believers, that is, body, 
soul, and spirit, whereas unbelievers have only souls and bodies.
41
   
The Holy Spirit is seen as the one who creates a human being’s spirit as an organ 
whereby the believer receives ‘divine influence’ and knows ‘divine truth’.42 The spirit, then, is 
the bearer of the likeness of God, gifted to Adam, lost through the Fall, recovered in the process 
of redemption. But is Irenaeus suggesting that what human beings lost at the Fall was only 
something tacked to them, something extra, a ‘something’ which even if absent would not make 
a difference in their personhood? This is the so-called donum superadditum, a teaching 
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 Here I follow closely Cairns’ analysis in Image of God, 80-81.  
38 CD, III/2, 330.  
39 See for example D. J. A. Clines, ‘The Image of God in Man’, Tyndale Bulletin 19 (1968), 53-103. For a different 
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40 Cairns, Image of God, 81. On this issue, see Brunner’s criticism of Irenaeus in Man in Revolt, 504-06.  
41 Against Heresies, II.33.5 [Cairns mistakenly has II.35.5]. 
42 Cairns, op. cit., 79.  
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elaborated by scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages, and which teaches that humans lost 
only a gift of God that had been tacked onto them.
43
 As we shall see in chapter 3, this teaching 
minimizes the effect of the Fall on human nature. The Fall was not only a result of the loss of 
something additional to a human’s existence, it involved the total corruption of being, an 
understanding that is important to formulating a good theological anthropology. In sum: Irenaeus 
is right to notice the cleavage in the general concept but erred on two fronts. First, in splitting the 
terms imago and similitudo in his interpretation of Genesis 1.26, and second in thinking that the 
retained aspect of the imago Dei is primarily rationality. I call this move ‘intellectualism’ which 
reduces human intrinsic value to reason and is detrimental to intellectually impaired individuals.  
3.2 St Augustine of Hippo 
 
Throughout the history of interpretation, commentators have found it all too easy to 
contextualize the term imago Dei in order to fit into the service of their contemporary 
philosophical and religious thought. Karl Barth demonstrated in his survey of the history of the 
doctrine how each interpreter gave content to the concept solely from the anthropology and 
theology of his own age.
44
 For example, for Ambrose, the soul was the image and for 
Athanasius, rationality, in the light of the Logos doctrine. St Augustine (and his followers), under 
the influence of trinitarian dogma, did not take up the distinction forwarded by Irenaeus, but 
presented a more personalistic, psychological and existential account of the imago Dei. Like 
Irenaeus, Augustine was also responding to the presence of a threat facing the Early Church, in 
his case the Manicheans and the belief in the entrapment of the soul. This becomes quite clear 
when one considers his philosophical anthropology. As an alternative to the dualism of the 
Manicheans, Augustine found it necessary to embrace Neoplatonism.   
For Augustine, the individual human being is a body-soul composite. However, there is 
an asymmetry between soul and body, in which the soul being superior to the body rules over 
it.
45
  Augustine thinks that to understand and appreciate the unique place of human begins within 
the contours of morality, a good grasp of the soul is important. Here we find that Augustine’s 
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view is not very different from what Plato maintains in his Timaeus
46
 or what Aristotle argues in 
his De Anima.
47
 Both philosophers discuss different levels of soul in terms of ascending degrees 
of complexity in the functional capacities with rational thinking being at the highest level.  
Augustine still maintains that there is an asymmetry in these functional capacities, and reason is 
of course seen as higher than the others. Space does not allow us to thoroughly examine 
Augustine’s doctrine of the imago Dei, and also his corpus is vast, so of necessity our 
examination will involve some oversimplification and glossing.     
From the outset Augustine’s inclination was to develop an anthropology based on 
Neoplatonic categories.
48
 For Augustine the human likeness to God must be in the mind or soul 
so that other possibilities are excluded from the outset.
49
  In this regard Augustine was merely 
reflecting the tenor of his times in viewing the body in a negative light. Thus he seems to hold 
that our embodiedness cannot be the place where the image, and hence our true humanity, is 
found. Augustine’s thought on the soul-body relation is fairly clear and it runs counter to the 
Manichean stand of the soul’s entrapment. However, matters are somewhat less clear when we 
turn to the question of how the soul comes to be embodied, a subject which is outside the scope 
of our section here. Suffice it to say, here, that Augustine’s thought about how we are to 
understand our embodied status remains vague. Augustine seems to follow Irenaeus in 
distinguishing between imago and likeness, but with a correction to the concept of ‘immaturity’ 
which Irenaeus posited for Adam. Augustine attempted to overcome the dualism implicit in the 
thought of Irenaeus by drawing from the doctrine of the Trinity. Based on the perichoresis of the 
Trinity, one can conclude that at the heart of personhood is love for the Other or a capacity for 
relatedness and a capacity for love. This means that these two capacities are not actually two 
different things. Augustine describes this capacity as residing in the unity of the diversity of 
memory, intellect, and will, (memoria, intellegentia, and volutas) for no one can love what he or 
she does not know. This capacity for love is not merely affectivity, but is preeminently a rational 
and volitional ability.
50
 As such Augustine means a human being is a person since he/she can 
stand in loving relation with another who can reciprocate that love. But what of those individuals 
who cannot reciprocate?   
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For Augustine, since God is a trinity, and human beings are in the imago Dei, then human 
beings must have a trinitarian aspect to their being. From Books IX through XIV of De Trinitate, 
Augustine describes the constitution of human beings. In these books, Augustine searches for the 
imago Dei, through which he intends to further reflect upon the Trinity in God.
51
 For Augustine 
this is a climb from the lower to the higher, it is an exercise in faith seeking understanding.
52
 It is 
within these passages that we gain insight into what Augustine thinks is the content of the imago 
Dei. For example, Augustine is convinced that the image of God is to be ‘sought in the 
immortality of the rational soul’. Indeed in chapter IV of book XIV, Augustine thinks and 
intends to show that the ‘Trinity is demonstrated in the mind.53 He says:  
 
Therefore neither is that trinity an image of God, which is not now, nor is that other an image of 
God, which then will not be; but we must find in the soul of man, i.e., the rational or intellectual 
soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality…. so, although 
reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at another appears small, and at another great, yet the 
human soul is never anything save rational or intellectual; and hence, if it is made after the image 
of God in respect to this, that it is able to use reason and intellect in order to understand and 
behold God, then from the moment when that nature so marvelous and so great began to be, 
whether this image be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether it be obscure and 
defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is.54 
 
For Augustine, the image of God in human beings has a Trinitarian structure, reflecting 
either the tripartite structure of the human soul (spirit, self-consciousness, and love) or the 
threefold aspects of the psyche, that is, a human being’s power of memory, understanding and 
loving God, (memoria, intellectus, amor)
55
 which are all manifestations of a human being’s 
rationality. In short, Augustine uses the threefold ‘cogito-type’ accounts of the mind’s self-
certainty to argue they reflect the Trinity.
56
 In the second half of the De trinitate Augustine starts 
to articulate an account of the mind’s self-knowing in the Word as a site for ‘analogical 
exploration of the Trinity’ as that which constitutes us as in the imago Dei.57 In short, for 
Augustine the rationality of the immortal soul is the locus of the image. In the same book, 
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Augustine thinks that the image of God in human beings orients them to God in invocation, 
knowledge and love.
58
  
In Confessions 13 Augustine reflects on the soul that is engaged in cognitive action as 
imaging something of the Trinitarian life. Lewis Ayres says that Augustine’s ‘strong, early and 
commonplace belief that intellectual life represents the ‘highest” part of the created order 
combines with a strong belief in that order’s intelligibility’. However, no one reason accounts for 
Augustine’s interest in images found with the ‘human mens’.59 Ayres thinks that Augustine does 
not turn to ‘mental analogies’ earlier because of his ambiguity about whether the imago has been 
lost in fallen humanity. It is only much later that Augustine states with finality that the imago 
which rests in human rationality remains even after the fall. Augustine is implying that there is 
an indisputable rationality consisting of a power to ‘understand and behold’ God, whether that 
power be used in a right and rational manner or not. We can distinguish Augustine’s doctrine of 
the imago from that of Irenaeus by the conception of the primal state as a state of complete 
perfection.   
The precise concept of the ‘person’ that is to be found in De Trinitate is beyond the scope 
of this section, but it has elsewhere been variously assessed.
60
 However, it seems safe to 
conclude that Augustine does not advance a fully developed concept of personhood, particularly 
in relational terms. Two reasons account for this conclusion: firstly, Augustine does not discard 
the doctrine of the soul as a substance; and secondly, he does not discuss the interrelationship he 
finds in the persons of the Trinity in terms of human persons.
61
 From his philosophical 
anthropology, Augustine concluded that if only humans bear the imago Dei, that image must be 
the distinguishing marker between human beings and animals. He therefore looked to the rational 
soul, and to the soul’s highest part as the one nearest to God, namely, mens (mind). Thus 
Boethius’ later definition of ‘person’ as a ‘rational substance’ is not altogether foreign in 
Augustine’s usage for he continues to maintain a substantial view of the self. However, for 
Augustine, the image that differentiates human beings from animals, the rationality of his 
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substance, is not ‘ordered to knowledge but to love through knowledge’.62 Further, the imago is 
‘not a lifeless imprint’, instead it is a ‘living person’, that is, the ‘unity of self-remembrance, self-
knowledge, and self-love’ turned toward God and human beings in a mutual relation of love.63  
In his De Trinitate X and Confessions, Augustine presents an examination of the mind 
and memory. Again the topic is too complex to do it justice in such limited space. The faculty of 
memory in Augustine's broad usage means more than just the ability to remember or the act of 
remembering. For Augustine, memory encompasses all cognitive capacities and is the repository 
of all of a person’s experiences and knowledge.64 So memory includes sensations and 
perceptions, imaginations and dreams, hopes and fears, emotions and awareness of self.
65
 It 
seems, then, according to Augustine, that memory is the locus of personal identity. He says: 
‘Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; 
and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself’.66 It is through the memory that the past and 
future both become present. Furthermore, due to the fact that the present is so temporary, 
memory is central to any sense of continuity experienced. In other words, for Augustine, the past 
and the future are present through memory. Augustine thinks memory and mind are synonymous 
and that memory is the depository of knowledge.
67
 But if memory is mind and the repository of 
personal identity, what of infants and individual persons who are hindered intellectually? 
Augustine’s attempts to limit image to reason, like those of Irenaeus, remain problematic. 
3.2.1 Criticism   
 
I agree with Gunton that an implication of Augustine’s vagueness on our embodiment and hence 
our true humanity amounts to a ‘foreclosing of the ontological question’ which has 
consequences: first is a tendency to overstress the inner dimensions of the person. Second, and 
equally important, Augustine’s search for the Trinity within the soul, ‘the inner Trinity’, risks 
rendering the Holy Trinity a theological irrelevance. This is because Augustine’s quest makes it 
difficult to ask in what other ways the doctrine of the Trinity may shed light on the human 
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condition.
68
 Augustine does manage to overcome the dualism of Irenaeus through his mystical 
concept of the imago as the single expression of the person in love and knowledge of God, but 
goes astray in locating the locus of the imago Dei in reason. To deny that the imago is found in 
the whole person and to locate it in reason is to show an intellectual bias, especially against 
people who do not have the capacity to reason instrumentally. Again, human embodiment must 
not be relegated to secondary status in any theological anthropology and human identity is not 
and should not exclusively be determined by cognitive capacity but also as we shall see in the 
next two chapters, by affective and relational capacities and possibilities, which are intimately 
connected to our being embodied.   
3.3 St Thomas Aquinas  
 
By the time Thomas enters the story, the tendency, triggered by Irenaeus and continued by 
Augustine, to make reason both a chief ontological characteristic and the mark of difference 
between human and non-human animals was taken for granted. Thus for Aquinas the divine 
image is specifically to be identified with rationality, so that only intellectual beings, by which 
he means angels and humans, can be regarded as true image-bearers.
69
 For a substantialist 
conception of the imago we need not look any further than Aquinas’s understanding of human 
reason as the seat of the imago Dei. For Aquinas, then, there is a congruence of rationality 
between the creator and the creation. This general approach has found wide acceptance within 
the Christian community, although some alterations have been advocated.  
Aquinas’s account of the image of God is a development of Augustine’s ideas and those 
of St. John Damascene. His whole analysis is based on a concise analysis of the metaphysical 
notions of person, being and good, as a basis on which to understand the content of revelation, 
and on an intimate relationship between these concepts, the divine nature and the Trinity of 
divine persons. Aquinas adopted the fertile doctrine of St. Augustine on the imago Dei, 
elaborated it further to make it more explicit, and contextualized it to fit his more conceptual and 
scientific level. While Augustine explores the doctrine of the image of God as an avenue to 
understand something of the divine Trinity from its image in human beings, Aquinas examines 
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the theme in its own right.
70
 The frequency with which Aquinas quotes Augustine demonstrates 
the influence the latter had on him. However, it is clear that Aquinas aimed to contextualize the 
theme of the imago Dei to acquire new meaning, and in the process clear differences emerge in 
significant issues between the Summa and De Trinitate. For example, the more developed 
psychology of Aquinas leads him to reject the role of memory as a separate intellectual power (in 
the Augustinian trinity of memory, intellect and will). Aquinas supports his argument by 
interpreting a passage in Book XIV of De Trinitate to show that, it is clear that Augustine ‘does 
not take the above three for three powers; but by memory Augustine understands the soul’s habit 
of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will’.71   
In Question 93, Aquinas examines the question of the imago Dei as it is expressed in 
human intellectual capacity. His understanding of the imago Dei carries with it the problems 
related to most substantialist conceptions of the imago Dei, including, particularly for our 
purpose, the ascription of privileged status to intellectually able individuals and the 
marginalization of cognitively impaired persons. For Aquinas, citing Genesis 1.26, the image of 
God is found in all humans. However, for him, and this is a key point, only intellectual creatures 
properly image God. Aquinas grounds his argument on the degree to which creatures of reason 
are after God’s image. He says: 
 
But things are likened to God, first and most generally in so far as they are; secondly in so far as 
they are alive; thirdly and lastly in so far as they have discernment and intelligence. It is these 
latter, as Augustine says, which are so close in likeness to God that there is nothing closer in all 
creation. It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to 
God’s image.
72
 
 
Thus, for Aquinas it is clear that while all creatures bear the image of God, only intelligent 
creatures are ‘properly speaking’ after God’s image.73 This is because intelligent creatures 
possess the high capacity for knowledge and understanding to approach God’s likeness. Some 
passages in the Summa seem to suggest that Aquinas thinks creatures which lack intellectual 
capacities utterly lack the imago Dei. For example, quoting Augustine, he says: ‘We can speak of 
God’s image in two ways: first, referring to that in which the idea of ‘image’ is primarily 
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realized, namely to an intelligent nature’.74 This follows that: ‘God’s image is not directly and 
properly realized in man in such ways except on the basis of the first sort of imitation in virtue of 
man’s intelligent nature; otherwise even the animals would be after God’s image’.75 This and 
other passages seem to suggest that Aquinas denies the imago Dei to all creatures which lack the 
intellectual capacity. However, upon further inquiry into his Summa, we discover that Aquinas 
clarifies his position. In fact his theology is based on the notion that God is Being, and hence all 
created things image Him to a certain degree.   
Human beings, then, are most perfectly like God in their intellectual capacity to imitate.
76
 
But the obvious question here in relation to cognitively impaired people is: What of those who 
do not possess this capacity? Well, Aquinas finds the image of God in some sense in all people, 
whether they are able bodied or physically or cognitively impaired. He says: ‘So the image of the 
divine Trinity is to be found in the mind with reference to any object’.77 Furthermore, for him, 
the ‘the image remains always in the mind; whether this image of God is faint – so shadowy, we 
might say – that it is practically non-existent, as in those who lack the use of reason; or whether 
it is dim and disfigured, as in sinners; or whether it is bright and beautiful, as in the just’.78 In 
this respect we note that he follows Irenaeus, though he does not distinguish, as we have 
mentioned, between image and likeness.
79
 Aquinas comes close to our position in this study 
when in answer to his own question ‘is God’s image realized in man by his (mental) capacities, 
attitudes, or activities?’, says that ‘God’s image is not to be looked for in the soul’s activities’.80  
However, in Article 4 of Question 93, Aquinas seems to again depart from this position 
when he admits that the image of God in humans is not, as Hoekema says, always equally 
bright.
81
 Aquinas nuances what he means by the ability of intellectual creatures ‘to know or 
understand’, and he clarifies why this ability is significant as an indicator of those who ‘brightly’ 
bear the imago. For Aquinas, only human beings properly image God because only they are able 
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to imitate ‘God’s understanding and loving of himself’.82 According to Aquinas, human beings 
accomplish this in three ways: (1) a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God, an 
aptitude which consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all human beings; (2) 
actual or dispositively (habitually) knowing and loving God; and (3) complete perfection in the 
love and knowledge of God.
83
 For Aquinas, the ‘first state of the image then is found in all men, 
second only in the just, and the third only in the blessed’.84 Again from this passage it is clear 
that for Aquinas, not all human beings necessarily ‘properly’ image God. In addition, Aquinas 
thinks that since the imago Dei consists mainly in the capacity for intellectual aptitude, and 
because the intellectual nature in angels is more perfect than in human beings, angels reflect the 
image more brightly.
85
 Thus when he makes this claim, i.e., that the imago Dei is found more in 
angels than in human beings, he seems to be reinforcing his claim that only intellectual creatures 
properly image God.
86
  
So, can cognitively impaired persons ‘properly’ image God? Aquinas might still have 
thought that all human beings, including anencephalous or microcephalous or severely 
cognitively impaired human beings, were still rational beings and therefore still fully human – 
the only difference being that they don’t exhibit the fullness of their humanity; i.e. their being 
rational beings is a generic claim which applies to all human beings, even if the phenotype of 
rationality is not actually displayed in every instantiation of humankind.
87
 What we can deduce 
from exploring each aspect of Aquinas’s argument about what it is to ‘properly’ image God, is 
that his emphasis on intellectual capacity becomes more transparent. Thus his argument here 
risks marginalizing those who do not have the capacity to employ the concepts of self and those 
necessary to reflect upon that which lies beyond their person.  
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3.3.1 Criticism 
 
We must question Aquinas’s reading of the imago Dei on two counts.88 First, we must reject his 
finding of the image of God in human being’s intellectual nature. This view has its genesis in 
Greek thought rather than in Scripture. Both Plato and Aristotle called a human being’s intellect 
‘divine’, claiming that it was the ‘spark of divinity within humans’.89 Thus Aquinas, perhaps 
unknowingly, echoes a Greek idea when he maintains the image is in human intellectual ability. 
We do not deny that a human being’s intellectual ability is a reflection of God, but it is wrong to 
pin point it as the sole or even primary bearer of the image. Furthermore does not the Bible say 
that God is ‘love’ and nowhere does it distinctly say that God is ‘intellect’?90 Insisting on the 
intellectual capacity of human being, as Hoekema says, ‘downplays if not removes altogether a 
human being’s relatedness to God and to others, that is, a person’s capacity for loving God and 
neighbour’.91  
Secondly, Aquinas’s view detracts from the seriousness of the Fall, which as we shall see 
in chapter 3, is fundamental for the development of sound theological anthropology. This means 
that according to Aquinas, human beings are essentially the same before and after the Fall. They 
only lack the ‘gift of supernatural grace, or the donum superadditum’.92 This thought implies that 
the gift which all humans received before the Fall, was not something essential to human beings 
nature, but something tacked on his or her nature. Accordingly, fallen humans are not so much 
‘depraved’ as ‘deprived’.93 In short Aquinas fails to do justice to the devastating effects of the 
Fall on human nature.  
Another criticism I want to level against Aquinas is one that is core to the subject of this 
study - embodiment. By this is meant the opposition between reason and the ‘lower powers’ held 
by Aquinas which suggests a kind of devaluation of the body as the seat of a human being’s 
‘lower nature’.94 According to Scripture, however, we do not find in humans lower and higher 
powers. As we will see in chapter 4, human being as a totality (body and soul) has been created 
by God and no aspect of her being is ‘lower’ (read body) or ‘less noble’ than other aspects. 
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Again, this conclusion has the implication of marginalizing those persons who lack a fully 
intellectual capacity, and to whom the only means of relating is through bodily presence.  
We have said that theological reflection’s attempt to explain the imago in terms of human 
capabilities is deeply entrenched in the history of doctrine. One would hope that the story 
changes during the Reformation period. That is not the case. We will skip this period
95
 and hope 
that perhaps a more recent theologian had woken up to the Christian West tradition’s tendency to 
marginalize intellectually impaired people. To find out, we will engage Joseph Fletcher who 
embraced Lockean principles in trying to establish the parameters of what it is to be human. 
3.4 Joseph Fletcher 
 
The theology of the post-Reformation period did not add any new ideas to the theology of the 
imago Dei. Instead we trace a tendency to return to a scholastic conception of the image as a 
rational soul (anima rationalis), with the Aristotelian/Lockean concept of reason the formal basis 
for the humanum. John Locke followed Aristotle, Augustine and even Descartes in his definition 
of human beings as rational creatures. However, for Locke, this meant the ability to think in 
abstractions,
96
 but considers those unable to do so as unreasonable creatures. He says: ‘herein 
seems to lie the difference between Idiots and mad Men, That mad Men put wrong Ideas 
together, and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason right from them: But Idiots 
make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all’.97 So because cognitively impaired 
persons do not have innate/knowledge, they only appear to be human. Furthermore, Locke thinks 
that if bodily defects are assumed to make monsters (a general consensus among his 
contemporaries), all the more reason to think that rational impediments exclude an individual 
from being considered human.
98
 For Locke, ‘idiots’ were neither moral nor soulish creatures,99 
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thus were not expected to inherit eternal life,
100
 which made infanticide permissible.
101
 Locke’s 
opinion comes into sharp light in the thought of Joseph Fletcher.   
Fletcher seems to conflate both Lockean principles and the content of imago when he 
says: 
 
To be a person, to have moral being, is to have the capacity for intelligent causal action.  It means 
to be free of physiology! It means to have selfness or self-awareness. This is something that is not 
found in the body or in any of its organs.  In Biblical terms it means that man is made in the image 
of God, and that there he is self-conscious, saying “I am” and that he is self-determined, saying “I 
will”.102 
 
For Fletcher this is what it means to be a person and not an object which can be ‘manipulated 
either by doctors of medicine or by the impassive operations of physical nature’.103 So according 
to him, in Biblical terms, to be created in the image of God is to possess the capacity for 
intelligent causal action, and to be ‘self-conscious’ and ‘self-determined’. There is a dualism of 
body and person at work in Fletcher’s account of the person. For Fletcher, embodiment is not 
significant in establishing who persons are (I shall return to this point). To further grasp how 
Fletcher conflates Lockean principles and the imago Dei in human persons, and why human 
persons have a higher value than nonhuman animals it is necessary to examine Fletcher’s attempt 
to provide the biomedical decision marker required for determining persons.
104
   
Fletcher thinks that we cannot ‘appraise quality or enumerate human values’ if we cannot 
first articulate what a human being is.
105
 So when he set out to define what it is to be a person, he 
initially listed twenty characteristics but later reduced them to four.
106
 At that time, the language 
of personhood had not solidified because Fletcher could still use ‘human’ and ‘person’ 
interchangeably. However, moving forward, his view became the benchmark for distinguishing 
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clearly between the class of human beings and the (narrower) class of persons. The four 
characteristics are meant to provide necessary and sufficient grounds for attributing the status of 
person to another. There are other proposals for the optimal traits and capabilities, however for 
Fletcher these four contend for the sine qua non, the essential core without which no 
combination of the others can add up to humanhood. The four traits nominated as the ‘singular 
esse of humanness’ are ‘neocortical function, self-consciousness, relational ability, and 
happiness’.107 According to Fletcher, none of these contenders is mutually exclusive of any of 
the others, any more than the optimal indicators are (sense of time, curiosity, ideomorphous 
identity, obligation, reason-feeling balance, self-control, changeability, etc.).
108
 However, which 
one of these traits, if any, is capable of upholding the others? Which one acts as the core of what 
it means to be human? For our present purpose, we will engage Fletcher’s four conversation 
partners and go between his two lists. It is not my purpose to try to evaluate each of these 
‘criteria’ separately, as I am only interested in trying to make a more general point concerning 
the vagueness of this list.  
We begin with Michael Tooley, who proposed what he called the ‘self-consciousness 
requirement’ as the singular esse of humanhood. Tooley’s thesis runs thus: ‘fetuses and infants 
do not meet this threshold, neither do machines which do not possess consciousness and thus 
may be sacrificed in a competing values situation’.109 Further, Tooley thinks that nonhuman 
animals are also not self-conscious, a notion which is challenged by animal rights advocates and 
pet lovers but without much success. Indeed, consciousness of oneself as a self is quite a 
sophisticated concept which even the most ardent pet lover cannot easily claim for their pet. But 
what about persons who have deficient natural intellectual capacities and thus are not self-
conscious? According to Tooley these persons would not meet the threshold for persons. For 
Tooley, an infant becomes a person when his or her ‘neurological “switchboard”’ comes alive 
allowing for consciousness of self to emerge.
110
 I am inclined to reject Tooley’s proposal on 
what makes human beings more valuable than nonhuman animals because self-consciousness 
immediately rules out persons who are cognitively-intellectually impaired.  
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Relational ability was proposed by Richard McCormick, Fletcher’s second 
conversational partner. He says that ‘the meaning, substance, and consummation of life is found 
in human relationships’.111 Thus, ‘life is a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains some 
potentiality for human relationships’.112 On these grounds Fletcher argues that ‘anencephalics 
certainly, and idiots probably, lack personal status, with a consequent lack of claim rights’.113 ‘If 
that [relational] potential is simply nonexistent or would be utterly submerged and undeveloped 
in the mere struggle to survive, that life has achieved its potential’.114 Any person, then, that 
lacks ‘relational potential’ cannot be a person. Relationality is the theme that comes close to 
matching our proposal in this study. However, relationality as imagined by Fletcher, i.e., the 
capacity for personal status and thus ability to relate, privileges persons with the capacity for 
cognitive activity and discriminates against those without it. I am thus inclined to reject 
Fletcher’s version.   
The so-called ‘happiness’ criterion was proposed by the third of Fletcher’s conversation 
partner, a pediatrician who attended to cognitively impaired children. The pediatrician rejected 
Fletcher’s suggestion that ‘minimal intelligence’ or ‘cerebral function’ is the essential factor in 
being human.
115
 The pediatrician gave Fletcher the example of a boy she knew who was ‘happy’ 
and that in her opinion made him as human as any person living. But Fletcher concludes that by 
‘human’ the pediatrician meant ‘morally, not only biologically’.116 The pediatrician proceeded to 
describe the little boy’s ‘affectionate response’ to stimulus, a fact that reminds me of my own 
personal experience with such children and adults. Although Fletcher does not expound further 
the pediatrician’s response, I am suspicious of his conclusion here. Again, from my experience in 
a similar hospital setting,
117
 and my reading of other cases,
118
 I am inclined to think that by 
‘happy’ the pediatrician did not mean what Fletcher concluded to be simply ‘euphoria’, or 
‘happiness without any reason for it’.119 I believe that what the pediatrician was expressing is 
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something that only comes with constantly being near and observing intellectually impaired 
persons. Indeed I suggest that the pediatrician had perhaps come to terms with the fact that being 
human has more to do with simply the possession of ‘minimal intelligence or cerebral function’ 
as suggested by Fletcher.  
So far in our discussion, we have mentioned three traits suggested by Fletcher’s 
conversation partners as the content for what makes humans created in the image of God more 
valuable than nonhuman persons. However, we have rejected all three traits. What of Fletcher? 
Fletcher himself stands by his own hypothesis that ‘neocortical function’ is the ‘key to 
humanness’.120 By this Fletcher means that without the ‘synthesizing function of the cerebral 
cortex’, that is, ‘without thought or mind, whether before it is present or with its end, the person 
is nonexistent’.121 To Fletcher, such individuals are ‘objects but not subjects’.122 Of course 
Fletcher emphasizes the cerebral cortex because he assumes that to be human is to be rational, or 
in his language, ‘Homo is indeed sapiens, in order to be homo. The ratio, in another turn of 
speech, is what makes a person of the vita. Mere biological life, before minimal intelligence is 
achieved or after it is lost irretrievably, is without personal status’.123 For Fletcher, then, any 
individual who scores below the I.Q. 40-mark in a Stanford-Binet test is ‘questionably a person’, 
and if one scores 20 or below is not a person.
124
 To attribute humanity to another, Fletcher argues 
that individuals must meet, even if minimally, the threshold of ‘sapient’.125 For him, this is the 
sine qua non, or the uniting factor of all other traits which go into the fullness of humanness.
126
 
The neocortical function, then, is in Fletcher’s words the ‘key to the definition of a human 
being’.127 Fletcher says: ‘[i]n Biblical terms it means that man is made in the image of God, and 
that therefore he is self-conscious’.128  
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3.4.1 Criticism 
 
There are both empirical and substantive issues about Fletcher’s position that need to be raised. 
Regarding the former, Fletcher seems to base his position on the assumption that activities such 
as instrumental learning and cognition reside entirely in the neo-cortex, an issue that has perhaps 
not yet been decisively established. While we cannot discount the importance of the neo-cortex 
for our behaviour, yet we should at least be aware that the identification of brain and mind is 
fraught with philosophical and empirical difficulties. Furthermore, we must be careful how we 
distinguish between body and mind, since it may be that our spirit and individuality is more 
dependent on ‘mere biological or bodily processes’. More substantively, we can ask what 
purpose Fletcher’s criteria are to serve. His criteria seem to lend themselves to an interpretation 
that would exclude many that are now receiving care as human beings. Furthermore, I agree with 
Stanley Hauerwas that Fletcher fails to distinguish between criteria that are ‘necessary and those 
that are sufficient’ to determine the human.129 So, for example, if the threshold for being human 
is ‘having a proper balance between rationality and feeling’, then cognitively impaired people 
are, as are plenty of others, in perpetual peril of losing their status as humans.
130
  
We have been examining the Christian tradition’s perspective on the imago Dei, from 
which we conclude that the predominant view is substantive. As mentioned, this view places a 
significance on rationality, which risks marginalizing persons who are profoundly intellectually 
impaired. Consequently, we should seek an alternative path. Let us now turn and take a look at 
some dangers posed by a dominant substantive view, and why this traditional perspective should 
perhaps be augmented. These dangers will be examined by considering an issue relevant to our 
present purpose - rationality as the intrinsic value of human persons.  
4. ‘Rethinking Rationality’: On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons  
 
The Christian tradition we have been examining is ‘intellectualist’. This means that the tradition 
perpetuates the victimization of intellectually impaired persons by emphasizing intellectual 
capacities. But suppose the rationality thesis is true, that the capacity to exercise problem solving 
intelligence is fundamental to the intrinsic value of human persons. Would the criterion of 
rationality and feeling stand scrutiny? To further show what I mean, let us engage with 
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philosophers Philip Quinn and Robert Adams.
131
 Human beings are constantly trying to answer 
the question of what makes human persons innately valuable. In this endeavour, it is tempting to 
think that what makes a human being innately valuable must be ‘something’ that all and only 
human beings possess. But what might that be? I asked an undergraduate seminar group to 
respond to this question and their responses were quite interesting. The question was embedded 
in an example thus: if forced, for example, to choose between saving the life of a human child 
and saving the life of a pet in danger of drowning in the frigid waters of Durham City’s River 
Wear, most people would not hesitate to save the child and would, in so doing, be considered to 
have shown proper respect for the values at stake in the choice. What is the basis of this 
difference in value between human beings and non-human animals? After a time of discussion, 
the group decided that though difficult to articulate, there was what they called ‘a something’ 
that grounds this difference between human beings and animals. However, while some in the 
group were willing to finger rationality as that ‘something’, others were a bit hesitant. As we 
have seen in this study, the students who identified rationality stand in the company of many 
church fathers and theologians, some of whom we have considered in this study and many moral 
philosophers today.  
‘And what is rationality?’ poses Adams. In answer to his own question, Adams says that 
‘it seems not to be a single, simple feature of persons but a complex system of capacities – some 
that we possess in higher degree than non human animals, some that we have and they don’t 
have at all, and perhaps some that we simply share with nonhuman animals’.132  That this answer 
is appealing should not come as a surprise, now that we know most of the famous definitions 
have it that human being is a rational animal.
133
 Philip Quinn thinks that accepting this 
definition, is the beginning of securing an ‘attractive economy’ in our thought if we suppose that 
rationality, which accounts for only one specific difference between human beings and all 
nonhuman animals, also grounds the difference in value between human beings and all other 
animals.
134
 From here it is not difficult to see the appeal in concluding that rationality is the 
defining characteristic of human beings, and that which makes them inherently valuable, since as 
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far as we can tell, rationality makes human beings valuable among other earthly beings. If we 
hold that rationality makes human beings special among other non human animals, we need to 
say more about what rationality is for the proposal to be more illuminating.  
Philosophers have often disagreed sharply about which capacities undergird rationality, 
even though it is now widely accepted that rationality is a complex system of capacities 
reasonably regarded as excellent which include ‘rationality, but also emotional, social, and 
creative capacities’.135 All of these capacities are related to rationality but go beyond it in various 
ways. For example, as Quinn says, for Hume, practical reason is nothing more than the capacity 
to reason about means to ends independently fixed by desire. On the other hand, Kant’s 
understanding of practical reason is more ‘capacious’, and it includes the ‘capacity to set ends, 
the capacity for self-legislation, and the capacity to transcend natural causation’.136 I agree with 
Quinn that if we are to accept rationality as the ‘something’, which some of my students could 
not articulate, that makes human persons intrinsically valuable, then at least three constraints 
must be satisfied by an acceptable account of rationality.
137
 First, according to Quinn, rationality 
must be attributed to all human persons, because we are committed to the idea that all human 
persons possess this value.
138
 Secondly, ‘equal rationality’ must be attributed to all human 
persons, since we are also committed to the notion that human persons are ‘equally valuable’.139 
Thirdly, perhaps rationality should be the preserve of humans only.  
At the end, when measured against these constraints, both Hume’s and Kant’s account of 
practical rationality fall short. If we are in doubt about the capability of human persons 
transcending natural causation, then it is far from clear that Kant’s account fulfills the first 
constraint. Furthermore, different human persons possess in different degrees both the capacity 
to ‘set ends’ and the capacity to ‘reason instrumentally’.140 Consequently, this means that both 
Hume and Kant fail to satisfy the second constraint. How do we respond to such a dilemma? A 
natural response is to construct what Adams thinks is a rationality that does not come in 
‘degrees’ but one an individual simply possesses or does not. He says: ‘rational agency may be a 
plausible candidate; we could say that one has enough rationality to be a rational agent, and to be 
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as much a rational agent as anyone else (though not as rational in every sense), if one is able at 
all to do something for a reason’.141 In short, all rational agents deserve equal regard.  
To the extent this solution works, Adams proposes that it is quite compatible with 
supposing that rational agency in the indicated sense is an ‘excellence and, indeed, a way in 
which we image God’.142 For Adams, rational agency will be equal in all who possess it, and so 
it will ground an attribution of equal intrinsic value to them all. This proposal encounters a 
familiar tension. Firstly, as we have severally mentioned, not all human beings are rational 
agents in this particular sense. Most often the response to this difficulty is to deny the 
personhood of such human beings, which would, on that account, allow one to continue to hold 
that all human persons are rational agents and so equal in intrinsic value. However, denying that 
such human beings are persons does not seem like a viable option to those who hold that such a 
denial perpetuates the stigma imposed on people with cognitive impairment and makes them 
more vulnerable to suffer from abuses. Secondly, some nonhuman primates will probably turn 
out to be rational agents in the sense specified by Adams.
143
 Take for example documented cases 
of some primates demonstrating action that proves reason in the course of their behavioral 
sequence and thus the exercise of rational agency. Quinn thinks that a good response to this 
difficulty would be to elevate the qualification for rational agency, to a level which no matter 
how intelligent a nonhuman animal is, its behaviour would not qualify as an exercise of a 
rational agent.
144
   
The difficulty with this proposal is that, for it to be consistent, a large number of human 
beings who suffer from intellectual disability are in danger of being left out. In short, if we 
specify rationality in terms of rational agency, as suggested by Adams, perhaps we will be forced 
to conclude either that ‘not all human beings are rational agents or that some nonhuman animals 
are rational agents’.145 Here I agree with Quinn, that in both cases, rationality thus understood 
seems at best a problematic candidate for the role of grounding the intrinsic value of human 
persons as such because all and only human persons have it.
146
 But could these tensions with 
Adams’ proposal be merely ‘technical problems’ that could be solved with sufficient 
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‘ingenuity’? May be, but there seems to be a much deeper problem with the attempt to 
understand what makes human persons inherently valuable in terms of rationality alone.  
Thus, I suggest that in the same way ‘speciesism’ is the assigning of different values or 
rights to beings on the basis of their membership in a particular species, so does the reduction of 
human value to rationalism betray what I have called ‘intellectualism’. And so, just as 
‘speciesism’ or ‘anthropocentrism’ stands for a kind of behaviour that selfishly disregards the 
legitimate interests of members of other species, so is ‘intellectualism’. As I define 
intellectualism, it is a deplorable behaviour that selfishly disregards the legitimate interests of 
persons suffering from cognitive impairment. When I use the term ‘intellectualism’, then, I am 
describing the prevalent marginalization and stigmatization practiced by sections of society 
against persons who are profoundly intellectually impaired. I suggest that to use the criterion of 
intelligence as the threshold that warrants the exclusion of those that repel and think differently 
from us is to practice ‘intellectualism’. Furthermore it is to cut off the moral basis of our ability 
to be rational at all.
147
 Richard Ryder, the British psychologist who coined the term 
‘speciesism’148 drew a parallel between speciesism and racism which I want to adopt. He says:  
 
speciesism and racism are both forms of prejudice that are based upon appearances – if other 
individual looks different then he is rated as being beyond the moral pale […] Speciesism and 
racism both overlook or underestimate the similarities between the discriminator and those 
discriminated against and both forms of prejudice show a selfish disregard for the interests of 
others, and for their sufferings.149  
 
‘Intellectualism’, then, I suggest, is also a form of discrimination, and like all discrimination it 
does not recognise or simply underestimates the similarities that exist between the discriminator 
and those discriminated against. Indeed, cognitively impaired persons are one of the societal 
groups against whom it still seems socially acceptable to hold prejudice. Perhaps it is not 
surprising that ‘intellectualism’ is prevalent in a society dominated by intellectuals. What I 
believe society needs is for some intellectuals to take a stand for fellow cognitively impaired 
individuals, and particularly for those who are severely intellectually impaired. It has been done 
                                               
147Hauerwas and Burrell, ‘The Retarded’, 162.   
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in other situations. For example the civil rights movement did and still stands up for the 
marginalized minorities. The disability rights movement stood up for the inclusion of the 
physically impaired, and even nonhuman animals have advocates like Mercy for Animals (MFA) 
and PETA.
150
 But who will stand up for our fellow human beings who are cognitively impaired?  
Perhaps all it takes are a few reminders that should convince most cognitively able people 
that framing what it means to be human in terms of rationality or closely allied notions is way 
too narrow. Indeed, Adams, rightly, thinks that such accounts that elevate reason as the one 
factor which makes human beings valuable are ‘much too simple and one-sided’.151 Adams’s 
starting point is perhaps a bit strange. He starts from bad things done or which happen to human 
persons that count as violations of their personhood. This negative method of addressing the 
question is employed in several other recent discussions of the value of persons. For example 
according to Nicholas Wolterstorff, if we wish to identify the theme in Christian thought that 
provides a reason for favoring the political arrangements typical of modern liberal democracies, 
we must turn our attention to the great evil of violating human persons. Wolterstorff’s argument 
makes contact with Adams’ when the latter thinks he can identify two necessary conditions for 
violating personhood. The scope of this section does not permit me to examine his views in any 
detail. Here I will just mention the two main conditions. He spells out the first condition thus: 
 
An act that violates a person must attack the person. Its foreseeable effects must be so damaging to 
the person, or so contrary to her (actual or presumed) will, that fully intending them, in the 
absence of reason to believe them necessary for the prevention of greater harm to her, would 
constitute hostility toward the person.
152
  
 
The second he formulates thus: ‘a violation is an act that attacks the person seriously and 
directly. Most (but not all) violations of a person will assault her body.’153 However, if rationality 
makes humans persons intrinsically valuable, Adams asks: ‘why should we feel so violated by 
things that are done to (for example) our sexual organs?’154 Thus not all violations of human 
personhood involve violation of the person’s rationality, as is indicated by cases of sexual 
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violation such as rape. Furthermore, violation of rationality is not the only kind of violation of 
human personhood.  
Summarizing, now, what makes human persons inherently valuable is not exhausted by 
their rationality. This is not to say that we should completely exclude rational agency from the 
image of God. In fact Adams thinks that interfering with a person’s rational agency through 
techniques such as mind-altering drugs seem to violate the image of God.
155
 Still even though 
rationality is one of the things that make us human persons intrinsically valuable, there is more 
than rational agency, and more than rationality, to the image of God in us. I suggest it is 
important that we grasp this lesson because it paves the way for us to understand the multiplicity 
of grounds for the intrinsic value of human persons and thus to a richer appreciation of their 
value. I have been dwelling on this discussion because I intended to disprove the notion that 
rationality alone makes human persons inherently valuable. In the next two chapters, we will turn 
to an exploration of relationality and embodiment as potential, and favorable, to ground 
personhood. However, before that, let us now attempt to push against a prevalent move in 
philosophical discourse - animalizing cognitive impairment and then finally begin to point 
toward my own preferred approach to the core issue of our study.  
5. Unmasking the ‘Beast’: The Case Against Animalizing Cognitive Impairment 
 
Recall that in this chapter we have been saying that the Christian tradition has, perhaps 
unknowingly, been culpably inattentive to its marginalization of cognitively impaired persons for 
giving significance to rationality in its views of the imago Dei. In this section, and in anticipation 
of chapter 5, I want to show that it is not only the Christian tradition that is guilty of 
marginalizing cognitively impaired persons, but that these fellow human beings are marginalized 
in social and philosophical discourse. Of these two forms of marginalization, I find the depiction 
of cognitively impaired people in philosophical discourse as non-persons and radically Other a 
more pressing issue to tackle. I take a stand against the animalization of intellectual disability in 
philosophical discourse because there is a deeply held notion that ‘by definition … we [normals] 
believe the person with a stigma is not quite human’.156 What I am saying is that intellectually 
impaired individuals are as much persons as anyone else is, not Other, and not a lower kind that 
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156 See Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Garden 
City, NY: Anchor, 1961).  
57 
 
we set off from the human kind. Animalizing cognitive impairment is one of the most pervasive 
ways in which profoundly cognitively impaired persons are stigmatized.  
Animalizing persons with bodily defects and cognitive impairment was common in 
Locke’s time. Recall Locke’s opinion, that: ‘Idiots’ are neither ‘moral nor soulish creatures’.157 
Consequently they are not expected to inherit eternal life,
158
 and infanticide is thus permitted.
159
 
Today animalizing is confined to intellectually impaired individuals. Consider the examples 
found in the anthology Ethics in Practice where all of the references to ‘deficient humans’ are 
found in the section on animals.
160
 But why is this so? Why do some in society and moral 
philosophical discourse regard intellectual disability in such terms? The quick answer is that it is 
because philosophy and society seems to have generally made a connection between intellectual 
disability and animality. Michel Foucault calls it ‘animality of madness’.161 In his Madness and 
Civilization, Foucault paints a troubling picture of how society has historically treated those 
human beings who are cognitively impaired. He documents a certain image of animality that 
haunted the hospitals of the period concluding that ‘madness borrowed its face from the mask of 
the beast’.162    
Some philosophical discourse thinks of individuals with cognitive impairments as a kind 
more akin to animals than to other humans. In essence, cognitively impaired individuals have in 
many respects become our ‘philosophical pets’. Hence although these fellow humans are often 
there in philosophical discussions, they are there under the banner of non-human animals. This 
continued stigmatization of fellow human beings by some philosophers is a wrong that needs to 
be corrected. The association between cognitively impaired persons and animals may manifest 
itself in two ways: Firstly, it can be comparative, in which case the status of persons with 
cognitive impairment is compared with animals or the ‘relationship between “normal” human 
beings and the “intellectually disabled” is thought analogous to our relationship with animals’. 
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Secondly it can be definitional. Here cognitively impaired individuals by virtue of certain 
quantitative qualities, or lack thereof, are placed in the same moral category as non-humans.
163
 
For example, in his discussion of ‘idiots’, Vinit Haksar draws a hard line between 
intellectually impaired individuals and human beings. Haksar even seems to suggest that these 
impaired persons are less worthy of moral consideration than animals. He says: ‘It is sometimes 
thought that human beings, unlike animals, have rationality. But some idiots are less rational 
than some animals, so why should we give more weight to the interests of idiots than to the 
interests of animals?’164 Some philosophers are not content with these moves in philosophical 
discourse and hence push against it. For example Martha Nussbaum, whom we will engage 
further in chapter 5, defends her Capabilities Approach’s ability to include individuals with 
intellectual impairments. In doing so, she discusses among others, Eva Kittay’s profoundly 
intellectually impaired daughter Sesha. When arguing for the possibility of imagining a 
conception of human flourishing that includes Sesha, Nussbaum makes the following move:  
 
An emphasis on the species norm makes sense even when we are considering a woman like Sesha, 
who may never be able to attain the whole list of capabilities on her own, and may need to attain 
some of them through the proxy of her guardians. For what the species norm says to us is that 
Sesha’s life is to that extent unfortunate, in a way that the life of a contented chimpanzee is not 
unfortunate. People with severe impairments are all too often compared to higher animals. In some 
ways this analogy can be revealing, reminding us of the complex cognitive abilities of animals. 
But in other ways it is quite misleading.
165
 
 
Although Nussbaum here discusses Sesha in comparison to a chimpanzee, she does acknowledge 
that there is something revolting about animalizing cognitive impairment.
166
 Paul Spicker also 
argues against the comparison of cognitively impaired individuals with animals for two reasons: 
(1) ‘the moral rights accorded to humans and animals are not equivalent’ and (2) ‘the behaviour 
of people toward animals is generally different from the behaviour of people toward other 
people. The identification of mentally handicapped people with animals is liable to change the 
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way in which other people behave towards them’.167 I agree. However, the practice is prevalent 
in philosophical debates, and most authors are uncritical of these moves.  
But are we pressing the question for nothing? I think not. The moves made in 
philosophical discourse are by no means a purely academic exercise. The concrete consequences 
of these moves are profound and become clearer when we critically examine an even more 
prevalent philosophical move: invoking cognitively impaired individuals in arguments against 
the wrongness of killing and speciesism.  
Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer, like most philosophers who animalize cognitive 
impairment, use the severely intellectually disabled to illustrate examples of the badness of 
killing and speciesism or what McMahan calls anthropocentrism. They do this by examining the 
issue of experimentation and the killing of non-human animals. It is not surprising that the 
congenitally severely cognitively impaired individuals are often used (I will later mention why 
mild cases are not used) to illustrate examples of the badness of killing and speciesism. Thus 
once we start to examine the case of the congenitally severely cognitively impaired, or in 
McMahan’s words, ‘the severely retarded’,168 the argument ultimately collapses into a 
comparison of animals and severely cognitively impaired human beings and speciesism.    
Consider the wrongness of killing and recall Haksar’s quote above. McMahan advances a 
similar view. Like Haksar, he also does not think there are any ‘morally significant intrinsic 
differences between severely retarded human beings and animals with comparable psychological 
capacities’.169 In fact he thinks that it is impossible to distinguish, in some cases, intellectually 
impaired people and nonhuman animals. He states: ‘How a being ought to be treated depends, to 
some significant extent, on its intrinsic properties – in particular, its psychological properties and 
capacities. With respect to this dimension of morality, there is nothing to distinguish cognitively 
impaired people from comparably endowed nonhuman animals’.170  
In a section of his book The Ethics of Killing titled ‘Animals and Severely Cognitively 
Impaired Human Beings’, which some may find alarming, McMahan examines the inherent 
anthropocentrism in the sanctity of life argument – the traditional belief, by identifying some 
‘difference in intrinsic or nonrelational properties’ that only human beings possess and which 
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then makes them sacred. McMahan does not think the traditional position held by speciesism 
about the appropriate treatment of severely intellectually impaired human beings and about the 
permissibility of various widely accepted practices involving the use and killing of animals is 
compatible with what he calls the Time-Relative Interest Account.
171
  
McMahan argues that the Time-Relative Interest Account (henceforth TRIA) offers an 
explanation of why the killing of animals is less seriously objectionable than the killing of 
persons. This is because the ‘psychological capacities of animals are significantly less well 
developed than those of persons’, thus ‘the range of goods accessible to them is narrower and the 
degree of psychological unity within their lives is less’.172 Animals, then, have a weaker time-
relative interest in continuing to live than a person normally does.
173
 
Thus when challenged on their treatment of animals, some people typically respond by 
citing the various differences between the psychological capacities of persons and those of 
animals.
174
 In short, McMahan presents a possibility that his TRIA approach offers a plausible 
explanation of the moral significance of the differences between human beings and non-human 
animals that are typically cited when individuals are confronted to justify the belief that killing 
the latter is morally much less serious than killing persons. For example that it is precisely our 
possession of these various psychological capacities that enables us to have a time-relative 
interest in continuing to live that is so much stronger than that of any other animal.  
Thus McMahan: ‘There is a serious problem here, which is that, whatever we take to be 
the range of psychological capacities that differentiate us morally from animals, there are some 
human beings whose psychological capacities are no more advanced than those of certain 
animals’.175 McMahan distinguishes three groups of which this is true: (1) fetuses and infants, (2) 
those with acquired cognitive impairment like dementia and those with brain damage, and (3) 
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congenitally severely cognitively impaired human beings. To him, because of their individual 
‘rudimentary cognitive and emotional capacities’,176 human beings of all three types have a 
comparatively weak time-relative interest in continuing to live’.177  
Of the three groups, McMahan thinks that the most problematic case is that of the 
severely cognitively impaired because these individuals have ‘cognitive and emotional capacities 
no higher than those of certain animals’. So as a consequence, he thinks that these severely 
intellectually impaired individuals’ ‘time-relative interest in continuing to live is not stronger 
than that of their nonhuman counterparts’.178 McMahan’s conclusion is what many people would 
find unwelcome. He says: ‘According to the Time-Relative Interest Account, therefore, it is no 
more wrong, other things being equal, to kill a severely retarded human being than it is to kill an 
animal with comparable psychological capacities’.179 For McMahan, the fact that many people 
would object to this but not the killing of non-human animals puts into relief our anthropocentric 
bias: the basis for our outrage in the case of the severely cognitively impaired person is based on 
an arbitrary value placed on membership within the species Homo sapiens.  
McMahan goes on to argue that not only are the ‘psychological capacities of the severely 
cognitive impaired comparable to those of certain animals, but they also have no more potential 
than those animals’.180 Additionally, for him, these individuals are not ‘distinguishable from 
animals in the way that fetuses and infants are, nor do they have a former status that 
differentiates them from animals in the same way as the demented’.181 In short, for him, it is 
difficult to identify any intrinsic difference between the severely intellectually impaired and 
animals with comparable psychological capacities that is relevant to the morality of killing them. 
Peter Singer addresses the issue of killing non-human animals by examining the inherent 
speciesism
182
 in the sanctity of life argument. This is the belief that human life, and only human 
life, is sacred.
183
 Singer examines the example of an infant born with ‘massive and irreparable 
brain damage … so severe that the infant can never be any more than a “human vegetable”, 
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unable to talk, recognize other people, act independently of others, or develop a sense of self-
awareness’.184 He then asks whether, if asked by the child’s parents, the doctor should kill the 
infant.
185
 Singer is aware that this would be revolting to many people. However, he thinks this is 
exactly where speciesist bias is exhibited, where the killing of non-human animals is not a big 
issue as the killing of an individual born of human parents. So he argues that the reaction to the 
killing of an human infant, albeit one who is severely intellectually impaired is based on what he 
thinks is an arbitrary value placed on species membership. Singer disagrees with this, and thus 
argues that there are more relevant features on which we should base our judgment in the case of 
killing. He says, and I will quote him at length: 
 
Adult chimpanzees, dogs, pigs, and members of many other species far surpass the brain-damaged 
infant in their ability to relate to others, act independently, be self-aware, and any other capacity 
that could reasonably be said to give value to life. With the most intensive care possible, some 
severely retarded infants can never achieve the intelligence level of a dog…. The only thing that 
distinguishes the infant from the animal, in the eyes of the those who claim it has a “right to life”, 
is that it is, biologically, a member of the species Homo Sapiens, whereas chimpanzees, dogs, and 
pigs are not. But to use this difference as the basis for granting a right to life to the infant and not 
to the other animals is, of course, pure speciesism. It is exactly the kind of arbitrary difference that 
the most crude and overt kind of racist uses in attempting to justify racial discrimination….Those 
who hold the sanctity of life view do this, because while distinguishing sharply between human 
beings and other animals they allow distinctions to be made within our own species, objecting to 
the killing of the severely retarded and the hopelessly senile as strongly as they object to the 
killing of normal adults.
186
 
 
To Singer, then, there are more important criteria on which to base moral boundaries, which 
would make the killing of animals equally if not more revolting than the killing of brain-
damaged infants. In this example, as well as when he examines experimentation, severely 
intellectually impaired persons serve to illustrate a bias toward our own species which, according 
to Singer, is both inappropriate and arbitrary.  
But note that Singer does not discuss the mildly impaired. Why so? Is it because he 
thinks they possess the capacities often considered relevant for moral preference? I suspect that 
moral philosophers like Singer and McMahan use the severely impaired in the manner they do in 
their discourse because these individuals are at the margins of definitions of personhood. As 
fringe members who, according to some, are only Homo sapiens by virtue of biology, the 
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severely intellectually impaired seem suited to these philosophers to illustrate the arbitrariness of 
this boundary. My contention is that moral philosophy has ‘tilted’ this boundary.187 Traditionally 
society has thought of an imaginary vertical line which separates the species Homo sapiens from 
all nonhuman animals. However, I think the line has now been tilted horizontally and I.Q. is used 
to determine persons (those that fall above the line) and non-persons (those who fall below the 
line). After the line is tilted, it becomes easy to strip our severely impaired fellow human beings 
of all relevant human qualities, place them at the margins of humanity and claim that there is 
something unjust about preferring them to animals that possess higher qualities. Indeed, only a 
group so far removed from ‘us’ could convince us that there is only one feature which we have in 
common, biological membership, and that this feature is morally irrelevant. 
Interestingly Singer does not choose those with acquired cognitive deficits to make his 
case against speciesism. Arguably, they ‘can never achieve the intelligence level of a dog’. And a 
‘chimpanzee, dog or a pig will have a higher degree of self-awareness than Grandma’.188 So we 
might decide that ‘an experiment cannot be justifiable unless the experiment is so important that 
the use of … [those who have suffered brain damage of dementia] would also be justifiable’.189 
Perhaps we would conclude that it is better to save the life of a normal human being than 
Grandma’s, or that our choice to experiment on an animal rather than Grandma is arbitrary and 
unjustifiable, and in making it we join racists and sexists in our brand of discrimination. But why 
do these examples seem troublesome? Because Grandma, for many of us, has a human face and a 
human history, and stands in some kind of relationship with other human beings, while for many 
a ‘human vegetable’ or a brain-damaged infant does not. As Carlson says, severely cognitively 
impaired individuals present us with a case to which many of us have little exposure or 
emotional resonance, and draws on our preconceptions and intuitions about individuals with 
severe intellectual disabilities.
190
 Unlike Singer, McMahan does not avoid discussing those who 
are hopelessly senile and those with brain damage. But again his conclusion is troubling. He 
says: ‘it seems that Time-Relative Interest Account implies that it would be no more seriously 
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wrong, other things being equal, to kill [those with acquired dementia] than it would be to kill an 
animal with comparable psychological capacities’.191  
McMahan concludes that speciesism alone cannot justify giving preference to the 
interests of intellectually impaired over ‘comparably endowed animals’. He presents these fellow 
human beings as if the only thing we share with them is membership in the species Homo 
sapiens. He says: ‘Bare co-membership in the human species, which is what we share with the 
cognitively impaired, does not involve personal ties, mutual sympathy, shared values, a common 
commitment to a certain way of life, social cooperation, or any of the other features of relations 
that are more readily recognizable as legitimate bases for partiality’.192 Again, McMahan’s 
position is predicated on his belief, like Singer’s and Joseph Fletcher’s, as we saw in chapter 2, 
that personhood requires more characteristics than simply being a member of Homo sapiens. 
Perhaps severely cognitively impaired individuals as a group are chosen to refute 
speciesism and the badness of killing not only because its members are often believed to have 
more in common with animals than with humans, but because they are perceived as radically 
other.
193
 As Carlson says, many philosophers are not familiar with the history of the 
‘classifications and the complexities of this condition (e.g., its internal and external heterogeneity 
and its instability)’.194 So McMahan’s claim that ‘bare co-membership’ in the species and 
Singer’s claim that we may have more in common with an intelligent Martian than with an 
individual who is severely cognitively impaired are just two examples of the ways that these so-
called non-persons have been relegated to the sphere of profound otherness. Furthermore, in 
addition to Martians discussed by both McMahan and Singer, I think that all the common 
analogies that invoke, for example, ‘halflings’, ‘Frodo’, and all other hypothetical characters 
borrowed from popular culture and used in philosophical discourse are also culpable of 
relegating severely impaired individuals to this sphere of otherness.  
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In conclusion, it is unfortunate that when our fellow human beings who are socially 
marginalized do become visible in philosophical discourse, it is often in ‘truncated, distorted, or 
prototypical form’.195 Additionally, it is equally disappointing that work like Singer’s, which is 
allegedly aimed at dispelling myths and refuting ‘complacent, unargued assumptions’ about one 
marginalized group, draws on and perpetuates myths and assumptions about another. And for 
me, McMahan’s distinction of ‘them’ from ‘us’ based on a set of desirable characteristics 
amounts to the same harmful nationalism he abhors as virulent nationalism.
196
 Although absent 
from many other areas of philosophy, the presence of cognitive impairment in discussions of 
animal rights is striking, and it reveals certain features of the traditional approach to intellectual 
impairment in philosophy. I am arguing that the gravity of the claims being made, e.g., when it is 
justifiable to kill, should offer enough compelling reasons to refrain from animalizing fellow 
human beings both in arguments devoted to refuting speciesism, the wrongness of killing and in 
other philosophical and social discussions about cognitive impairment. 
6. The Imago Dei in Biblical Teaching  
 
In this section, I want to briefly begin pointing to my preferred approach (non-structural/non-
functional), to the core issue of this study. In the history of Christian thought, the Christian 
doctrine of human beings created in God’s image as explicitly stated in (Genesis 1:26-28; 5:1-3; 
9:6 and as appears in 1 Corinthians 11:7; 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15) has received a lot of attention. 
Here I intend to only sketch a brief outline of the main points in Biblical teaching.
197
 One of the 
anomalies in the study of this theme is that while it has generated volumes of literature, it is 
rarely mentioned and it does not play a very important part in the Bible. Furthermore, the Bible 
does not provide definitive answers to all the questions raised about the content of the image of 
God or of personhood. Was it an oversight on the part of the biblical authors which leads some to 
conclude that the Bible is not relevant in modern discussions of personhood? The lack of 
definitive answers may have more to do with the nature of the questions than the content or 
relevance of the Bible. In many ways, it may be that the wrong questions are being asked of the 
Bible. While the most distinctive feature of biblical anthropology is the teaching that human 
                                               
195 Ibid. 
196 McMahan, EoK, 221. 
197 For an extended coverage of this theme as presented in the Bible, see Barth, CD III/1§46 Doctrine of Creation; 
Brunner, Man in Revolt, 82-112 and Appendix I, 499-16; Cairns, The Image of God in Man, 17-32; Hoekema, 
Created in God’s Image, 11-32.    
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beings are created in the imago Dei, the Bible is not a philosophical treatise on such issues as 
personhood and human nature. It is evident that the biblical authors were not interested in 
answering the questions of the content of the image, the origin of the soul, and the extent of 
freedom, all of which have been brought into sharp focus throughout the history of Christian 
thought. The most enduring of this, as we have seen in our exposition of the theme in tradition, is 
the content of the image.   
What, then, is the Bible keen to communicate when it states that human beings are made 
in the image of God? Most expositors acknowledge that the theme is critical to understanding 
human nature and to all the affirmations of biblical anthropology in both the Old and New 
Testaments. However, the phrase is not used extensively in either Testament, and Old Testament 
does not mention it much. In fact the concept is only stated directly in only three passages in the 
book of Genesis, and alluded to in Psalm 8. That is not to say that the scarcity of references 
means the theme is not important for Old Testament thought.
198
 The use of the phrase in Genesis 
does suggest some general themes of anthropological significance but its interpretation is often 
problematic. In the Old Testament passages, the image of God describes a dignity conferred on 
human beings, one which is somehow like God and distinguishes human beings from all other 
nonhuman animals. In the New Testament, the theme is mentioned less than a dozen times and 
mostly in the writings of St. Paul. Here we are told that all human persons bear the image, ‘the 
image and glory of God (1 Corinthians). However, present in the New Testament are additional 
passages that give this theme of the image of God an entirely new meaning. The most definite 
are: Romans 8.29; 2 Cor. 3.18; Ephesians 4.24; Colossians 3.10. Several passages in the New 
Testament teach that there is a sense in which the image of God needs to be renewed. If the 
image needs to be restored, it means that it has been corrupted and there can be no other event 
this side of Genesis other than the Fall (8.29; 2 Cor. 3:18). Here, I will not join the debate of 
whether the imago Dei was partially or completely corrupted at the Fall.
199
   
Contrary to our observations when we considered different views of the imago Dei 
above, and our exposition of the theme in tradition, two themes emerge from the biblical 
perspective. Firstly, the whole person is seen as created in the image of God. This perspective 
rejects interpretations which locate the image of God in one or another aspect of human nature, 
                                               
198 See Gerhard von Rad, Th. Worterbuch zum N.T., Vol. II, 387-90. cited in Clines, The Image of God, 18. 
199 For the famous debate between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner on this issue, see Chapter 4 in this study. 
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for example: intellect (substantial view) or his uprightness (physical view) or in one a quality 
possessed by humans or because of what human beings can to (function). The Biblical 
perspective also objects to both monism and dualism, and opts for a vision of human beings 
where the spiritual, physical, social and historical dimensions are presented jointly. Secondly, the 
biblical perspective makes it clear that a human is not created as an isolated being: ‘God created 
mankind in his image, in the image of God he created them, male and female he created them’ 
(Gen. 1:27). According to this perspective, a human being exists in relation with other human 
beings, with God, with the world, and with self. Thus a human being is not an isolated individual 
but a person. In short, human beings are relational beings. However, the imago Dei is far from 
being a ‘pure actualism’ that would otherwise deny the imago Dei its permanent ontological 
status. Instead its fundamentally relational character itself ‘constitutes its ontological structure’ 
and the foundation for its exercise of freedom and responsibility’.200 In sum, the Biblical 
perspective teaches that in a very important sense, human beings may be fallen but they are still 
bearers of the imago Dei, thus must still be so viewed. Additionally, there is a need to be restored 
to the image of God, a restoration that is enabled through Jesus Christ. So the Biblical 
perspective is not concerned with content, and it does not mention any characteristic that humans 
possess, be it what humans can do, as in function, their physical characteristics, and particularly 
not rationality. 
7. Conclusion 
 
Our discussion in this chapter has focused on the basic views of the image of God. In our 
investigation, we have seen that predominant in the Christian tradition is the 
substantive/structural view that maintains the divine image is an intrinsic human capacity that 
mirrors the character or attributes of God. We have also seen that, historically, a number of 
suggestions have been put forward regarding this feature being constituted by rationality or the 
capacity to reason; morality or the capacity to experience guilt, shame, and responsibility; 
spirituality or the capacity for religious experience; or the upright physical posture. Thus 
rationality has persisted in the Christian tradition as the primary feature of the imago Dei. 
Consequently, ‘man must be rational to have fellowship with God’.201 We have already seen, 
                                               
200 Di Noia, et al., ‘Communion and Stewardship’, http://www.vatican.va. Retrieved 24 March, 2011. 
201 Gordon Clark, ‘Image of God’, Baker Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1973), 313, cited 
in Anderson, On Being Human, 225. 
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however, that his view has, by giving significance to rationality, perhaps unknowingly 
marginalized intellectually impaired persons.  
However, not only is understanding the image of God in any of these terms problematic 
for those individuals who do not clearly meet the set standard, but in effect the result 
marginalizes such people. In short, we said that it amounts to practicing what we termed 
‘intellectualism’, or discrimination against such persons. I hasten to add that in this study, I do 
not deny that any or even all of these elements suggested might contribute to understanding God. 
Instead, I am suggesting that the imago Dei is neither exhausted nor predominantly defined by 
any of these features. Recall the words of Eva Kittay, a feminist philosopher and mother of a 
severely disabled daughter, Sesha. She captures it best when she puts it in conversation with her 
son, Leo (Sesha’s brother) thus: 
 
if our anthropologies – whether philosophical or theological, I would add – cannot include Sesha, 
‘they are at best incomplete, at worst faulty. And that is not because Sesha is so different from us, 
we are so much like her. We understand so much more about who we are and what moves us, 
when we see what moves Sesha.
202
  
 
As mentioned, all the theologians we examined in the history of Christian thought, collectively 
endorse the substantive/structural view. The functional view we said holds that the image 
consists in what human beings do, not what they are. Again, however, this view perpetuates the 
marginalization of people with cognitive impairments. Worse, it inspires the claim that ‘the 
mentally retarded are without the image of God [since] the imago Dei is basically centered on 
responsibility’.203 Furthermore, is it not the same rationale which continues to inform current 
practices of prenatal testing, selective abortions, and end-of-life care giving? Again, I am not 
denying that the image of God excludes this capacity entirely. It is only to say that it might be 
more helpful if we, perhaps, understand this responsibility of God that empowers human 
dominion less as the ‘power to rule over and more as the power to rule with others’.204 The result 
is that we will see people with disabilities as manifesting the divine image precisely in harmony 
with others who are more actively engaged in exercising the God given responsibility of 
                                               
202
 Eva F. Kittay and Leo Kittay, ‘On the Expressivity and Ethics of Selective Abortion for Disability: Conversations 
with My Son’, in eds., Erick Parens and Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press), 165-95.  
203 Elmer L. Towns and Roberta L. Groff, Successful Ministry to the Retarded (Chicago, IL: Moody, 1972), 39. As 
cited in Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 173.   
204 This point is argued by Middleton both exegetically and ethically. See Richard J. Middleton, The Liberating 
Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2005), chapter 7, esp. 297.  
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dominion in the world. I am inclined to reject both views for the reasons stated: that it 
perpetuates the marginalization and stigmatization of intellectually hindered persons, and is 
discriminatory on all levels against such people. 
The relational view, as we will see in chapter 4, emerged strongly in the work of neo-
orthodox theologians such as Karl Barth. In this view, the imago Dei consists neither in human 
structures nor in human functions but in their relationship with God, their interrelationality with 
other persons, and their embodied interdependence with the world. Christian anthropology is 
redemptively materialist and non-dualist. As fallen creatures, human beings are subject to all the 
finite and mortal limits this status entails. Finitude and mortality are definitive features of the 
status of being embodied, and their absence means humans would not be creatures. Thus to deny 
the personhood of human beings going through the natural process of ageing is to attack one of 
the very qualities, alongside death, that define what it means to be a creature. Indeed, it amounts 
to denying one’s being. This relational view seems to hold the most promise for a theological 
anthropology that is informed by cognitive disability perspectives. But does it? It is to this task 
that we now turn in chapter three.  
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CHAPTER 3 
After Rationality the Theological Turn to Relationality: Rethinking Relational Anthropology in 
John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras  
  
1. Introduction   
 
Our study in chapter 2 has shown that the imago Dei all too often has been connected with 
disembodied rationality. Again, we have said that the traditional understanding of the imago Dei 
examined is essentially individualist and dualistic as it gives little, if any, importance to the many 
relationships which constitute persons with cognitive impairments in their own particular being.  
Although the image of God served to give an account of where humanity stood between God and 
nonhuman creatures, the traditional individualist account does not demonstrate an appreciation 
for the complex relationality which exists among God, humans, and the nonhuman creation. It is 
for this reason that much of the recent theological reflection on the imago Dei has sought to 
reinterpret the image, not as an individually held static quality of the mind, but as a relational 
achievement which is constituted between Others-in-relation. The direct theological model for 
this type of relationality is analogically derived from the dynamic, or perichoretic
1
 understanding 
of God as Trinity, found at the very nub of God’s dynamic and triune being, while highlighting 
the continuities between divine and human personhood.   
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and rethink, after a sustained emphasis on 
rationality, the theological turn to relationality, and its impact on personhood.
2
 In this chapter I 
pick up this emphasis on the continuities between divine and human personhood and seek to 
expose a major blind spot of a relational approach to theological anthropology. In short, I am 
suggesting that while focusing on the relational dimensions of personhood, recent currents within 
theological anthropology have neglected other important aspects such as: discontinuity between 
divine and human persons, the doctrine of sin, and particularly for our purposes in this study, 
embodiment. Consequently these relational approaches perpetuate the stigmatization of 
individuals suffering from profound cognitive impairment. Specifically, I am claiming that 
                                               
1 Perichoresis (or circumincession) refers to the mutual interpenetration and indwelling within the threefold nature 
of the Trinity, God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
2 For discussion on the philosophical turn to relationality see LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: 
After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003). Shults traces two epochs in 
philosophical reflection: (1) From Aristotle to Kant, and (2) From Hegel to Levinas.  
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relational anthropologies are not able to account for the full humanity of people with severe 
cognitive impairment, and thus must be reconceived to properly take into account human 
embodiment.  
To accomplish our task, I will draw from the theological anthropology of John Zizioulas 
and Christos Yannaras, two prominent Greek Orthodox theologians, whose theological 
anthropologies, which can be considered paradigmatic examples of a relational anthropology, 
have been of particular importance in the popularization of this ‘relational turn’. So although 
these concerns are raised in relation to their work, many of them are instructive for relational 
anthropologies more generally. I address the theology of Zizioulas because of his decisive 
contribution to theological anthropology, and I address Yannaras’s personalist anthropology, the 
lesser known of the two, because of the distinctive way he consciously undertakes to express or 
reiterate the ontological approaches that are found in the philosophical tradition of early and 
Byzantine Christianity using the language of his contemporary philosophical setting, and 
specifically his engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy. Yannaras’s approach is interesting 
because the language he takes up refers more to the modern philosophical context, and in 
particular to the terminology of Heidegger and existentialism rather than to the philosophical 
terms of say the Cappadocian Fathers.   
The very title of Yannaras’s thesis, The Ontological Content of the Theological Notion of 
the Person, indicates an assumption that traditional theological positions about personal being 
can be discussed in terms of philosophical ontology. This is no surprise because elsewhere 
Yannaras suggests that Heidegger’s metaphysical analysis echoes the theology of apophaticism. 
Consequently, Yannaras appears to be accommodating to the terms of the Heideggerean 
articulation in his attempt to deliver the Greek Father’s theology on the subject of existence and 
the concept of the person, since as we will see Being in this tradition is approached only as 
personal. Yannaras’s project unfolds in a wide-ranging engagement and conversation with 
pivotal Western texts, and his reading is well noted for its fierce anti-Western polemic.    
Both theologians base their theological anthropology on the Greek Church Fathers which many 
commentators argue is a rich source for a theological critique of modern individualism.
3
 
However, there are theologians who are very critical of the move to ground relational 
                                               
3 See e.g. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 12-14. 
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anthropology in patristic sources.
4
 While the Fathers of the Church invoked notions and terms 
related to the existence of the person when tackling the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology, 
they do not seem to have separately expanded on their anthropological presuppositions and they 
did not provide us with an elaborate, independent theological anthropology. This is quite widely 
recognized by today’s theologians, that the Fathers of the Church did not provide the Church 
with a distinct doctrine of the human person. Indeed, it is not a recent observation: over half a 
century ago the Russian émigré theologian Vladimir Lossky made the same comment, and was 
critical towards the attitude of attributing complex concepts of the human person from modern 
philosophical traditions to the Fathers. In short he dislikes the idea of the Fathers being proto-
existentialist. However, he did not deny that at the same time we can, from the side, as it were, 
find some Christian anthropology in the Fathers, which in fact Lossky calls ‘unquestionably 
personalist’.5 This historical debate is diverse, complex and beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Thus, in this chapter I will not attempt to join this discussion.  
2. On Trinitarian Communion and ‘Relational Being’   
 
Relationality is of course not a new concept in Christian theology. Indeed, in recent years a 
panoply of Western theologians, in the era immediately following Barth, have attempted to draw 
from the supposed ‘social’ Trinitarian of the Cappadocian fathers and Eastern theology in a 
deliberate and intensive effort to re-assess Trinitarian theology
6
 which is, together with the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, inherently relational. The proponents of Trinitarian theology view it 
as a rich source for new orientations on a variety of theological topics, but particularly the 
                                               
4 Among others, see particularly Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998); Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of 
Trinitarian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); and Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), who is particularly critical of 
Zizioulas’s theology of  the Trinity, though for quite different reasons. 
5 Vladimir Lossky, ‘The Theological Notion of the Human Person’, in In the Image and Likeness of God (New 
York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974), 111-2. 
6 The list of Western revivalists is now commonplace: Catherine M. LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1991); Christoph Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton, eds. Persons, Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1991); id., The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: An Essay on 
Trinitarian Description and Human Participation (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996); Robert Jenson, The Triune 
Identity (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1982). For an overview covering much of the literature, see David S. 
Cunningham, These Three are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998). 
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constitution of the person through their relation to God, others, self and the world.
7
 The basis for 
the current resurgence is a reevaluation of the notion of ‘person’. Recall classical theology 
understood ‘person’ in a substantial sense, but today’s trinitarian thinking with its understanding 
of salvation as the gift of participation in the life of the triune God is concerned with how human 
beings are drawn into this communion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  
However, a thesis I want to develop in this study is that although many proposals of 
relational personhood have freed us from many of the problems associated with classic 
theology’s understanding of the imago Dei, they continue to think from the center of human 
subjectivity. Additionally, they fail to give any detailed account of the dynamic commerce which 
exists between humans and the multiplicity of nonhumans with whom we share our daily lives. 
In short, theological anthropologies fail to account for the discontinuity between divine persons 
and human persons.
8
 For the theological turn to relationality to work, it must adopt a much more 
radical second step. Thus this chapter will anticipate chapter 4 where I will argue that the body is 
always central in defining the self, while in all cultures the meaning of the body reflects and 
augments relationships. Consequently, while to be a person in theological and some 
philosophical circles
9
 is now being increasingly understood in relational terms, and while this 
understanding takes for granted the capacity for proper cognitive function, I argue that, 
embodiment, or the bodily presence of an individual, should be retrieved as a significant resource 
for the conception of the ‘hard cases’ in intellectually impaired individuals as participators in 
non-instrumental relationships.
10
 So I will argue that the tendency to overemphasize the 
                                               
7 The literature is growing, but see for example but excluding John D. Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras, Ray S. 
Anderson, On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology (Pasadena, CA: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982); 
Schwöbel  and Gunton, Persons, Divine and Human) (Hereafter PDH); Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of 
Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008) 
(Hereafter RGF); Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipulation and 
Promise (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995); Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1991); Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1988); Catherine Mowry 
LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991); See also Shults, 
Reforming Theological Anthropology (2003). It is generally accepted that Karl Barth’s groundbreaking efforts in his 
Church Dogmatics, which treat this doctrine as prolegomenon to and structural motif for his entire theological 
project, were in sum and the major catalyst for the new reorientation regarding the doctrine of the Trinity (See Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I/1, trans. G. W. Bromiley, ed., G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. 
& T Clark, 1975), 339-49.  
8 Edward Russell captures this point well in ‘Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assessment of John 
Zizioulas’ Theological Anthropology’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 2 (2003), 168-86. 
9 See Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, esp. 11-33. 
10 As we will see in chapter 4, my argument is almost concurrent with that of David Kelsey in Eccentric Existence: 
A Theological Anthropology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009), see esp. 242-08. 
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continuities between divine and human persons, coupled with, particularly for Zizioulas and 
Yannaras, the centrality of ekstasis to understanding personhood, risks dismissing the body, 
physicality and the boundaries of the self.
11
  
As will become clear, by ek-stasis (ecstasis) we mean the movement towards communion 
which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the ‘self’ and thus to freedom.12 Perhaps the 
greatest strength of both Zizioulas’s and Yannaras’s understanding of the person is their radically 
open-ended definition of the self as uncircumscribable, ecstatic, irreducibly uncontainable, and 
unique. Their relational anthropologies stand in direct contrast to interpretations of the self as 
naturae rationabilis individua substantia. However, I want to highlight some areas of systematic 
concern regarding the idea of relational personhood through which light can be shed on the task 
for theological anthropology more generally.  
The augmentation I am proposing does not limit relational being to the ‘ecstatic being’ 
that is grounded in communion, as distinguished from a ‘being’ that is grounded in itself as 
substance. While I agree with this first point, the second step argues that the ecstatic nature of 
being human is also understood as embodied. So again, I suggest that what is needed, and an 
overall objective of this thesis is to develop a theological anthropology in which alongside 
relationality, embodiment is a key factor in thinking about what it is to be and remain human, 
particularly taking into account the personhood of profoundly intellectually impaired persons.  
This chapter will address these concerns in three parts. In the first section, I begin with a 
detailed analysis of Zizioulas’s and Yannaras’s work as far as it impinges on their anthropology, 
and in the second section, I offer a critical assessment of aspects of their anthropology. Again, in 
this section, I will also weave in a defense of my counter claim that relational anthropologies 
tend to, in particular, overlook embodiment. Let us now turn and sketch each theologian’s 
relational anthropology, with a view to examining the degree to which they are similar or 
different in the treatment of the question of ontology, their approach to relational personhood and 
how this impacts cognitive impairment.  
                                               
11 E.g. John D. Zizioulas, ‘Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood’, 
Scottish Journal of Theology 28 (1975), 408-10 and 414 (Hereafter ‘Human Capacity’); for Yannaras see id., Person 
and Eros, trans. Norman Russell (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2007), 19-20, 27-8; 129-30, 262-7, 
273-4.  
12 See esp. Zizioulas, ‘Human Capacity’, 408. 
75 
 
3. John Zizioulas’s Relational Anthropology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas is a theologian whose thought is pioneering in his field.
13
 In 
his work, Zizioulas blazes a path which not only resurrects the Greek patristic tradition for a 
much wider audience but offers an alternative to the customary and fashionable. Apart from 
being one of the most well known and important Orthodox theologians, Zizioulas is a prolific 
and engaged modern theologian. His overall contribution to theological anthropology, 
particularly his account of the emergence of the patristic ontology of communion with its thesis 
of the constitutive role of personhood vis-à-vis being is widely considered by many to be one of 
the most significant of recent times.
14
 Zizioulas’s thought, which is centered on ecclesiology, is 
anchored upon an ontology of the person which derives primarily from a consideration of the 
nature of the triune God, intent on presenting a neopatristic synthesis.
15
 Little surprise, then, that 
his contribution has drawn much of its direction from patristic theology, and particularly the 
personalism and thought of the Cappadocian fathers to challenge Greek philosophy which, he 
argues, simply did not have the capacity to give due weight to the ‘particular’. 
Again, this construal of the personalism of the Cappadocians has earned Zizioulas rebuke 
from his critics who accuse him of attempting to dress his philosophical personalism and 
existentialism with Cappadocian language and parade it as patristic.
16
 However this may be, my 
interest is not in patristic disputes but in Zizioulas’s systematic theology. By limiting myself to 
the ideas that undergird his various analyses rather than whether or not his use of the Fathers is 
                                               
13 For different assessments of Zizioulas’s work, see Torrance, Persons in Communion, Robert Jenson, Systematic 
Theology: The Triune God, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Volf, After our Likeness; Matthew 
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004); Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Douglas H. Knight, ed., The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and 
Church (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2007). 
14 See John Meyendorff, ‘Forward’ in Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church 
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 12; Knight, The Theology of John Zizioulas, 1. 
15 G. H. Williams, ‘The Neo-patristic synthesis of Georges Florovsky’ in A. Blane, ed., Georges Florovsky: Russian 
Intellectual, Orthodox Churchman (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1993), 287-340; Boris Gudziak, ‘Towards an 
Analysis of the Neo-partristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky’, Logos 1(2000), 197-238; Andrew Louth, ‘The 
Patristic Revival and Its Protagonists’ in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology. eds., Mary B. 
Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
16 Other than the ones mentioned above, Lucian Turcescu gives the most recent and, perhaps, sharpest expression of 
this critique. See idem, ‘“Person’” versus “Individual” and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa’, 
Modern Theology 4 (2002), 97-109. See also John G. F. Wilks, ‘The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizioulas’, Vox 
Evangelica 25 (1995), 63-8. 
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accurate, I do not intend to diminish the importance of the question. Zizioulas offers an insightful 
investigation of the ontology of triune personhood in such a manner as to integrate our 
understandings of being and communion on the one hand, and divine and human personhood on 
the other. In one of his earliest essays,
17
 Zizioulas sets out to examine the implications of the 
uncircumscribability of human capacity and, therefore, of human personhood. He holds that all 
persons, intellectually impaired or not, are unique in that they are characterized by an irreducible 
uncontainability within definable limits. He says that the person ‘goes beyond his actual state in 
a movement of transcendence of the actual human limitations’.18 Consequently the nature of 
human beings is such that we may not describe it with reference to Western, ‘static’ conceptions 
of ‘substance’, ‘qualities’ and ‘essence’. Further, contrary to what has become common within 
bioethics today, the person is not to be defined by reference to innate capacities or incapacities.  
3.2 Ontology of Personhood 
 
Zizioulas summarizes his ‘ontology of personhood’ in an essay now published in various 
places.
19
 It is necessary in understanding Zizioulas to properly rehearse the ordo essendi of his 
theology. We shall sketch them one at a time, stopping to examine his treatment of ecstatic 
personhood and then moving on to his thoughts on human personhood and then ecclesiology 
which we have said encapsulates his thoughts. We seek to know how they impinge upon his 
anthropology, relational personhood, and consequently how we account for fellow human beings 
affected by intellectual and sometimes  profound impairment.  
3.3 On Divine Persons 
 
We start with the divine persons, because it is from divine communion we are supposed to 
understand being human. According to Zizioulas, the Cappadocian fathers represent an 
ontological revolution in their understanding that ‘it is the person of the Father and not divine 
substance that is the source and cause of the Trinity’.20 In short: ‘the identification of the 
                                               
17 Zizioulas, ‘On Human Capacity’, 401-8. 
18
 Ibid., 401. 
19 See Zizioulas, ‘On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood’ in Communion and Otherness: Further 
Studies in Personhood and the Church, ed. Paul McPartlan (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2006), 99 -112; See also 
Christoph Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton eds., PDH, 33- 47. 
20 John D. Zizioulas, ‘The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution’, in 
Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed., Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1995), 51-2. 
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“hypostasis” with the “person” revolutionized Greek philosophy.21 Unlike the Greek Fathers, 
Zizioulas argues that, both the classical Greek and Roman traditions do not attribute ontological 
content to the person, a concept so important to his theology.
22
 For example, in Greek ontology, 
individual substances always preceded relation. And so in this sense, relations are what happen 
between already constituted individual substances. This ‘revolution’ was the culmination of the 
Cappadocian concern ‘to give ontological expression to its faith in the Triune God’, to ‘develop a 
solution to the trinitarian problems ….’23 Essentially the term ‘hypostasis’ was ‘dissociated from 
that of ousia and became identified with that of prosopon’.24 This resulted in a relational term 
(prosopon) being admitted into ontology and the drawing of an ontological category (hypostasis) 
into the relational categories of existence. And the result? Being is identified with communion. 
Thus, ‘to be and to be in relation become identical’.25 The significance of Cappadocian thought 
is twofold:  
 
(a) The person is no longer an adjunct to a being, a category we add to a concrete entity once we 
have first verified its ontological hypostasis. It is itself the hypostasis of the being. (b) Entities no 
longer trace their being to being itself – that is, being is not an absolute category in itself – but to 
the person, to precisely that which constitutes being, that is, enables entities to be entities.
26
 
 
This means that the notion of personhood became the essential ontological concept. In sum, 
Zizioulas says: 
 
In other words from an adjunct to a being (a kind of mask) the person becomes the being itself and 
is simultaneously – a most significant point – the constitutive element (the ‘principle’ or ‘cause’) 
of beings.
27
 
 
Previously, personhood was thought to be a prefabricated and God-like or spirit-like substance 
that was merely added to an individual’s material body as if it were an afterthought. This is 
important to our purpose here, because it means that were one to lose her ‘spirit-like substance’, 
which, as mentioned in chapter 2, has traditionally been equated with reason, one could be 
relegated to the status of non-person. In short some intellectually impaired individuals would not 
be considered persons. However, advocates of a fully Trinitarian understanding of personhood, 
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 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 36f. 
22Ibid., 27-35; idem, ‘Human Capacity’, 401-48, 403-6; idem, Communion and Otherness, 100-03. 
23 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 87, 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 88. 
26 Ibid., 39 (italics in original).  
27 Ibid. 
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argue that it is our relationality which constitutes our being. So human beings are, in fact, 
nothing if not for the relationships in which they exist. But what is the status of those who cannot 
engage in meaningful reciprocal relationships, for example persons suffering from acute 
dementia?  
Perhaps a more careful consideration of the twofold consequences of the patristic 
theological and philosophical ‘revolution’, which together undergird the ontology of persons as 
argued by Zizioulas might avail some answers. Two basic ‘leavenings’ in patristic theology 
contributed to the new ontology suggested here. First, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, in 
contrast to prior Greek ontology, meant that the world is not ontologically necessary and is 
therefore a ‘product of freedom’ such that the being of ‘the world became free from necessity’.28 
Second and following from this, ‘the being of God Himself was identified with the person’.29  
The divine substance, then, is constituted through constitutive relationships with the Son 
and the Spirit and does not occur in self-isolation: ‘it is precisely His trinitarian existence that 
constitutes this confirmation’.30 In short, and a point that is very relevant to our study is this: 
‘person’ forms the ultimate ontological reality and personhood can only be constituted in 
communion. Thus when Zizioulas castigates the Western theological tradition with the charge of 
essentialism, common enough in Orthodox views of the Latin understanding of the trinity, it is 
the priority in God of the divine substance that he has in mind. Typical would be the following 
quote: ‘The one God is the Father. Substance is something common to all three persons of the 
Trinity, but it is not ontologically primary until Augustine makes it so’.31  
For Zizioulas, then, the being of God is relational. He says: ‘The Holy Trinity is a 
primordial ontological concept and not a notion which is added to the divine substance or rather 
which follows it…The substance of God, ‘God’, has no ontological content, no true being, apart 
from communion’.32 We have said that the Father constitutes the divine communion, which 
means that God’s substance does not contain him, and that communion does not restrict his 
existence. God’s being, then, is the consequence of a free person. In other words a free person 
constitutes being. Thus Zizioulas: ‘True being comes only from the free person, from the person 
who loves freely, that is, who freely affirms his being, his identity, by means of an event of 
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30 Ibid. 
31 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 106. See also note 13 in idem.  
32 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 17. 
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communion with other persons’.33 These principles emerge from this regarding the relationship 
between person and communion: first, true being is not possible minus communion, and 
communion is an ontological category. Second, ‘the person cannot exist without communion; but 
every form of communion which denies or suppresses the person, is inadmissible’.34  
Thus far we are saying that the Father is the one who freely and lovingly ‘begets’ the Son 
and ‘brings forth’ the Spirit, without any compulsion whatever. Zizioulas, then, argues that it is 
in view of the ontological priority of the Father, hence of hypostasis over ousia, that we can 
make the ontological equation: being = communion = freedom.
35
 If the divine substance is 
constituted via the divine person, divinity must then be contained in the idea of the person and all 
of God’s characteristics must be derivable from his personhood. For his characteristics are not 
something qualifying God’s being, but rather are identical with it.  
3.4 On Ecstatic Personhood 
 
To properly grasp Zizioulas’s understanding of personhood, two terms are indispensible - 
ekstasis and hypostasis. The former was prominent in the Greek patristic concept of truth, but in 
its application to the idea of ‘person’ it needs to be completed by the latter. And so hypostasis, 
when paired with ekstasis, points to freedom for the whole. This freedom is for oneself, in one’s 
own identity and particularity as holder of the whole. We can say that personhood is God’s 
essence and logically precedes God’s characteristics. This can be summed up to mean that God’s 
essence is person, which Volf argues simply means that God is love.
36
 Thus the statement: “‘God 
is person” acquires its full significance only if it is also reversible: “person is God”’.37  
So strictly speaking personhood is something we attribute only to God. This means that 
God is an entity ‘whose particularity is established in full ontological freedom, i.e., not by virtue 
of its boundaries but by its ekstasis of communion’.38 Again, God’s being is ‘ecstatic’, which for 
Zizioulas means God’s being is ‘being as communion’. To explain what the notion of ekstasis is 
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supposed to clarify, Zizioulas indicates how it is distinct from the notion of hypostasis.
39
 Both 
ekstasis and hypostasis portray being in different ways. Hypostasis specifies a particular being in 
its concreteness, and ekstasis does so in the particular being’s relationship to other beings. Both 
refer to a concrete being. However, unlike hypostasis, ekstasis does not refer to the concrete 
being with regard to its substance, but with regard to the relationship that identifies its 
concreteness. In short, ekstasis is ‘othering’ – i.e., it is the state of being which freely grants 
integrity to another self by relating to it. For Zizioulas, otherness is constitutive of unity, and not 
a threat to it. It is a sine qua non condition of unity.
40
 To Zizioulas, this unity is safeguarded by 
the priority of the Father (monarchia of the Father), and not by the unity of substance as 
conceived by some Western theologians.
41
  
Following the Cappadocian Fathers, Zizioulas goes beyond Irenaeus’ teaching that the 
Son and the Spirit do the work of the Father in the economy, to claim the ontological priority of 
the Father (the monarchy of the Father). In other words, for Zizioulas, everything begins with the 
particular person of the Father and He is the principle of everything both divine and created. By 
this he means that the trinitarian communion is ‘hypostasized’ through the ecstatic character of 
the Father, who is the cause of both the being and the divinity of the Son and Spirit and so also of 
trinitarian communion.
42
 Zizioulas himself interprets ecstatic being as a ‘movement towards 
communion’,43 which as Reinders correctly worries, raises the issue of the initiating subject of 
this movement.
44
 So against his intentions, Zizioulas’s account seems to reopen the case for 
relational personhood in terms of human subjectivity.
45
 I agree with Reinders. Furthermore, a 
theological conception of ‘ecstatic being’ should explain why God is the sole initiating subject of 
our interrelatedness in a manner that does not emphasize features inherent to our being.
46
 This is 
the task of chapter 4 where we engage Karl Barth’s theological anthropology. For now let us 
continue and examine how Zizioulas thinks the question of authentic personhood can be realized 
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in human existence. To answer this question we must turn to Zizioulas’s distinction between 
what he calls our ‘biological’ being and our ‘ecclesial’ being. 
3.5 On Created Persons  
 
Recall that regarding divine persons, for Zizioulas, personhood is ontologically prior to 
substance. This means that God’s ‘being in communion’ is logically prior to God’s 
characteristics. So just as at the divine level ‘person’ enjoys precedence over ‘substance’, so also 
at the human level. In contrast to such logic, Zizioulas argues that Western culture and 
philosophy understands a person to be one who possesses certain characteristics. Zizioulas is 
right because this is precisely the kind of thought that has continued to marginalize intellectually 
impaired persons, wrongly consigning them to the category of ‘Other’ and considering them a 
‘threat’. According to Zizioulas, it was the ‘cross-fertilization’ of Boethian and Augustinian 
approaches which produced the individualistic tendency to regard the other as a threat.
47
 This is 
because the two basic components of the Boethian-Augustinian approach to the self are ‘rational 
individuality’ and ‘psychological experience and consciousness’.48  
On the basis of this combination, Western thought holds a ‘static’ or ‘rigid’ 
understanding of the self as an autonomous ‘individual and/or a personality, i.e., a unit endowed 
with intellectual, psychological and moral qualities centred on the axis of consciousness’.49 Little 
surprise, then, that when society encounters persons with dementia, persons in permanent 
vegetative states (PVS), and the ‘Kellys50 of this world in general, it feels threatened and crudely 
advocates for, in some instances, death. Against this, the trinitarian witness is explicit, and 
perhaps herein lies the strength of Zizioulas’s anthropology which rejects such approaches 
(Boethian-Augustinian) in accordance with the trinitarian model that places persons and 
communion prior to substance. 
                                               
47 Zizioulas, ‘Human Capacity’, 405. 
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 For example P. F. Strawson in his book Individuals simply assumes the definition of person in terms of 
consciousness: ‘One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can 
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50 See Hans Reinders’ story of Kelley who is a micro-encephalic in The Gift of Friendship, 20-24, as discussed 
throughout this study.  
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How, then, is personhood to be understood? And more specifically, how are we to think 
of the personhood of those individuals whose humanity society has placed in doubt? Negatively, 
and a point significant to our purpose here, a human being:  
should not be understood in terms of ‘personality’, i.e., of a complex of natural, psychological, or 
moral qualities that are in some sense ‘possessed’ by or ‘contained’ in the human individuum. On 
the contrary, being a person is basically different from being an individual or ‘personality’ in that 
the person cannot be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to.
51
 
 
Again, it follows that:  
 
personhood implies the ‘openness of being’, and even more than that, the ek-stasis of being, i.e., a 
movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the ‘self’ and 
thus a freedom…[T]he person in its ekstatic character reveals its being in a catholic, i.e., integral 
and undivided, way, and thus in its being ekstatic it becomes hypostatic, i.e. the bearer of its 
nature in its totality.
52
 
 
This means that: 
 
in contrast to the partiality of the individual which is subject to addition and combination, the 
person in its ek-static character reveals its being in a catholic, i.e. integral and undivided, way, and 
thus in its being ek-static it becomes hypostatic, i.e., the bearer of its nature in its totality.
53
 
 
Caution must be taken to understand what is being said here. Zizioulas does not hold that 
qualities are in every way irrelevant to the case. Instead he means that they are secondary to the 
absolute uniqueness of the particular hypostasis. And so, he says, such qualities, important as 
they are for personal identity, ‘become ontologically personal only through the hypostasis to 
which they belong: only by being my qualities they are personal’.54 Furthermore, for Zizioulas, 
when we refer to the ingredient ‘me’ of an individual, we are claiming her absolute uniqueness 
which is not guaranteed by these classifiable qualities constituting her ‘what’, but by something 
else. What is this something else?  
For Zizioulas ekstasis and hypostasis are the two basic aspects of personhood. Although 
the term ek-stasis in this sense is known mainly through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, 
Zizioulas says that before Heidegger, the term was used in the mystical writings of the Greek 
Fathers (e.g. Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, etc.) in basically the same sense. For Zizioulas, 
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Trinitarian being whose witness against ancient Greek philosophy is explicit provides a paradigm 
for a theology of created being. He says:  
 
God by being uncreated is not faced with given being: He, as a particular being (the Father) 
brings about his own being (the Trinity). He is thus free in an ontological sense, and therefore the 
particular is primary in ontology in this case. But what about the human being?55 
 
Let us turn to Zizioulas’s answer to his own question. For Zizioulas, a theological anthropology 
of particularity (which is not individualistic) is founded on principles. He says:  
  
That otherness is constitutive of unity, and not consequent upon it…[God’s] oneness or unity is 
not safeguarded by the unity of substance, as St Augustine and other Western theologians have 
argued, [but] by the monarchia of the Father, Who is Himself one of the Trinity … Secondly, a 
study of the Trinity reveals that otherness is absolute. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are 
absolutely different … Thirdly … otherness is not moral or psychological but ontological … As a 
result of this … otherness is inconceivable apart from relationship … Communion does not 
threaten otherness; it generates it.56 
 
That ‘something else’ of absolute uniqueness is indicated only through an affirmation arising 
freely from a relationship. But how does Zizioulas derive theological anthropology out of this? 
Applied to human being, this understanding of ontological freedom presents a problem. How so? 
The hypostasis of biological existence is constituted by conception and birth, the product of 
communion between two people.
57
 Human beings, then, are ‘individuals’ by merely being born. 
However, two passions radically affect the biological constitution of a human’s hypostasis, 
which destroys the person.
58
 The first ‘passion’ is ‘ontological necessity’. Zizioulas says: ‘the 
hypostasis is inevitably tied to the natural instinct, to an impulse which is “necessary” and not 
subject to control of freedom’.59 The person, then, ‘subsists’ not as freedom but as necessity. 
Individualism is the second passion that separates the hypostases and logically leads to death 
(Rom. 7:24).
60
 Thus Zizioulas: 
The biological constitution of the human hypostasis, fundamentally tied as it is to the necessity of 
its “nature,” ends in the perpetuation of this “nature” through the creation of bodies, that is, of 
hypostatic unities which affirm their identity as separation from other unities or “hypostases”.61 
 
                                               
55 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 108.  
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This means that the body behaves like ‘the fortress of an ego’, or ‘a new “mask”’, which hinders 
the hypostasis from becoming a person.
62
 The body tends towards the person but leads finally to 
the individual. This ‘failure of nature’ makes two revelations simultaneously. First, that for the 
hypostasis to survive it must express itself as ecstasis, and second, that the ‘failure’ of the 
survival of the biological hypostasis is the result of the ‘very constitutional make up of the 
hypostasis, i.e., of the biological act of the perpetuation of the species’ and not the result of some 
acquired fault of a moral kind.
63
 Accordingly, ‘[m]an as a biological hypostasis is intrinsically a 
tragic figure’.64 While born as a result of an ecstatic fact – erotic love – this fact is interwoven 
with a natural necessity and thus lacks ontological freedom. In sum: human persons cannot exist 
without their biological and psychological being, but as such they cannot exist in ontological 
freedom either.  
Zizioulas locates the answer to this conundrum in christology and ecclesiology. For 
Zizioulas, a human being is not a person unless he or she has in some sense received God’s 
salvific grace. He says: ‘If biological birth gives us a hypostasis dependent ontologically on 
nature, this indicates that a ‘new birth’ is needed in order to experience an ontology of 
personhood’.65 For Zizioulas, ‘[t]he goal of salvation is that the personal life which is realized in 
God should also be realized on the level of human existence’.66 Salvation, then, is the realization 
of personhood in human beings. However, are there persons extra ecclesiam? Indeed Zizioulas 
himself asks: ‘But is not “man” a person even without salvation?’67 We shall come back to this 
question. Zizioulas’s argument rests upon an important distinction between individuals (or in his 
words the hypostasis of biological existence) and persons (or again the hypostasis of ecclesial 
existence), two modes of existences, which he adopts from patristic theology. The essence of 
salvific grace, then, is to transform perverted humanity’s biological existence into a new mode of 
ecclesial existence. In other words, an individual can only become a person in communion with 
God and is constituted in relationships of genuine love, within his church, the proper context for 
experiencing the ontology of personhood. In such a community, then, one ‘does not – and should 
                                               
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 52. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 109.  
66 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 50. 
67 Ibid. 
85 
 
not – identify the other with the help of their qualities (physical, social moral etc.)’.68 This 
community is of course the church which we will now consider more critically. 
3.6 On Ecclesial Beings 
 
Zizioulas argues that an authentic personhood is only possible ‘from above’. By this he means 
that only the church is capable of introducing individuals ‘into a kind of relationship with the 
world that is not determined by the laws of biology’.69 So for Zizioulas: ‘[t]he Church is not 
simply an institution. She is a “mode of existence”, a way of being’.70 With regard to 
anthropology there are three key aspects, some mentioned already, of Zizioulas’s ecclesiology: 
(1) Christ as the head of the body and person par excellence, (2) baptism as new birth, and (3) 
the Eucharist which constitutes the church.
71
  
First, the church proclaims the reality of human freedom from natural necessity as it is 
attested by the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Christ is the opposite of an individual; he is the 
person par excellence, since his identity is derived from a twofold relation; Son to Father and 
Head to body.
72
 Thus, the quest for the person, not as a ‘mask’ or as a ‘tragic figure’, became a 
historical reality in Christology.
73
 The identification of Christ’s personhood with the Son’s 
personhood, then, renders human personhood possible. Christ as body or corporate personality 
incorporates the many into himself as the one who at the same time represents multiplicity.
74
 In 
Christ, human personhood becomes identical with divine personhood through participation in the 
divine ‘dance’. The very same filial relationship that constitutes Christ himself also forms the 
base for the constitution of the personhood of every human being who is then set free from the 
bondage to necessity, separation and death intrinsic in creaturely existence.
75
 According to 
Zizioulas, then, salvific grace is the transformation of an individual into a ‘catholic’ person who 
is both unique in his or her own catholicity and constituted through the relationship of Christ to 
the Father. Christology, then, is the proclamation to human beings that their nature can be 
assumed and hypostasized in a manner free from the ontological necessity of their biological 
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hypostasis which as has been mentioned leads to the tragedy of individualism.
76
 Only the 
uncreated God is a person in the full sense of the word, and only in communion with the triune 
God can human beings become free, ‘catholic’ persons living in communion.  
The second of the key aspects to Zizioulas’s ecclesiology is baptism. For Zizioulas, the 
hypostasis that baptism gives to human beings is called ecclesial because, in fact, it is in the 
church that the ‘new biological hypostasis of man is realized in history’.77 This new birth that is 
mediated in baptism is the means of constituting an ecclesial hypostasis. In other words, it is 
through baptism that individuals become persons, not only by changing the inner constitution but 
also the ontological content of the human being. Thus Zizioulas: 
In Baptism which is constitutive of a new being, of a being which is not subject to death and 
therefore ontologically ultimate, precisely because Baptism is essentially nothing else but the 
application to humanity of the very filial relationship which exists between the Father and the 
Son.78 
 
As death and resurrection in Christ, baptism signifies the decisive passing of a human being’s 
existence from individualized being into the truth of personal being.
79
 Thus as ecclesial beings, 
human beings find that they are separated by individuality which is to be transcended by being 
drawn into the community of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This communion justifies the hope 
promised of being authentic persons in the final outcome of existence. ‘What happens to the 
biological hypostasis of man when…ecclesial hypostasis is brought into being?’80 It is to 
Zizioulas’s answer to this question that we now turn.  
For Zizioulas, baptism is understood as an eschatological promise because participation 
in the life of the church does not take away the concreteness of natural being. In sum, a tension 
exists between individual and person because the human being exists as person not as that which 
they are, rather as the person they will be. Consequently, participation in the act of communion, 
i.e. the ecclesia is a foretaste of what is to come but meanwhile an experience of authentic 
personhood is offered. Zizioulas continues: ‘What kind of experience of authentic personhood is 
it that the ecclesial hypostasis offers?’ Zizioulas says that a ‘new ontological category’ is needed 
to answer this question. However this new category is not to destroy the distinction between 
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biological and ecclesial hypostases, but to express their relationship which creates a paradoxical 
relationship in human existence.
81
 So the situation created by this paradoxical hypostasis which 
has its ‘roots in the future and its branches in the present’,82 could perhaps be better expressed by 
the ontological category, sacramental or Eucharistic hypostasis to which we now turn. 
While the Eucharist for Zizioulas is not an isolated means of grace or a sacrament among 
others, when we delve deeper into both his and Yannaras’s theology, as we shall see, we 
discover that each of their stand on the issue of Eucharist is a bit different. For Zizioulas, the 
Eucharist is first and above all ‘an assembly (synaxis), a community, a network of relations, in 
which man “subsists” in a manner different from the biological as a member of a body which 
transcends every exclusiveness of biological or social kind’.83 Further, for Zizioulas, not only is 
the Eucharist an assembly, or rather an ‘historical realisation and manifestation of the 
eschatological existence of man’, it is also, second, a movement or progression towards this 
realization.
84
 In other words, persons are constituted in the church through baptism and sustained 
by, and grounded in, the ‘experience’ of the eucharist which is ‘from above’.85 Assembly and 
movement are thus the two fundamental characteristics of the Eucharist.  
As a liturgical act of eschatological orientation and progressive movement, the Eucharist 
proves that ecclesial existence is not of this world but belongs to ‘the eschatological 
transcendence of history and not simply to history’.86 Thus, because it belongs to the 
transcendence of history the person has ‘roots in the future and is perpetually inspired, or rather 
maintained and nourished, by the future’.87 In sum, both the person and the Eucharist are 
understood not only as a realization of the eschaton but also as a movement towards the eschaton 
(Heb. 11:1).
88
 For Zizioulas, the Eucharist and eucharistic communion are identical. Thus, when 
the eucharistic community congregates to celebrate, they simply do not receive holy things, nor 
even the words and deeds of Christ, but rather the person of Christ in its totality.
89
 For Zizioulas, 
then, ‘[t]o eat the body of Christ and to drink his blood means to participate in him who took 
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upon himself the ‘multitude’ … in order to make of them a single body, his body’.90 From this 
understanding of the Eucharist follows a particular understanding of the relation between 
Eucharist and the church: it is not the church that constitutes the Eucharist, but Eucharist 
constitutes the church.
91
 Hence for Zizioulas, and particularly, as we will see, for Yannaras, as 
often as human beings participate in eucharist, their personhood is hypostasized by love and free 
from biological necessity and exclusiveness and will not finally die. The Person, then, has the 
final word over nature; in the same way that Jesus as person and not as nature had the last word. 
In sum: we have been saying that John Zizioulas argues for a perichoretic communion 
present in the intra-trinitarian relations which make ‘relationality’ the distinguishing 
characteristic of personhood. In this sense of communion, God’s being is said to be ‘ecstatic’. 
Hence for Zizioulas, God’s being is ‘being as communion’. That is how God exists. When 
applied to persons, Zizioulas distinguishes between individuals and persons. Thus all human 
beings are individuals by genesis, but must become persons in telos. So for him, it is only 
possible to become a person in ecclesia through baptism. We shall return to these points when 
we engage his critics. For now let us turn and consider Yannaras’s personalist anthropology.  
 
4. The Relational Ontology of Christos Yannaras  
4.1 Introduction 
 
Recall we have said that personalist anthropology is distinguished by an emphasis on certain 
elements that constitute personhood: relationality, freedom and the uniqueness of personal 
existence. These aspects of personal existence become apparent as we look closely at Christos 
Yannaras’s approach to the personal. Yannaras, a pivotal Greek theologian, and Zizioulas are by 
no means the only ones who have put forward a personalist theology. In fact the two theologians 
stand in a wider context of modern philosophers and theologians of the last few decades who, 
addressing ontological issues, have put forward their views in existentialist and personalist terms. 
Andrew Louth likens Yannaras’s relational theology of the person to the philosophy of 
Levinas.
92
 However, Yannaras is not influenced by Levinas but finds a connection to 
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Heidegger
93
 through his understanding of the notion of ‘being’ that he retrieved from the Pre-
Socratic philosopher Herakleitos.
94
 Yannaras agrees with Heidegger that the West, having lost 
the concept of ‘being’ drifted away from ontological truth.  
If Zizioulas’s work is a ‘neo-patristic synthesis’,95 Yannaras, a personalist philosopher, 
attempts a synthesis of what may loosely be called the Greek patristic tradition and modern 
phenomenological thought. Here, he attempts to compare the Byzantine apophatic tradition, and 
the confrontation with ‘Nothingness’ which for Heidegger is revealed as the final step of western 
metaphysics.
96
 In his writings, Yannaras has attempted to tackle what he argues are problems at 
the core of modern theology, and so for example, early on in his writings, the threads connecting 
his overall theological project are already in place. Here, Yannaras sees himself as writing to 
readers whose worldview has been shaped by Marx, Freud and the ‘Death of God’, and so he 
seeks to relate the Orthodox Patristic tradition to contemporary issues.  
Generally Yannaras articulates his position through three overlapping movements that 
correspond yet are inseparable and distinct: The first move is a critical and descriptive 
interrogation of the state of Eastern Orthodox theology today; the second a critical examination 
of Western theology; and, the third a re-reading of Eastern Orthodox theology in light of the 
Church Fathers. The first two represent a ‘deconstruction’ of modern Greek Orthodoxy and the 
Latin West, wherein the former is rid of Western scholasticism, while the third represents a re-
construction of Eastern Orthodox identity rooted in Gregory Palamas. Unlike Zizioulas and 
Orthodox theology in general, Yannaras remains largely undiscovered in the West. This is a pity 
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because Louth characterizes him as ‘without doubt the most important living [and controversial] 
Greek Orthodox theologian’,97 and one who seeks to address the issues and problems of modern 
life in the terms and concepts of today.  
In this section, we continue with our task of examining the theological turn to 
relationality and how it impinges on cognitive impairment. Remember we are saying that the 
rationality-relationality turn needs another radical step to account for individuals who are 
profoundly intellectually impaired. To properly understand Yannaras, one must recognize some 
categories that are significant for his treatment of the issue of ontology, namely: (1) the priority 
of the particular over the universal, (2) persons and relationality, (3) the ecstatic character of 
personal existence, (4) Eros, (5) the universality of the person, (6) the unity of the person, (7) the 
distinction he makes of ‘nature’ and the ‘energies’ of the person, (8) divine and human persons, 
and (9) the ecclesia. However, space will not allow us to examine all the individual constituents 
that have brought Yannaras to see the importance of personalism. Thus, we will focus mainly on 
some categories worked out fully in his treatise, To Prosopo kai o Eros (Person and Eros).  
Most Western readers would classify this book as an essay in ‘natural theology’, though 
as Rowan Williams says, it is a natural theology with a ‘Trinitarian sting in the tail’.98 We are 
interested in this work because therein Yannaras attempts to show how personhood as we know 
it is anchored in Being, and so in God. And because our starting point is from a particular 
concept of personhood, i.e., existence-in-communion, we are obliged to postulate ‘internal’ 
personal communion to God. As William says, this like any attempt to expound the relation of 
finite to infinite is inevitably an essay in analogy. However this should not necessarily mean that 
we take finite existence as a starting-point which is ‘more real’ or ‘more certain’ than infinite 
existence.
99
 Before we examine Yannaras’s understanding of personhood as erotic – that is, 
ontologically constituted by attraction, openness, freedom and communion, and how this 
exposition bears upon our drive towards reconsidering relational anthropology, let us consider an 
issue at the core of his thought and what he thinks is the demarcating line between East and 
West. 
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4.2 On the Distinction between the ‘Essence’ and the ‘Energies’ of the Person100 
 
Yannaras lays on this distinction the heavy burden of bearing the entire weight of Orthodox 
identity and also that which counters all the ills and errors of Latin West.
101
 However, Yannaras 
here is only following in the steps of his mentors, by building upon the foundation laid down by 
two Russian émigré theologians Vladimir Lossky and Georges Florovsky. In Christian theology, 
as we shall see, the person is an inseparable and integrity totality. Why, then, one might ask, do 
we here speak of a distinction between the essence (ousia) and energies (energeia) of a person? 
For Yannaras, this is a creation of the theological mind which it highlights with reference to the 
ontological categories regarding the person. When we consider divine personhood, it is perhaps 
normal to speak about the Triadic God and about the way in which we can speak about His 
existence. In addition, it is also possible to distinguish the reality which is shown by the word 
‘essence’ or ‘nature’ from the reality which is shown by the word ‘person’ or ‘hypostasis’. 
However, let us now speak of the word ‘energy’, that is, ‘essence’ and ‘hypostasis’ and which is 
just as constitutive of what exists as the other two and at the same time their consequence.  
What exactly is designated with the term energies? For Yannaras, we designate those 
potentials of nature or essence to make known the hypostasis and its existence, to make it known 
and participable.
102
 To make this definition clearer, Yannaras speaks about the energies of 
human nature or our essence. He says: ‘every man has understanding, reason, will, desire, 
imagination; every man works, loves, creates’.103 To Yannaras, all these capacities, and others 
analogous to them, ‘are common to all people’. This means that, for Yannaras, they all ‘belong to 
the human nature or essence’.104 These ‘natural capacities’, Yannaras argues, mark the difference 
between humans and every other being.
105
 However, Yannaras argues that although these natural 
energies are common to all, they are ‘disclosed and actualized’ by each individual in a unique 
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way. He says: ‘All men have understanding, will, desire, imagination; but every particular man 
thinks, wills, desires, imagines in a manner absolutely different’.106   
We must stop and ask what exactly Yannaras intends when he speaks of all these 
capacities as being common to all people, as belonging to our essence, and as marking the 
difference between humans and other beings? But what of those persons who do not possess 
some or all of these ‘natural’ capacities? To me, Yannaras’s argument here risks repeating the 
same move that we find everywhere, namely, the account of being human in terms of higher 
capacities distinct from the capacities of other beings. Yannaras’s move raises the same question 
here as it does elsewhere: if it is true that the ‘natural energies/capacities’ are the only way in 
which the ‘personal otherness’ of every human person, is revealed and disclosed, and that which 
‘differentiates every man from all his fellow men’,107 that casts doubt on the person of human 
beings without these natural energies. And so, what about our fellow human beings who are 
severely intellectually impaired and who, as far as we can tell, do not possess part or all of the 
‘energies’ mentioned? Is this not the point today’s bioethicists press time after time? I am afraid 
that although it is not his intention, Yannaras risks reinforcing their point.  
If such an account is to be rehabilitated, this can only be achieved by following the major 
thesis of our study: That we encounter those persons who do not possess the said ‘natural 
energies/capacities’ through their bodily presence. In short, the individual who does not possess 
all the capacities Yannaras claims are ‘common to all people’, i.e., reason, will, desire, 
imagination, love, creativity, and the ability to work, is encountered and relates to the rest of her 
fellow human beings by being bodily present. This claim should stand because as Yannaras 
argues, though common to all, the energies are disclosed and actualized individually in a unique 
manner. A profoundly intellectually impaired person’s unique manner of disclosing the only 
energies she perhaps possesses is through the physical body that is present to the rest of the 
parties in the relationship.  
That particular person’s embodiment, then, should count as her natural energy, and thus 
that which belongs to her essence and differentiates her from every other being. Indeed, for 
Yannaras, there is no other way of knowing the personal otherness of an individual, than by the 
manifestation of natural energies. He says: ‘[t]he natural energies permit us to know the 
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otherness of the person by sharing in the way or in the how of their manifestation’.108 Thus we 
share in the way or in the how of an intellectually impaired person’s manifestation by them being 
bodily present to us. Additionally, the individual is a person who does not have the capacity to 
say reason, will, desire, imagine, love, be creative and work. Furthermore the person who once 
possessed these natural energies, as in the case of an acquired cognitive impairment, e.g., 
advanced dementia etc, does not lose his dignity even when his capacities for reason and will are 
suddenly frustrated. And on the other spectrum, that neonate whose capacities are undeveloped is 
a person too, and it is not true that the perfection of these natural energies is their ultimate telos 
and the ground for their dignity.  
What we are left with, then, is the question about relationships in which individuals 
become persons á la Zizioulas and Yannaras. The tension in this issue of relationality comes to 
the fore from the perspective of individuals lacking in these natural energies/capacities. It is 
difficult not to conclude that the lives of individuals who do not possess the said natural 
energies/capacities is ‘subhuman’. But I am not suggesting that this is what Yannaras is saying. 
Instead, my point is that the claim as described warrants such conclusion. In chapter 4 then, I will 
discuss possible responses to such a conclusion.  
4.3 On Person as Relational Reality  
 
Yannaras maintains that ‘person’ is one of the two categories that stand at the centre of the 
philosophical Christian tradition in relation to the question of ontology. Like, Zizioulas who 
tends to associate the concept of the ‘person’ with hypostasis, at the core of Yannaras’s 
understanding of personhood is the term tropos hyparxeos (‘mode of existence’),109 which is one 
of the characterizations of person or hypostasis suggested by the Cappadocians. This 
characterization was further developed by Maximus the Confessor, in contrast to nature as 
characterized by the principle of being. It means that like human nature, the mode of existence is 
not predetermined as a collection of properties. It is the way our human nature is lived out, or 
expressed, in a personal way of existence experienced as a ‘standing outside’, a self-
transcendence, an ek-stasis moving beyond oneself in loving freedom.
110
 Thus Yannaras: ‘[t]his 
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movement from noetic-conscious stationariness (stasis) to universal relation is also a transition 
from the ontic-individual perception of human existence to its ecstatic determination’.111 So 
‘person’ in Yannaras does not determine nature, but rather describes its real manifestation, that 
is, its mode of existence or the ‘how’ it exists.  
Yannaras owes his theology of trinitarian personhood to Lossky who was first to develop 
in Orthodox theology an understanding of personhood as ekstatic (freedom from self for God) 
and hypostatic (unique) based on an apophatic approach to the doctrine of the Trinity.
112
 But 
Lossky seems to have left unattended a tension within his own theology between his apophatic 
trinitarian theology and his more cataphatic claims about personhood. It is only when Yannaras 
started to integrate more coherently Lossky’s emphasis on apophaticism and the ‘ontology’ of 
personhood as ekstatic and hypostatic that we start to sense a genuine tradition within 
contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology. Both Zizioulas and Yannaras add an element to this 
trinitarian understanding of personhood not clearly present in Lossky - relationality. However in 
contemporary discussions of ecclesiology and trinitarian theology, most of the credit has been 
attributed to Zizioulas for popularizing this understanding of trinitarian personhood as ekstatic, 
hypostatic, and relational.  
From the very beginning of his analysis of the personal, Yannaras declares that 
personhood implies relationship. In short, the person is a relational reality. Here, Yannaras starts 
by carefully parsing the term prosopon. This Greek term does not point to an abstract analogy or 
comparison but to ‘being-opposite-someone/something’.113 For Yannaras it is no coincidence 
that the Greek word for person, prosopon, should have the literal meaning ‘face’.114 It is a face or 
a look that turns towards someone or something, and thus denotes a movement, an immediate 
reference, a relationship-to-somebody or to-something.
115
 Each of us, then, is authentically a 
person only in so far as we ‘face’ others and relate to them in love without regard to their ability 
or capacity for agency. For Yannaras, herein lays the ‘potential which constitutes man, the 
potential to be opposite someone or something, to have one’s face-toward someone or 
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something, to be a person’.116  Immediately we encounter an idea which is very prominent in 
Yannaras, and present throughout his reflection and argumentation, that the person is the sole 
existential possibility of relation and the fact of relation as the initial assumption of the 
ontological question.  
By the word ‘person’, then, we define a referential reality. In other words, the term 
manifests a communicative contact with the other and it is almost a synonym for the opportunity 
for relationship.
117
 That which is ‘opposite-someone/something’, i.e., the person, represents an 
individual, but an individual in relation, a dynamic actualization of relationship. Persons 
therefore realize their very being by moving to connect with what is found outside of them. Thus 
beings exist only as things-set-opposite, i.e., they manifest being only in relation to person.
118
 
Again recall we are saying that this manner of thinking risks marginalizing fellow human beings 
who do not have the capacity to ‘face’ others, ‘move’ to connect with the other, or have 
meaningful reciprocal relations which ‘manifest their being’. For Yannaras, the person is 
dynamic which straightway juxtaposes it with any notion of a static existence. The person is here 
contrasted with the idea of the individual where the latter is closed and bound off in isolation, in 
the limitedness of its individuality and secured in the egocentricity of its self-sufficiency. 
However, according to Yannaras while the person also carries individuality, it is an individual in 
relation, a dynamic actualization of relationship.
119
  
Yannaras argues that apophaticism is the presupposition for a relational personhood that 
is both ekstatic and hypostatic. To Yannaras, to the extent that apophaticism rejects the idea of 
reducing God to a necessary concept, it is the basis of the possibility of knowing and engaging 
with the personal God. This knowledge of God as a personal encounter is simultaneously an 
event of Eros. Eros, then, is the ‘supreme road’ to knowledge of the person. This is because Eros 
is ‘an acceptance of the other person as a whole’.120 Thus eros does not project onto the other 
person ‘individual preferences’, ‘demands or desires’, especially if the person has any type of 
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disability, and in the case of this study cognitive impairment. Instead, it accepts him or her as 
he/she is, in the fullness of his/her personal uniqueness.
121
  
4.4 On the Ecstatic Character of Personal Existence 
In pursuing categories that are fundamental to Yannaras’s discourse of the person and nature, let 
us now briefly sketch the notion of the ecstatic/ecstasy, which is common and key to both 
Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s theological anthropology.122 I must begin by saying that unlike in 
Zizioulas’s treatment123 of the same, the idea of ecstasy or the ecstatic is not presented in 
Yannaras’s work in a very straightforward manner. It is therefore a bit difficult to clearly draw 
out Yannaras on terms ‘ecstasy’ and ‘ek-stasis’ as he uses them in Person and Eros. This is 
because he employs the terms broadly and in connection with not just a single concept but 
connects it with many other ideas.
124
 Having said that, according to my reading of his usage, the 
majority of the times when he uses the terms ‘ecstasy’ and ‘ecstatic’, he does so to demonstrate 
the dynamics of relationality and personal engagement.
125
 Yannaras borrows the concept ecstasy 
from Heidegger’s analysis of ‘EK-sistenz’, which to Heidegger means ‘rising up into the truth of 
Being’ and the truth of Being.126 However, the Greek language does not offer the same analysis, 
and so Yannaras seems to super-impose Heidegger’s analysis to ek-stasis. By my reading 
Yannaras uses the concept of ecstasy when he intends to express how two separate realities are 
connected – as in the case of God’s movement towards human beings and human beings to 
human beings or creation in general.  
For Yannaras, ek-stasis is mainly a ‘standing-out’ movement, the dynamic of the 
advancement from individuality to person that is accomplished through personal relationship, 
which is fundamental for the reality of the person.
127
 Zizioulas combines ekstasis and hypostasis 
as two movements which characterize personhood. For him, the two serve to balance one 
another. Their combination in the idea of the person reveals that personhood is ‘directly related 
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to ontology – it is not a quality added, as it were, to beings, something that beings “have” or 
“have not”, but is constitutive of what can be ultimately called a “being”’.128 Yannaras, as we 
will see below when we consider the ordo essendi of his theology, also maintains the notion of 
‘ecstatic being’, i.e., the character of personhood.  
Again, as we saw with Zizioulas’s understanding, this ecstatic being is grounded in 
communion. This means that both propose a relational personhood which is grounded in the 
center of human subjectivity. Although grounding in communion means that the estatic being is 
not grounded in itself as substance, both think of ecstatic being in terms of ‘movement’ towards 
communion. Again, we may ask, who initiates the movement? Once again, as with Zizioulas, 
and contrary also to Yannaras’s intention, his account seems to succumb to the trap of thinking 
about relational personhood in terms of human subjectivity. Recall we are saying that to be 
inclusive of fellow humans beings who are profoundly intellectually impaired or otherwise, we 
must think of ‘ecstatic being’ in a manner which does not reinforce the importance of features 
intrinsic to humans. We shall return to this point in chapter 4. For now let us examine the ordo 
essendi of Yannaras’s theology. 
4.5 On Divine Personhood 
 
God cannot be known in his Essence, but we do know the mode of his existence. God is a 
personal existence, three specific personal existences of whose personal difference the Church 
has direct historical experience. But what exactly is a personal existence? Specifically, what does 
‘person’ mean? The definition is, perhaps, unattainable and even for humans, as we shall see, 
where bodily individuality makes ‘personhood’, the personal elements of human existence, 
concrete and immediately accessible, it hardly seems feasible for us to define objectively what it 
is which constitutes personhood, which imparts a personal character to existence. We speak of a 
Triadic God, a Trinity that is a Monad of life, because the life of the hypostases of God is not 
simple survival, but a dynamic actualization of unbroken union of eros. Each Person exists not 
for himself, but exists offering himself in a community of love with the other Persons.  
The life within the Trinity is a commingling of life, which means that the life of the one 
becomes the life of the other; their Existence is drawn from the actualization of life as 
communion, from life which is identified with self-offering love. If God is the true Existence and 
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life, the cause and source and starting point of being, then in every case being, existence and life, 
is inseparable from the dynamic of love. Thus when the scriptures declare that ‘God is love’ (1 
Jn 4:16), it is not one of the properties of God’s ‘behaviour’ that is being referred to, but to what 
God is as the fullness of trinitarian and personal communion.
129
 Here, recall that for Yannaras, 
love is the ontological category par excellence, the only possibility for existence, since it is 
through love that God gives substance to His essence, and constitutes His being.
130
  
In Yannaras’s exposition, then, God does not ‘emerge’ into personhood, He is personal. 
The personal being is innately relational, and consequently it is also erotic, or at least called or 
created to be erotic. When humans relate to God, they apprehend His energy as triadic, and, at 
the same time, as kenotic. This personal energy is the foundation of finite, created personhood. 
Human beings are now free to exist in relationship with God on a truly personal nature as beings-
in-communion.  
4.6 On Human Personhood 
 
A crucial step in Yannaras’s analysis of the nature of the personal is his use of the distinction 
between the ‘person’ and the ‘individual’. Yannaras argues that while an individual is defined in 
terms of his or her self-identity and distinction from other individuals, as a kind of irreducible 
unit or monad, person is defined in terms of relationship; an openness to and acknowledgement 
of the ‘other’. The Greek person, then, is relational. For Yannaras, ‘the fact of “relation” is the 
initial assumption of the ontological question, and the “person” [is] the sole existential possibility 
of relation’.131 Yannaras agrees with Zizioulas when he argues that persons exist only over-
against, and in relation to someone or something. Zizioulas says: ‘we know beings as presence 
(par-ousia), not as essence (ousia).
132
  
This means that we cannot know ‘Being-in-itself’ as such, neither can we speak of the 
being-in-itself of beings; we can speak only of being-there or being-present (par-einai), of co-
existence with the possibility of their disclosure’.133 A human being’s acts of knowing, then, are 
not merely intellectual, but are an orientation of his personhood in relation. This is the outgoing 
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openness to other realities which Heidegger calls ‘ek-stasis’. In short, in relationships, humans 
discover not what it is to be human in general, what human nature is in abstract terms, as, for 
instance, a rational being, but the different ways of being human, the different unique ways of 
being human that are summed up in the notion of being a person. I agree with Louth that 
Yannaras’s analysis here closely matches that of Emmanuel Levinas in many respects much 
more than Heidegger’s. Indeed, Levinas’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of traditional 
ontology in favour of recognition of otherness (altérité) has some striking parallels with 
Yannaras’s analysis.134 So because Yannaras is criticized for using Heidegger, perhaps Levinas 
provides a much better philosophical foundation for the position Yannaras embraces than 
Heidegger himself?  
‘What is the body and what is the soul of man?’135 It is to Yannaras’s answer to his 
question that we turn to. To Yannaras, both the body and the soul are energies of human nature. 
By this he means that body and soul are the modes by which the event of the hypostasis (or 
personality, the ego, the identity of the subject) is given effect. For Yannaras, then, what each 
human being is, his or her real existence or hypostasis, this inmost I which constitutes her as an 
existential event, cannot be identified either with the body nor with his soul.
136
 For Yannaras, the 
soul and the body only ‘reveal and disclose what man is; they form energies, manifestation, 
expressions, functions to reveal the hypostasis of man’.137 So in other words ‘his hypostasis’ 
cannot be identified with either ‘his body or with his soul. It is only given effect, expressed and 
revealed by its bodily or spiritual functions’.138 ‘Therefore’ Yannaras says ‘no bodily infirmity, 
injury or deformity and no mental illness, loss of the power of speech or dementia can touch the 
truth of any man, the inmost I which constitutes him as an existential event’.139   
But why not? Why is that which as man is, his hypostasis, not identified with the body 
and soul? So what is she, what is a person’s hypostasis if the animate body which we engage 
when we encounter human beings in daily relations is not the person herself, her inmost ‘I’, that 
which she is? Yannaras’s move here worries me. So following Barth, I will argue that human 
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beings are bodily soul and ensouled body. I think Barth’s understanding here is, as we shall see, 
vastly different from Yannaras’s. Indeed, coming from a non-structural/non functional approach, 
I am worried when Yannaras uses the language of ‘function’ to define the body and soul.140 I 
think it is easy here to fall into the trap of thinking of a person as a ‘something’ else that is given 
effect by their bodily presence and spiritual presence as Yannaras says. To Yannaras, Gen. 1:26 
does not indicate merely the creation of one more of the creatures which fill the earth. For him 
the creature of this verse is set aside by the will of God from all the others to be the image and 
representation of God within the world.
141
 I agree with Yannaras here, I think we part ways when 
he sets out to define how this individual who is created in the image of God is manifested.  
Yannaras repeatedly equates soul with spirit. To him, these two categories are not only 
synonymous, but they bear the image of God in human beings. He says: 
 
If man is an image of God, how is this image revealed in his body and how in his soul or spirit? 
What becomes of the image of God in man when the body dies and decomposes in the earth? Is 
every trace of his soul or spirit extinguished together with the last look or smile? We must see if 
there are words especially to say what the body is, what the soul or spirit is, and which of the two 
constitutes what we call the existence of man.
142
 
 
This means that for Yannaras, the spirit/soul should not be identified (as contemporary 
rationalists do) with the cognitive function of brain centres, rigidly predetermined by 
biochemical composition. Unlike ancient Greek philosophy, Yannaras maintains that the soul is 
the sign of life but denies it is the source or cause of life.
143
 To him the soul is the bearer of 
life
144
 and hence any anthropological ontology must take the whole person as its starting point.  
For Yannaras, anything which has life, i.e., all animals, is called a soul.
145
 But although the 
human person and a nonhuman creature are both determined ensouled creatures, a human person 
more importantly is further determined to respond to God’s Word and to share in God’s very life. 
The soul/spirit-body are energies of the hypostasis of man. So they reveal what human ‘is’. Thus, 
disability (physical or cognitive) cannot affect an individual’s identity.  
As we will see in the next chapter, Karl Barth maintains that the spirit is the ‘bond’ that 
holds the tensions between body and soul together. What of Yannaras? This point is important: it 
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is certain, Yannaras says, that what constitutes a human being as an hypostasis, what gives her an 
ego and identity is not psychosomatic function, her nature or its existential possibilities, but her 
relationship with God. Thus Yannaras: ‘What man is as a personal existence “before” God, that 
is what constitutes the image of God in man, cannot be immobilized in some temporal moment 
or period’.146 This point is important to counter those who say that, for example, persons 
suffering from dementia are a burden to society and hence ought to be done away with. 
Significantly, the inmost ‘I’ of a person with a cognitive impairment remains untouched, even 
when he seems to lose his agency. Like Zizioulas, what Yannaras delineates as ‘personal 
existence’ or ‘hypostatic being’147 is to him attainable only within the Church.148 It is to this 
being that we turn to next.  
4.7 On Ecclesial beings 
 
When Yannaras puts forth his philosophical discussion about personal existence, he is not just 
engaging in a theoretical exercise with intellectual matter. Yannaras’s quest to explore and 
approach the constituents of personal existence and to set forth a perspective with respect to 
human personhood is first and foremost a search of a practical character, an enquiry with a very 
pragmatic concern: What is the truth about human existence and how does that truth delineate 
the way human beings should live? Particularly, how does the truth about human existence relate 
to the existence and life of the Church? In other words, what does participation in the life of the 
Church involve, and what are the parameters of an authentic Christian life? For Yannaras the 
Church is not just a religious institution or a certain group of people who share common ideas, 
but a state of being, the mode of communal being, where an individual has the opportunity to 
become a person.  
To him the ‘church’ is not merely the Sunday morning homily, a physical sanctuary, or a 
congregation of well-intentioned persons, but ground zero for the ‘personalization’ of an 
individual into an ‘ecclesial hypostasis’. How so? For Yannaras, the Church is a meal.149 So to 
him, an individual’s existence becomes a personal hypostasis only to the extent that it is restored 
to the true Life that the Church represents and sets forth. Yannaras treats the church with a 
                                               
146 Ibid. 
147 Yannaras, Elements of Faith, 58-59. 
148 Ibid., 128-9. 
149 Ibid., 125. 
102 
 
significance that is both encompassing and forceful. He says: ‘[e]ating and drinking are 
presupposition for the life of man’.150 This means the church is not merely a central model, but is 
determinative of being. It is how an individual shares life. So human beings share in life by 
participating in the action of eating and drinking.
151
 Yannaras claims that just as life was first 
distorted at the Fall through an act of eating to maintain individuality, so is the possibility of 
individuals being ontologically changed into an ecclesial hypostasis (person) by partaking in the 
meal served only in the ecclesia.
152
  
5. Critical Assessment  
 
The greatest strength of both Zizioulas and Yannaras is, perhaps, their understanding of the 
person as ecstatic and unique. Supremely important is Zizioulas’s offer of a dynamic 
anthropology where the self is conceived as irreducibly uncontainable and non-circumscribable. 
On the other hand, once the reader overcomes Yannaras’s oftentimes sharp stereotyping of the 
Latin tradition, one finds that his contribution to the area of inquiry in which we are engaged 
remains very substantial indeed. Consequently, both Yannaras and Zizioulas open up a path 
through some of the traditional impasses between transcendental anthropologies on the one hand 
and anthropologies grounded in preconceived notions of human finitude and sinfulness on the 
other. Zizioulas’s creative and critical, cross-fertilising engagement with Boethian and 
Augustinian,
153
 as also Cappadocian, approaches suggests the extent to which Barth and Rahner 
might have allowed their interpretations of personhood to have been revised by the doctrine of 
the Trinity in a manner that opened up the profound anthropological implications of the intra-
divine communion and our being brought ‘economically’ to participate within it by the Spirit and 
in and through the priesthood of Christ.  
Let us consider some blind spots in both Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s entire project. Here 
we will examine three specific aspects of their theologies: ‘persons’ and relations, ‘the place of 
sin’, and the distinction between ‘biological’ and ‘ecclesial beings’.154 The approach to all three 
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aspects will be guided by wider systematic concerns and will therefore be instructive for 
relational and theological anthropology more generally. 
5.1 Of ‘Persons’ and Relations  
 
As observed, most relational anthropologies are constructed by focusing on the continuities 
between divine and human personhood. However, might this focus in turn pose the danger of 
under-emphasizing the human side of the equation, of idealizing relationality and the loss of the 
uniqueness of personhood? When we consider both Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s understanding of 
person, these questions inevitably emerge at the top. I argue that as defined by both theologians, 
the concept of ‘person’ is a bit worrying. It seems that under their rubric, only certain people 
have the access to become an ecclesial hypostasis through participating in relationships at a 
given level and incorporation into the ecclesia. For both theologians, the body as conditioned, as 
individualizing and as moral hinders us from becoming persons, that is, in their terms, from 
affirming ourselves as love and freedom. Thus death as Zizioulas writes is the ‘natural’ 
development of the biological hypostasis; it is the cessation of ‘space’ and ‘time’ to other 
individual hypostases.  
For the person to survive, her biological hypostasis must be augmented by an ecclesial 
one through relations. For Zizioulas, this is the very essence of salvation. But we might ask: can 
we only become persons by participating in the proper kinds of relationships with the right sort 
of people? For instance Zizioulas says: ‘[a]s a person you exist as long as you love and you are 
loved. When you are treated as nature, you die as a particular identity’.155 And so, is that to say 
distorted relationships which are part of the fabric of society make us inauthentic persons?
156
 
What of those who are cognitively impaired or those who are not participating in Christ? And do 
socio-historical factors play any role in constituting personhood? Some might say that we are 
missing the two theologians’ main focus that human beings only become persons in the church. 
That may be so. However, it is in order to question the limits of their definition. That said, 
perhaps a more appropriate distinction would be between inauthentic personhood and fully 
realized personhood rather than person and individual. Furthermore, if we are to defend a 
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relational ontology, it is important to take into account the objections posed by Harriet Harris 
thus: should we say that personhood is relational? And, indeed, if personhood is relational, can 
we adequately define persons in terms of their relationships? One might argue that these 
questions are moving beyond the scope of Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s project, but I think they 
are worth considering.  
When we consider divine persons, relationships do largely define each person. However, 
recall that within the Godhead, personhood is ontologically prior to communion because 
Zizioulas argues for the monarchy of the Father. This changes when one considers human 
persons, and the discontinuity between divine persons and human persons. How so? Human 
beings are circumscribable in a way that divine beings are not simply because of their 
limitedness. But what about the act of procreation? Is it not the ultimate act of ‘communion’? It 
may be so, but boundaries still exist between two people.  
Recall that both theologians tightly integrate anthropology and ecclesiology. So the 
church for them is a way of being, not something with which beings become involved in.
157
 For 
both theologians, then, the goal of salvation is that the very life of God which is realized in the 
perichoretic union of the Trinity should also be realized by all human beings through divinization 
(theosis). Here, we ought to pose two questions concerning this discontinuity between divine 
persons and human persons by way of what Torrance calls an ‘ontology of ecclesiality’:158 First, 
how far can this discontinuity between divine persons and human persons be pushed before we 
take into account embodiment which is accompanied by suffering? How far before we recognise 
the physicality of human beings which is susceptible to a decline of agency (e.g. dementia) and 
separation which comes from socio-economic situations? Are these hard realities of being human 
not ontologically constitutive of personal, creaturely identity?
159
 Indeed they are and we are 
compelled to take them seriously. This means we ought to maintain a clear boundary between 
divine being and human being, a line both Yannaras and Zizioulas are in danger of glossing 
over.
160
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Second, does it allow us to describe as ‘persons’ human beings who are not participating 
in Christ, and thus be said to have been ‘divinised’ by participating (cognitively) in God’s 
personal existence through baptism or a eucharistic experience to participate? Again, as posed 
earlier, the question to Yannaras and Zizioulas is whether or not there is personhood extra 
ecclesiam (i.e., outside the church). If so, when Jesus speaks of ‘the least of these’, may he not be 
referring to our fellow human beings who do not possess this ‘capacity’ or have not had the 
opportunity to participate in such communion and yet are loved by God as persons?
161
 If the goal 
for Yannaras and Zizioulas is for human beings to be ‘divinised’ for personhood, then they both 
seem to have underestimated the ‘boundaries of the self’ and consequently I suggest do not 
distinguish sufficiently between finitude and infinitude.  
While ‘person’ is not circumscribable, relationships do have to form between someone or 
something. Harriet Harris, in her article ‘Should we Say that Personhood is Relational?’ captures 
what seems to be a logical problem that arises when we posit relations between relational entities 
that leads to either an infinite regress of relations, or a relational form of the ontological 
argument where the regress finds its starting-point in God.
162
 Let us entertain her questions 
briefly: Is it reasonable to say, then, that relations precede the existence of any one person in 
divine personhood, but is not so with human personhood? And should we, then, say that human 
beings are created relational but grow into relationships? We are not compelled to follow 
Harris’s path of affirming ‘being’ prior to ‘relations’. Instead to me the situation seems to be 
more a case of ‘both…and’. How so? All persons are born into an intricate web of relations 
which exist prior to their being born and before participating in any of these relations, they exist. 
But what is the ‘glue’ that binds together different persons to the same relation as between the 
Son and the Father which is common to all persons?  
As we shall see in the next chapter when we engage with Karl Barth, a strong Christology 
and a strong pneumatology would be of great help here. This is because the uniqueness of the 
persons can be maintained in Christ through the Holy Spirit. However, according to their critics 
pneumatology and Christology seem to be largely absent from Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s 
theology respectively. Thus Williams: ‘[O]ne misses…any real integration of the idea of the 
Holy Spirit’…and Yannaras develops a ‘cryptic and rather unsatisfactory’ Christology. And 
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Russell says, ‘pneumatology is largely absent from Zizioulas’s account’.163 Finally, the 
anthropology of both Yannaras and Zizioulas is in danger of dissolving the individual person into 
corporate existence in the ecclesia. Recall the questions of biological constraint posed earlier, 
i.e., our human finitude and limitedness. These in addition to alienation and mortality are 
responded to in Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s thought by distinguishing between two forms of 
existence, namely the hypostasis of biological existence and the hypostasis of ecclesial existence, 
to which we now turn. 
5.2 On Biological and Ecclesial being  
 
Yannaras and Zizioulas both seem to place a great premium on divine and human relations at the 
expense of other facets that make up the person. I am thinking here of the issue particular to our 
purpose - embodiment. Their distinction between biological and ecclesial hypostasis leaves open 
the extent to which the kind of transcendence, as Zizioulas puts it, ‘beyond created existence’164 
does or does not include those ‘persons’ whose ‘biological’ constitution (either through 
immaturity, acquired cognitive impairment like dementia and brain damage) is such that this 
kind of cognitive transcendence is no longer possible.
165
 Questions immediately arise from this 
biological/ecclesial hypostasis. For example Torrance wants to know: (1) On what basis does 
such a person’s eternal life and ‘survival’ depend? ‘Is it the ekstasis of other persons or some 
past or potential cognitive ekstasis which provides the necessary condition of such ‘survival’?’166 
(2) Does this distinction not circumvent too easily the issues posed by the extent of embodiment, 
that is, limitedness and personal tragedy? And (3) what is the meaning, then, of the Gospel of 
grace for those people who may not easily be described as spiritual or ecclesial ‘survivors’ for 
the eternal domain of communion?
167
  
I think that both theologians draw too rigid a line between biological and ecclesial being, 
and thus we cannot avoid sensing a lingering residue of reconstructed subjectivity at the center of 
their concept of personhood. This rigid line is necessitated by what they hold sin to be. Both 
retain a view of human beings as persons, rather than individuals, who share a common nature 
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but who, by virtue of their freedom, have certain distinctiveness which is apart from their nature. 
Thus when individuals become persons and thus a new creation over and against the old, and are 
not bound any longer by biological constraints, both Yannaras and Zizioulas are forced to make a 
strong distinction between biological and ecclesial being. Let us consider this question of sin 
which is crucial for understanding theological anthropology.  
5.3 On the Place of Sin 
 
Unlike other disciplines dealing with human beings, theology is faced with a fundamental 
methodological problem in its attempt to understand the human being. This problem emanates 
from the Christian view of the Fall, and as Zizioulas says, whatever we make of the Fall, the fact 
remains that there is something which can be called ‘sin’. A good understanding of what sin is, 
ensures the proper systematic relation to other doctrines, and enables an understanding of human 
embodiment in the world. Both theologians are instructive on both counts.  
Yannaras construes sin primarily as an existential failure. He says: ‘This lack of 
deprivation is what he (the author of the Areopagitic) calls sin…, that is to say, the failure to 
attain and the falling away from what is fitting. By sin he means, to take a metaphor from 
archery, the shot that misses the mark instead of hitting the target’.168 But is sin simply missing 
the mark? While the same Greek word for sin is used as an archery term, are humans just ‘target-
missers’? By my reading, the same Greek word might be used, but the two concepts could not be 
further apart. When the Scriptures describe the nature of a person’s rebellion against God, it 
paints a grimmer picture than simply missing God’s ‘bull’s eye’ (see Rom. 3:10-18). Instead of 
aiming carefully at God’s set target, it seems to me that human beings opt to turn their backs and 
shoot arrows everywhere else. By being self-centered, human beings seek mostly to please 
themselves. Thus they ignore the true set ‘target’ and direct their affections on seductive targets 
that cannot satisfy, divinise, or save. I suggest that human beings are not primarily target-
missers; they are self-centered false-target worshippers.  
Zizioulas on his part maintains that sin is primarily a perversion of personhood. This 
means that the ek-stasis of personhood becomes experienced as distance and separation between 
person and nature, which eventually distorts the imago Dei.
169
 In this case, sin is understood as 
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an ontological state or condition. Zizioulas explicitly rejects Martin Luther’s notion of the person 
as simul iustus et peccator.
170
 Why so? Two reasons emerge: First, Zizioulas, like Karl Barth, 
maintains a high view of humankind on account of Christ being ‘man’ par excellence. However, 
even though Zizioulas considers this to be a logical progression, this is by no means necessary as 
will be demonstrated in the next chapter where we will consider Barth’s anthropology, which 
also maintains a high view of humankind. Secondly, and more importantly, Zizioulas’s rejection 
is a direct consequence of his eschatology.
171
 While Zizioulas argues that ‘person can be claimed 
to be an essentially eschatological concept, in that true personhood will be realized only in the 
final kingdom of God’,172 on the other hand, it has been reasonably argued that Zizioulas holds 
an ‘over-realized eschatology’.173 This means that Zizioulas does not maintain a place 
‘systemically in the experience of salvific grace for the theologically necessary presence of 
unredemption’.174 Consequently, he insists on the full realization of the Kingdom in the 
Eucharist which is based on his ontology of person and on his understanding of salvific grace as 
the process of becoming a person. There is a tension here in Zizioulas’s thought which we should 
consider further.  
Again, to become a person, one must be freed from the restrictions of biological 
hypostasis.
175
 In short, the process of becoming a person is only initiated by God as it involves a 
total eschatological transcending (but not annihilation!)
176
 of the biological hypostasis. 
Moreover, Zizioulas understands salvation as an ontological constituting event in which the 
human being becomes a person. A result of this is that it is not possible to maintain a “‘dialectic 
of ‘already – not yet’”, that is, there can be no tension between realized and future eschatology. 
Volf explains: ‘if it is salvific grace itself that first constitutes a human being into a person 
ontologically, then that human being cannot simultaneously be both person and individual, or 
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cannot be the one or the other to a greater or lesser degree; she is either the one or the other’.177 
On the other hand, this means that if a human being is a person before they participate in salvific 
grace, then the person can be affirmed as simul iustus et peccator. To claim otherwise would be 
to ignore the ‘role of spatio-temporal location in constituting the person’.178  Being simul iustus 
et peccator, that is, maintaining a balance between future and realized eschatology, prevents a 
strong distinction between the person prior to and during ecclesial existence.  
Karl Barth, in comparison, strongly maintains that human beings are not only simul iustus 
et peccator, but are also simul totus iustus et totus peccator (completely just and completely 
sinful at the same time).
179
 However this is not through appearing to be just, a dualism between 
the old and the new, nor by distinguishing between empirical and ideal person.
180
  For this reason 
Barth refers to justification as a ‘history’ rather than a ‘state’, which means that the self is 
constituted in a narrative taking into account embodiment which seems unaccounted for in 
Zizioulas’s account.181 Thus Barth: 
 
The justification of man begins in his past and it is completed in his future. But as his past as a 
sinner is still his present, so his future as a righteous man is already his present. The fact [is] that 
although he is still a sinner he is already righteous, that in the same present in which he comes out 
of his past as a sinner he goes forward to the future as a righteous man.
182
  
 
We see that Barth is able to maintain both the positive and the negative because he holds the 
truth about justification, not in human beings per se, but in Jesus Christ. The eschatological 
future has been realized historically in Jesus, and it is in this history that human beings 
participate.
183
 Thus unlike Zizioulas, Barth’s eschatology enables him to affirm the person as 
both totus iustus and totus peccator. This point is of extreme importance to theological 
anthropology because it maintains the balance between the now and the not yet. Testimony of 
this is borne in Romans 6-7, whether or not it refers to Paul’s pre-Christian experience. Good 
theological anthropology demands that the right balance between future and realized eschatology 
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be maintained. Furthermore, when considered together with a doctrine of sin the theological 
framework is laid for an understanding of human embodiment.  
By my reading, it seems that both Yannaras’s and Zizioulas’s definition risk under-
emphasizing the gravity of sin. This can be seen to impact negatively the place of suffering and 
embodiment (including socio-historical factors) in constituting personhood. Furthermore, it is my 
suggestion that the gravity of sin, and the resulting suffering which often stems from it, seems 
not to be taken seriously enough in Yannaras and Zizioulas’s theology. So sin appears to be a 
matter of necessity, separateness and fragmented relationships, especially in Zizioulas case. 
Torrance vividly captures this point when commenting on Zizioulas’s ‘ontology of ecclesiality’. 
He poses the following questions: 
 
[H]ow far can such affirmations take account of the hard realities of suffering, alienation, and 
separation – not only through death, but as a result of physical, social, economic, and other factors 
– of cerebral disintegration through age, mental handicap and so on? Are we not compelled to take 
these factors seriously as ontologically constitutive of personal, creaturely identity?
184
 
 
Torrance seems to imply that Zizioulas does not account sufficiently for the role of corporate 
structures, suffering and the gravity of sin for constituting personhood. The same questions, I 
believe, can be posed to Yannaras. For both theologians, it appears that personhood is 
determined by a predominantly theological agenda. In other words, Yannaras and Zizioulas seem 
to undervalue createdness, or the physicality of a human being’s existence. Consequently, a weak 
doctrine of sin also has ramifications for a theology of the cross, and an under-emphasizing on 
the gravity of sin often results in a failure to take sufficient account of the ‘brokenness’ or 
‘rupture’ of the cross.185  
In this regard Alan Lewis seems to capture well the most serious weakness of Zizioulas’s 
theological exposition. I shall quote extensively from Lewis’ article which seems to me 
particularly illuminating:  
 
Zizioulas seems reluctant to acknowledge the death of Jesus as significant for God’s being.  For 
him the movement back from resurrection to incarnation indicates that, though no stranger ‘to the 
conditions of biological existence’, ‘Christ escaped the necessity and the passions of nature’.  
When he rose from the dead ‘the real hypostasis of Christ was proved to be not the biological one 
but the eschatological or trinitarian hypostasis’ (p.55). But how real is the incarnation if Christ is 
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held to have escaped biological necessity or ‘the tragic aspect of human person’ because of his 
trinitarian personhood?186  
 
There is a danger that the emphasis on baptism for Zizioulas and the Eucharist for Yannaras in 
constituting the person replaces the significance of the cross and resurrection. While baptism and 
the Eucharist symbolize the work of the cross and resurrection, the latter two receive very little 
treatment in the work of both Zizioulas and Yannaras. However, I concede that this depends on 
the extent to which they have a participatory theology. But might this be because their work is 
primarily concerned with ecclesiology? This ‘docetic’ tendency in both Yannaras’s and 
Zizioulas’s theology lends itself to undervaluing the createdness and physicality of existence. 
Addressing Zizioulas in particular, Lewis says: 
  
A similar flirtation with docetism seems to affect Zizioulas’ interpretation of the resurrection as 
‘the persistence, the survival of being’, which makes the cross a failed attempt to suppress being 
(p.108). This surely evades the finality and reality of the death of Jesus, presupposing an ontology 
in which God swamps non-being with the power of being, rather than receiving non-being into 
himself and thus going beyond it.187 
 
If one were to put it more directly to both theologians, how significant is the cross and 
resurrection and incarnation to them? And furthermore, did Jesus not resume the same body 
(glorified) to ascend to the Father? I suggest that the issue of personhood, especially the 
personhood of profoundly cognitively impaired persons, must be understood as couched in our 
relationality and embodiment.   
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have been examining the rationality-relationality turn in theological 
anthropology, after a sustained emphasis on rationality, and its implications on personhood in 
light of profound intellectual impairment. In seeking this emphasis on relationality in theological 
anthropology, I sought to expose a major blind spot in relational anthropology. Here, I have 
suggested that by focusing on the relational dimensions of personhood, recent currents within 
theological anthropology have neglected other important facets and as a result may perpetuate 
the stigmatization of intellectually impaired individuals. So with an eye toward persons with 
intellectual disabilities, I have critiqued those theological anthropologies, common to the 
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187 Ibid., 
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Christian tradition, which tend to overlook key aspects of theological anthropology. I have 
specifically focused on embodiment and argued that such anthropologies risk not being able to 
account for the full humanity of these individuals. In the end I suggest that our concept of the 
relationality of persons must be reconceived to take into account embodiment. I critique 
theological anthropologies, not for what they do but for what they are not doing.  
There are, conceivably, two key elements to a well-formed theological anthropology. The 
first is theological and as has been demonstrated in this chapter is well represented with 
relational anthropologies. To demonstrate this we interrogated the theological anthropologies of 
both Zizioulas and Yannaras who we said are paradigmatic examples of a relational theological 
anthropology which emphasizes that we become persons through our relations. Both advance 
ethically valuable and pastorally illuminating insights that as persons we develop in relation to 
others, just as the persons of the divine Trinity commingle in their perichoretic relationship.  
When we considered Zizioulas, we mentioned he attempts a neo-patristic synthesis. It is of no 
surprise that he draws the bulk of his direction from the Greek Fathers, and in particular the 
personalism of the Cappadocian fathers. So at the heart of his thought, both methodologically 
and substantively, is ecclesiology. We have noted that Zizioulas’s thought is anchored upon an 
ontology of the person which derives primarily from a consideration of the nature of the triune 
God. We have also said that the core of Yannaras’s personalist anthropology is wrapped up in 
the concepts ‘person’ and ‘eros’. Yannaras’s method, which draws criticism from Zizioulas, 
incorporates a synthesis of Greek patristic tradition and modern phenomenological thought.  
At the end, both theologians emphasize the relational aspect of personhood, distinguish 
between ‘persons’ and ‘individuals’ and focus on the ecclesia as a key component of divinizing 
‘individuals’ to become ‘persons’. While Zizioulas zeros in on baptism as the key to 
transforming individuals into persons by participating in specific relationships in the church, 
Yannaras anchors this transformation on the Eucharist, which to him is a ‘meal’ of great 
significance. After interrogating the ordo essendi of their theology, we conclude that although 
right to emphasize the relational aspect of personhood, we have noted that their thought has often 
been accompanied by an inadequate doctrine of sin, an underemphasis on the discontinuity 
between divine and human personhood, and in particular, an underemphasis on human 
embodiment. As mentioned, many of the problems in this regard arise from insufficient 
systematic grounding being given to the relation between various doctrines.  
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The second key element of theological anthropology is concerned with embodiment, 
which I think has not received sufficient attention in relational accounts of the person. At the 
very least this means that theology must engage with the question of a person’s embodiment. 
Insufficient engagement with human embodiment in the world only continues to marginalize 
some human beings. Furthermore, an intellectual conception of the self has serious and 
detrimental consequences for those with intellectual disabilities, and relational anthropologies in 
a very real sense, threaten to draw us back into many of the pitfalls which were produced by the 
traditional and individualist accounts of the image of God discussed in chapter 2. In this chapter, 
we have anticipated chapter 4 which will demonstrate that Karl Barth is an exception here. In my 
understanding, Barth’s theological anthropology which is treated at great length in his Church 
Dogmatics is made up of three components: relationality, ontology and temporality. Particularly 
in Church Dogmatics III/2, Barth considers the issue of embodiment at great length. This 
important aspect of anthropology will be picked up as the major focus of the next chapter, where 
we will examine Barth’s understanding of human ontology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Rethinking Theological Anthropology: Towards an Ontological Determination of Human 
Persons in Karl Barth’s Christological Anthropology 
 
 
That which we believed we valued, what we – I – thought was at the center of humanity, the 
capacity for thought, for reason, was not it, not it at all. 
 
       --- Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor 
 
   
1. Introduction  
 
In chapter 2 and 3 we considered questions that confront the enquirer after a theological 
anthropology. We have said that historically Western society and the Christian tradition have 
agreed that human beings are uniquely created to image God. Indeed, Christian theology is 
perpetually tasked with understanding the uniqueness of homo sapiens because the Incarnation 
placed this question of personhood at the core of theological reflection rather than at its 
periphery.
1
 However, and what is problematic for some humans, reason has traditionally been 
taken to be a chief ontological characteristic of the imago Dei. This question of personhood has 
risen to great prominence in our thinking and is being asked with a sense of urgency in nearly all 
of today’s disciplines.2 But why is it that we suddenly seem so concerned with this question of 
personhood? Perhaps it is an indication of the state of our philosophy of bioethics: not that it is in 
good shape, but rather that it is in deep trouble. In chapter 3 we said that since the traditional 
view of the imago marginalized some humans, it necessitated a turn from rationality to 
                                               
1 Joan E. O’Donovan, ‘Man in the Image of God: The Disagreement between Barth and Brunner Reconsidered’, 
Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986), 433- 59. 
2 The literature is already immense and still growing. See for example the following: Ray Anderson, who sees this 
anthropological question as primary: ‘Pondering the significance of Karl Barth’s remark that “theology has become 
anthropology since God became man”, I began to see theological anthropology at the heart of the theological course 
of study’ (id., On Being Human (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), vii). In theology, see T. F. Torrance, 
Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1966), 99. With reference to Karl Barth, he says: ‘At no 
point is theology more relevant today than in the issues it raises about our knowledge of man’. See also David 
Cairns, The Image of God in Man (London: SCM, 1953), 9; John Zizioulas, Being in Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997). In Christian ethics, see Robert 
Spaemann who discusses the issue of ‘persons’ and ‘non-persons’ within membership of the species homo sapiens. 
(id. Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, trans. Oliver O’Donovan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). Among philosophers, see John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber and Faber, 
1968), esp. 29-38; Id., Persons in Relation, (London: Faber and Faber, 1961). In Old Testament studies, Walter 
Eichrodt opens his book Man in the Old Testament with the comment: ‘The question how we are to understand 
human life is being asked among us to-day with a new intensity’ (Id., trans. K. and R. Gregor Smith, Studies in 
Biblical Theology (London: SCM, 1951), 7).  
115 
 
relationality. In this chapter I will suggest that if we are to speak of individuals realizing their 
being in relations, in light of what we are calling ‘hard cases’ within cognitive impairment, 
something more than that needs to be said. 
 In what follows, then, I am suggesting an approach to anthropology that can take us 
further than the traditional understanding of the image examined in chapter 2, and the relational 
view considered in chapter 3. Recall in chapter 3 we said that embodiment is the second key 
element of a well-formed theological anthropology, albeit one that suffers from much neglect. 
Here I am merely saying that what theological anthropology needs is to retrieve the embodiment 
model, as a critical theme to support claims of a connection between our person and our bodily 
life, especially bearing in mind that some humans are profoundly intellectually impaired. If our 
argument is successful, I hope to achieve the following: First, to push against the Cartesian 
bifurcation of soul (mind) and body. However I am not suggesting that this be replaced by the 
absorptions of soul by matter (physicalism) or of the matter by mind. Instead, and secondly, I 
will suggest that it is perfectly proper to speak of bodily soul and ensouled body, and that the 
belief there is a polar opposition between body and soul (mind) is a category mistake.  
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will push against a 
Cartesian dualistic ‘criterion of personhood’ which has marginalized some humans at the edges 
of moral personhood and which we said permeates contemporary bioethics. I will follow Oliver 
O’Donovan in asserting that no criteria of personhood exists by which a person could be 
recognized independently. The second section considers Barth’s approach to method through his 
affirmation of the ‘Chalcedonian formula’ for a Christological anthropology. In this section, we 
will briefly sketch Barth’s Christocentrism and consider its significance for the actual 
construction of his theological anthropology.  
In the third section we will revisit the doctrine of the imago Dei. We revisit this issue 
because of the fact that by asserting the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of 
God, Genesis established a solid basis for human ontology, anthropology and ethics, and has 
significance for the question of who and what we are. In short the Scriptures show an interest in 
the body from the very beginning. In this third section, we are interested in a clear answer 
concerning the role and meaning of the imago Dei in the theological understanding of human 
ontology and the constitution of its uniqueness. To achieve our objective, we will rehearse 
Barth’s reading of the imago Dei through his great theological debate with Emil Brunner. Barth’s 
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transcendental-relational understanding of human being will be suggested as an alternative 
reading to chapter two’s reading of the imago Dei where some in the Christian community have 
often interpreted disability as a marring of the imago. It is in this section that we will engage the 
concepts analogia entis and analogia fidei.
3
 With a good understanding of the latter, there 
emerges three fundamental and constitutive aspects of the human creature in its correspondence 
with God. First is humanity as co-humanity; second the human person as the soul of the body; 
and third the human person in limited time.
4
  
In section four, with our lenses adjusted by fellow human beings who are severely 
intellectually impaired, we will focus on Barth’s treatment of embodiment in the body-soul 
relation. To achieve our goal in this section, I shall contrast the positions of Barth with the 
utilitarian philosopher Jeff McMahan on who persons are and why it matters. As we will see, 
both Barth and McMahan think we are relational and embodied beings. However, they diverge 
when they elucidate their positions. I will suggest that a general utilitarian-Cartesian answer to 
what it is to be human is not satisfactory because it has continually marginalized intellectually 
impaired persons and thus calls for the pursuit of a different path 
2. How We Identify Persons: Against Criteria of Personhood   
 
Although I am saying that we need to recapture embodiment as a critical theme, I am not arguing 
for any criteria of personhood where the presence or absence of a person can be demonstrated by 
proving that this or that biological or psychological capacity is present. No! In fact from a logical 
point of view, that would be a category mistake.
5
 Thus it is a category mistake to say that a 
demented person or any person suffering from an intellectual impairment cannot be a person 
because their cognitive functions are currently frustrated. It is also a category mistake to say that 
                                               
3 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. III/2, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. Harold Knight et al. 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), 220. (Hereafter by volume, part and page number). 
4 Wolf Krötke, trans. Philip G. Ziegler ‘The Humanity of the Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology’, in John 
Webster, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159-76. 
5 Simon Blackburn says a category mistake is an ontological error in which ‘things or facts of one kind are presented 
as if they belonged to another’. Additionally, ‘[t]hinking of beliefs as in the head, or numbers as large spatial 
objects, or God as a person, or time as flowing, may each be making category mistakes’. (See The Oxford 
Dictionary of Philosophy. s.v. ‘category mistake’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 55-56. The notion is 
prominent in the work of Gilbert Ryle who introduced the idea to dispel the confusions he thought to be rampant in 
the Cartesian theory of the mind. According to Ryle, a category mistake is made when one mistakes the logical type 
or category of a certain expression. For example he says, someone would make a category mistake if after being 
shown all the departments, laboratories, libraries etc., he wished to be shown the university. (See id. The Concept of 
Mind (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1949), 16-17).   
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neonates cannot be persons until there is brain activity. But additionally it is a category mistake 
to say that both intellectually impaired persons and neonates must be persons because they 
possess ‘individual genetic structure’.6 The point I wish to make here is that we must be careful 
to avoid the tendency to reduce the concept of personhood to one constituent of human 
functioning. So when we think of ‘person’, it is important that we do not think that ‘the person’ 
is just another component of an individual, like say the ‘brain’ or ‘the heart’, only different.  
This move is important because it points to something about how we identify persons. 
Oliver O’Donovan claims that humans are known ‘in a way that members of other animal 
species are not known’.7 By this he means that it is possible to recognise things abstractly, by 
simple observation. For example we may recognize a lion abstractly, by simple observation, and 
distinguish it from ‘Tobby’ my pet cat, even though both belong to the cat family. And in the 
same manner we may be able to distinguish human beings from say elephants. However such 
observational recognition is not adequate for the kind of knowledge that it is appropriate for one 
human being to have of another.
8
 ‘And notoriously’, he says, it falls short in answering the moral 
questions about our fellow human beings which are posed for us by medical technology.
9
 I agree. 
Person to person encounters are vastly different from person to non-human encounter. Again 
simple observation is enough for humans to categorize non-human animals. However, when 
human beings engage human beings, they do not need to be told they have encountered another 
substance of a rational nature, albeit in some instances one whose rational nature is currently 
hindered. So in this case it is wrong to ask whether an individual in Permanent Vegetative State 
(PVS) is a ‘person’ or not. Thus ‘[w]henever we say that man is a person, we mean that he is 
more than a mere parcel of matter, more than an individual element in nature, such as is an atom, 
a blade of grass, a fly or an elephant…Man is an animal and an individual, but unlike other 
animals or individuals’.10 What makes humans ‘unlike’ other creatures, then, is different from 
                                               
6 Oliver O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who Is a Person?’ [1985] in eds., Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey, On Moral 
Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 382. 
7 Ibid., 381. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law [1944] (London: Bles, 1945), 5, 6.   
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what makes an elephant unlike a dog or even what makes a dog unlike its kennel.
11
 How so? 
‘Persons’, says Robert Spaemann, are ‘singular in an unparalleled fashion’.12  
So when we ask whether a profoundly impaired or a demented individual or a person in a 
PVS is a ‘person’ or not, O’Donovan, quite properly, says that it does no good to answer that ‘he 
is not an elephant’.13 Instead, what we seek is to know whether the person is that same human 
agent, with whom we related to as fellow agents in life. The point here is that there are no 
conceivable set of purely observational criteria that can answer that question adequately for us.
14
 
However, we could answer negatively by checking the person’s brain activity or positively by 
showing that his or her vital bodily functions are as active as they used to be. However, in all 
these efforts we would be missing the point for it was not her brain with which we conversed 
with, but the person.
15
 Again we should not think of ‘person’ as another constituent of the 
individual like his or her vital biological and neurological functions.  
O’Donovan points to some who have tried to circumvent this categorical difference by 
thinking of personhood as an ‘epiphenomenon supervening upon the presence of biological and 
neurological functions, and so depending upon them without, nevertheless, being reducible to 
them’.16 O’Donovan rightly says we cannot grasp ‘the person’ by following this path. What we 
can arrive at is ‘personality’ or a group of ‘second order capacities’, different in kind from the 
biological and neurological functions mentioned, but no less genetic than they are.
17
 
‘Personality’ is a cluster of behavioral and relational attributes, which characteristically belong to 
human beings as a kind.
18
 It is therefore a common misunderstanding, when talking about 
persons, to think that it is interchangeable with talk about personality or some aspect about 
personality, such as the capacity for relationship.
19
 So when we speak of human beings, we are 
not speaking of any kind of capacity nor of any kind of attribute.  
                                               
11 Grotius said: ‘Man is to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior kind, much farther removed from all other 
animals than the different kinds of animals are from one another’ (Id., De lure Belli ac Pacis, prolegomena, II).   
12 Spaemann, Persons, 35. Elsewhere Duns Scotus wrote of their ‘ultimate solitude’, and Aquinas wrote of their 
‘incommunicability’ (See Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis 1 d. 25 q. 2 n. 14; Aquinas, 2 Sent. 3. 1. 1. in id., note 1, 
p.35).   
13
 O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who Is a Person?’, 381.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 382. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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My argument is not that we can know persons by observing their capacity for 
relationship. Instead, like O’Donovan, I am saying that we know persons in relationship. This 
means that a person must engage another person to know them. O’Donovan captures this best 
when he says we must ‘abandon the observer’s stance altogether and commit ourselves to 
treating [persons] as persons’.20 Elsewhere in this study, I have said that relationships assume a 
capacity to develop personal attributes and capacities to engage. So, as O’Donovan says, 
‘persons are intended for relationship, and will therefore (barring accidents) develop these 
personal attributes and capacities’.21 But what about what we are calling the ‘hard cases’ within 
cognitive impairment? What about those whose capacities and personal attributes are currently 
frustrated? O’Donovan says that it is a different thing to take these attributes as a supposedly 
objective criterion for determining the status of persons. Instead, for him, ‘personality discloses 
personhood; it does not constitute it’.22  
In the same manner, when we suggest that a carefully constituted theological 
anthropology ought to recapture the theme of ‘embodiment’, we are not suggesting that this can 
be used as a criterion of knowing persons. What we are saying is this: that the ‘bodily presence’ 
of persons who cannot otherwise actively engage in relations via their personal attributes and 
capacities, allows us to know them in relationship. But we should not attempt to entirely 
demonstrate the presence or absence of a person by their capacity for relationship or by their 
bodily presence. Instead in this chapter, I am saying that it is perfectly possible to follow Barth in 
his talk of persons as bodily soul and ensouled body. As we will see, the person is the body of 
her soul no less than she is the soul (mind, will) of her body. Thus the person is not merely mind 
nor merely body but the coinherence of mind and body, a unity of body and soul.  
As Paul Ramsey said when he defended his account of the persons as embodied, ‘The 
body counts, and it may not be reduced to something “wholly other” than the person’.23 In 
addition Ramsey suggests that ‘an individual’s body, including his sexual nature, belongs to him, 
his humanum, his personhood and self-identity, in such a way that the bodily life cannot be 
reduced to the class of the animals over which Adam was given unlimited dominion’.24 This 
                                               
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 
132. 
24 Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 87. 
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means that we may not treat persons as objects which we can master and manipulate; presuming 
(or expecting) that individuals are or should become something other than embodied creatures.
25
 
Our move here allows us to still talk of intellectually impaired persons as persons were 
traditionally known - substances of a rational nature, but whose rational nature is being currently 
hindered.  
Two final comments serve to complete this section. First, our rejection of dualism will 
also lead to a rejection of Fletcher’s brand of ‘personalism’, alluded to earlier in chapter 2, with 
respect to the question of who counts as a person. So we reject defining a ‘person’ in terms of 
biological or neurological capacities. Second, in light of what we are saying are ‘hard cases’, and 
intellectually impaired persons generally, we engage not only an animated body,
26
 but when we 
look at the human organism created in the imago Dei, we insist that this particular animated body 
(or ensouled body) counts for a person. The interests of an individual, including their right to life 
do not depend upon their cognitive abilities. So for me, merely existing as an innocent living 
human being is good enough to have an intrinsic claim to life. But what about those who will 
complain of ‘physicalism’ or an unwarranted reduction of persons to organism? To them we say 
their fear assumes an unwarranted dualism which marginalizes some fellow human beings. Such 
is our argument. We will try to defend this argument through Barth’s treatment of the soul-body 
relation. Before we commit to that task, let us say something about Barth’s approach to method 
which is significant to understanding his theological anthropology. 
3. The Chalcedonian Formula: A Barthian Approach to Method  
 
Barth’s Christology is commonly described as ‘Chalcedonian’.27 Indeed, Bruce McCormack 
argues for what he calls Barth’s ‘historicized Chalcedonianism’. By this he means that Barth’s 
                                               
25 Allen Verhey, ‘The Body and the Bible: Life in the Flesh According to the Spirit’ in Embodiment, Morality, and 
Medicine, eds., Lisa S. Cahill and Margaret A. Farley (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1995), 6.  
26 Or what Augustine describes as terra animata  in the City of God. Id., De civitate Dei, trans. Henry Bettenson 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 20.20.  
27 See T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990), 169 and 
esp. 198-201; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. E. T. 
Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 115; more critically see George Hunsinger, ‘Karl Barth’s Christology: 
Its Basic Chalcedonian Character’, in John Webster ed., The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 127-42; See also Bruce L. McCormack, ‘The Ontological Presuppositions of 
Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement’, in eds., Frank A. James III and Charles E. Hill, The Glory of the Atonement: 
Biblical, Historical and Practical Perspectives (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004), 346-66; Mostly recently 
see Paul D. Jones, The Humanity of Christ: Christology in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London: T. & T. Clark, 
2008), 16-59, esp. 26-37.  However Jones thinks the term should only be applied to Barth’s Dogmatics ‘loosely and 
with due reservations’ (Id., 18).  
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later Christology preserves all the theological values present in a ‘highly actualistic a posteriori 
Chalcedonianism’.28 The Chalcedonian formula/pattern29 is one of at least three such formal 
patterns at work in Barth’s Church Dogmatics.30 This complex pattern of reasoning has been 
used by Barth to examine a wide range of substantive questions. In what follows, I intend to gain 
a point of entry into Barth’s Christological approach to method. I will begin with the 
Chalcedonian definition and then follow Bruce McCormack’s analysis to try and grasp Barth’s 
Christology and its relevance to understanding theological anthropology.  
The Council of Chalcedon affirmed ‘one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, 
acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no 
separation; at no point was the difference between the natures taken away through the union, but 
rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single person and a 
single subsistent being’.31 What is important in this formulation is the attempt to find the unity of 
the two natures in the singularity of the ‘person’ or hypostasis in whom the being and existence 
of both is grounded, a ‘person’ who is immediately identified as ‘one and the same only begotten 
Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ’.32 Thus the relationship of the two natures of Jesus Christ is 
explained in terms of the singularity of the ‘person’. Chalcedon proposes that when Christ’s two 
natures met, neither his deity nor his humanity lost its defining characteristics, and yet the 
natures united indissolubly. Barth views Chalcedon as a reply to liberal hedging regarding 
Christ’s divinity. In particular, for Barth, the formula grounds his concern to coordinate an 
affirmation of Christ’s ontological complexity with an affirmation of Christ’s personal 
simplicity. The significant features of the Chalcedonian pattern, then, include: inseparable unity 
                                               
28 Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-
1936 (London: Clarendon, Press, 1995), 454. (Hereafter Karl Barth’s CRDT)   
29 The Chalcedonian formula / pattern alludes to the famous Chalcedonian definition of faith, developed by the 
Council of Chalcedon in 451 to settle Christological controversies and guide the church in its understanding of Jesus 
Christ as both human and divine. A standard account can be found in R. V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon: A 
Historical and Doctrinal Survey (London: SPCK, 1953).  
30
 The other two patterns are the Hegelian pattern of Aufhebung (the pattern of affirming (thesis), canceling 
(antithesis), and then reconstituting (synthesis) something in a higher plane.) and the trinitarian pattern of dialectical 
inclusion (See George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of his Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 85-86).  
31 Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 
1:86. 
32 Ibid. 
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(‘coincide in occurrence without separation or division’), indissoluble differentiation (related 
‘without confusion or change’), and asymmetry ‘indestructible order’.33  
Of these terms, the latter requires special attention. George Hunsinger says that the 
significance of the term ‘asymmetry’ can be explained by contrasting it with the term 
‘hierarchy’. Thus when Barth uses the formula, he conceives the relationship between the divine 
and human natures of Jesus in more nearly asymmetrical than hierarchical terms.
34
 In short, 
although there is a ‘divine priority and a human subsequence’, their asymmetry allows a 
conception which avoids a ‘hierarchical domination in favor of a mutual ordering in freedom’.35 
We shall return to this point below when we examine Barth’s discussion of the issue of 
embodiment. In his astounding study, Paul Dafydd Jones says that various interpreters have used 
the adjective ‘Chalcedonian’ profitably with respect to Barth’s mature Christology. However, he 
says that although Barth approves the substance of Chalcedon in Church Dogmatics I/2 and 
thereafter, he thinks that Barth ‘sidelines’ a key part of Chalcedon’s apparatus – specifically, 
Jones says, the word ‘nature’ (Natur, Wesen).36 So, he argues that Barth replaces the phrase ‘one 
person in two natures’ with the minimalist formula, vere Deus vere homo.37 For Jones, Barth’s 
‘circumspection’ vis-à-vis Chalcedon, indicates that he is keen to ensure that scripture, and not 
abstract categories, anchor christological reflection.
38
 Jones is also worried that Barth’s use of 
the anhypostasis/enhypostasis pairing endangers a robust depiction of Christ’s humanity and thus 
undermines Barth’s dogmatic account of human agency.39 We shall revisit Jones’s concerns 
below.  
For now let us examine why Barth secures a Christocentric approach to anthropology, 
and its implications on contemporary attempts to understand human nature. Obviously, it is 
difficult here to consider Barth’s ‘Christocentrism’40 in any great depth without digressing.41 
Here I only wish to tease out his attitude towards it. Barth consistently maintains that Jesus 
                                               
33 Ibid., 85. 
34 Ibid. n.1 chap. 4., 286. 
35 Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, n.1 chap. 4., 286-87. 
36 Jones, The Humanity of Christ, 18. Jones says that Barth favours the latter term (Wesen) although he does not 
reject the former. For Barth, they seem interchangeable. 
37
 Ibid., 18. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See ibid., 17-52. 
40 McCormack claims that Barth’s affiliation of the anhypostasis/enhypostasis pairing with the ‘dialectic of veiling 
and unveiling’ marks a key moment of intellectual maturation – the point at which Barth firmly secures a 
Christocentric orientation for his theology. 
41 For a good account of Barth’s Christology see McCormack, Karl Barth’s CRDT.  
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Christ is both fully divine and fully human. However he recognizes that anthropology and 
Christology are not interchangeable.
42
 He, then, must address the fact that ‘there can be no 
question of a direct equation of human nature as we know it in ourselves with the human nature 
of Jesus, and therefore of a simple deduction from Christology’.43 For although Jesus is fully 
human, theology ‘must not fail to appreciate how different are His nature and ours’.44 Indeed, 
Barth grounds this difference in the fact that the human nature of Jesus ‘is determined by a 
relation between God and Himself such as has never existed between God and us, and never will 
exist’.45 So Jesus enjoys a unique relationship with the Father that is not shared, unless it pleases 
him to mediate for human beings.  
In §44 Barth sets out to establish the ‘outline and form’46 of a Christological 
anthropology.
47
 Barth’s stated aim is to develop ‘the minimal requirements essential in all 
circumstances for a concept of man which can be used theologically’.48 Since human beings are 
fallen, their nature is darkened and thus is not suitable to ascertain these minimal requirements.
49
 
For Barth, then, our capacity for self-knowledge can only be ‘an act of discipleship’.50 Thus, it is 
only through God’s address to us in Jesus Christ that we can truly know what we are as human 
beings.
51
 For Barth, then, ‘the ontological determination (ontologische Bestimmung) of humanity 
is grounded in the fact that one man among all others is the man Jesus’.52 Barth’s exercise here is 
                                               
42 III/2, 71. 
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Ibid., 49. 
45 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid., 55. 
47 Barth himself recognized that his theological anthropology ‘deviates even more widely from dogmatic tradition 
than in the doctrine of predestination’ (III/2, ix). Some of his interpreters like Herbert Hartwell think it as ‘consistent 
of its kind’ and ‘revolutionary in content’ (Id., The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (London: Duckworth, 
1964), 123; T. F. Torrance referred to it as ‘the most arresting aspect of Barth’s theology’. See id., Karl Barth 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990), 22. Barth’s radical reversal of the traditional dogmatic way of thinking is 
connected to his unique understanding of election, an issue we will revisit in chapter 5. 
48 III/2, 72. 
49 Barth rejects any non-christological accounts of the human person as valid templates from which we can ‘read off 
that which corresponds and is similar in the man to the humanity of Jesus’ (III/2, 226). 
50 III/2, 53. 
51 Ibid. Indeed, as Hartwell says, Barth does not begin as the anthropology of traditional Christian dogmatics usually 
does, i.e., with the problem of the constitution of man’s being, of man’s existence (Dasein) and nature (Sosein) in 
order to proceed from there to the human nature of Jesus Christ in particular. On the contrary, he derives his concept 
of man, of real man, from the human nature of the one particular man Jesus Christ’ (id., The Theology of Karl Barth, 
123).  
52 III/2, 132. When Barth says that humans are ontologically determined in the man Jesus, he means first that 
humanity is ontologically determined by election. He says ‘the being of man as a being with Jesus rests upon the 
election of God’ (III/2, 142). And, ‘[t]he being of man is the history which shows how one of God’s creatures, 
elected and called by God, is caught up in personal responsibility…’(III/2, 55). Understanding Barth’s doctrine of 
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significant to our study because he sets out to develop a christological ‘foundation’,53 from 
which he can derive ‘the criteria’ by which we can ‘pose the question of the nature of man’.54 
Furthermore, Barth takes the humanity of Jesus Christ with absolute seriousness, and thus also 
the concrete and creaturely humanity of all persons. As mentioned, for Barth, Jesus Christ, as the 
New Testament points out, ‘is the whole man’55 and as with Jesus, so also (mutatis mutandis) 
with us. So, the question of what it means to be human must be answered by looking at none 
other than the person of Jesus as revealed ‘in His work and history’.56 It is from here that Barth 
extracts six principles, which he feels are biblically justified, and which then anchors his 
christological anthropology.
57
  
McCormack notes that the usual description of Barth’s theology as christocentric has 
very little explanatory value unless Christocentrism is defined concretely.
58
 Barth was well 
aware of these problems and he himself rarely used the term. According to McCormack, Barth’s 
particular form of Christocentrism can be defined as: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
election is helpful to grasp his Christological anthropology. Obviously a detailed analysis of the doctrine itself is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For such detailed analysis see Bruce L. McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: 
Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), esp. 183-200; Mary K. 
Cunningham, What is Theological Exegesis? Interpretation and Use of Scripture in Barth’s Doctrine of Election 
(Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995); John C. McDowell, ‘Learning Where to Place One’s Hope: 
The Eschatological Hope: The Eschatological Significance of Election in Barth’, Scottish Journal of Theology 53 
(2000), 316-38.  
53 III/2, 71. 
54 Ibid., 72. 
55 III/2, 330. 
56
 Ibid., 58. For Barth, a consideration of Jesus’ work means specifically his saving work since ‘the work of Jesus is 
the work of the Saviour’ (III/2, 58). Some interpreters criticize Barth on this point. They claim that Barth over 
stresses the soteriological work of Christ with the result that he ignores Jesus’ human life, hence minimizing the 
validity and significance of everyday realities. In particular, John Zizioulas is worried that such an exclusively 
christocentric orientation cannot provide any real help for ‘each man in his particular existential situation’. See id., 
‘Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood’, Scottish Journal of Theology 
28 (1975), 401-48. Zizioulas does not seem convinced that Barth was successful in making this application vitally 
useful. However, Barth’s anthropology does not lack existential concerns, as has been suggested by e.g. Nigel 
Biggar in Reckoning with Barth: Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of Karl Barth's Birth (London: 
Mowbray, 1988), 101-18; and by J. B. Webster in Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) and in Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1998). Indeed, such concerns played a prominent role in Barth’s consideration of ethics.  
57 III/2, 68-71. The principles are that: (1). In Jesus only, ‘there immediately meets us at this point the being of God 
also’. (2). God’s presence in union with Jesus is for humanity’s deliverance. (3). God does not ‘infringe on His 
sovereignty’ when he chooses to work in Jesus to save humanity. Instead it is an ‘exercise and demonstration’ of his 
sovereignty’. (4). Jesus ‘exists in the lordship of God’, since God is ‘sovereign in His presence’. (5). Although the 
man Jesus lives ‘within the lordship of God, in identity with the divine subject’ He is himself intertwined with the 
history of divine deliverance. (6). The ‘distinctiveness’ of this man Jesus consists in the fact that He is ‘for God’ in 
the totality of his existence.     
58 McCormack, Karl Barth’s CRDT, 454. 
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The attempt…to understand every doctrine from a centre in God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ; 
i.e. from a centre in God’s act of veiling and unveiling in Christ...‘Christocentrism’, for him, was a 
methodological rule…in accordance with which one presupposes a particular understanding of 
God’s Self-revelation in reflecting upon each and every other doctrinal topic, and seeks to interpret 
those topics in the light of what is already known of Jesus Christ.59  
 
From this definition, three points emerge which are particularly important for understanding 
Barth’s unique form of Christocentrism. First, Barth’s Christocentrism involves both ‘veiling and 
unveiling in Christ’. For Barth, God’s Word is never merely given, instead it is an event whereby 
God manifests himself to human beings while veiled in the mystery of his being. This means that 
Barth is not keen on any systematization of theology that denies the ‘veiling’60 by referring to 
some theological concept from which the rest of the system can be logically deduced.  
Second, McCormack highlights a ‘methodological rule’. For Barth, the direction of all 
theological thinking has consequences for the content of our theologies. Thus, theological 
anthropology like all theological discourse must move from Christ to any given theological 
formulation. I agree. Indeed, this is how theological anthropology distinguishes itself from other 
forms of anthropology. Thus for Barth, a speculative view that circumvents the Word of God 
overlooks the truth about a person’s human nature.61 Third, Barth’s Christocentrism involves a 
specific understanding of God’s Self-revelation. Barth believes that theological anthropology 
must begin with dogmatics, not with an a priori philosophy or speculative worldview. Thus 
Barth opposes any attempt to ground theology on a particular principle or idea. Instead, for 
Barth, Christocentrism centers on ‘an actual encounter with the reality to which theological 
                                               
59 Ibid., Eugene TeSelle also points out that Christocentrism can be applied to epistemological, anthropological, or 
ontological concerns. (Id., Christ in Context : Divine Purpose and Human Possibility (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1975), 1. Barth’s theology can properly be considered Christocentric on all three points. 
60 I/2, 868. 
61 Barth is often associated with theological isolationism. This means that Barth’s christological concentration 
purportedly involves a methodological christomonism that prevents him from significantly engaging with non-
theological disciplines. See Robert S. Crawford, ‘Theological Method of Karl Barth’, Scottish Journal of Theology 
25 (1972), 327; John Milbank, ‘Introduction: Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical Orthodoxy’, in Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, eds., John Milbank, et. al. (London: Routledge, 1999), 2). However, this 
methodological Christocentrism should not be interpreted as such. Barth acknowledges that there are general 
elements of truth in other disciplines. For example, Barth thinks natural science describes humanity in its creaturely 
setting. Indeed, several studies suggest that Barth is quite willing to interact with and learn from a broad spectrum of 
non-theological disciplines. See for example, T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990); Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); Joseph L. Mangina, 'Mediating Theologies: Karl Barth between Radical and Neo-
Orthodoxy', Scottish Journal of Theology 56 (2003); Id., Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (Aldershot, 
Hants: Ashgate, 2004); Daniel Migliore, ‘Response to “The Barth-Brunner Correspondence”’, in George Hunsinger, 
ed., For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2004), 44-52. 
126 
 
presentation can only point’.62 As Brunner notes, ‘the whole strength of Barthian theology lies in 
the assertion of the actual’.63 It is here, Brunner says, ‘that revelation in the ultimate, fullest sense 
can be an act, God speaking to me here and now’.64  
Barth’s method has certain acknowledged difficulties, which are impossible to examine 
deeply without digressing. Here we return to Jones’s concerns above, for he provides some 
questions that emerge when Barth’s Christology is examined critically: ‘how does Barth construe 
Christ’s humanity in its unity with Christ’s divinity?’ and ‘[h]ow more specifically, does Barth 
describe Christ’s human agency?’65 An initial worry would be the affiliation of the dialectic of 
veiling and unveiling as mentioned above with the anhypostasis/enhypostasis pairing and how it 
imperils his description of Christ’s humanity.66 However, drawing from Jones’s conclusion, we 
can set aside the initial worry that Barth’s Christology imperils his description of Christ’s 
humanity. This is because Jones concludes that Barth does not permit these ‘epistemologically 
useful theologoumena to set the agenda for his Christology proper’.67 Indeed, Barth, in CD I/2, 
launches a Christological programme that demonstrates interest not only in Christ’s divinity and 
human agency, but also in all individual’s humanity and agency, regardless of physical or 
cognitive ability. As we will see below, this rigorous Christological method has its benefits in the 
ethical realm. Indeed, Barth’s Christological realism refutes what we said became, after Joseph 
Fletcher, the dominant of two competing views of the person, and the relation of person to body: 
that only those beings who manifest the qualities of subjectivity and personality are ‘persons’ 
and are uniquely human. After gaining a point of entry into Barth’s Christological method, we 
are now ready to examine alternatives to the dominant marginalizing views. 
                                               
62 III/2, 553. 
63 Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” and the reply “No!” (London: 
The Centenary Press, 1946), 49. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Jones, The Humanity of Christ, 17. 
66 For a discussion on Barth’s use of the paring anhypostasis/enhypostasis and whether  using this pairing imperils a 
robust acclamation of Christ’s humanity, and specifically whether Barth’s use of it undermines his dogmatic account 
of human’s agency, see McCormack, Karl Barth's CRDT; Jones, The Humanity of Christ, 19-26; See also two 
important articles on this issue: F. LeRon Shults, ‘A Dubious Christological Formula? Leontius of Byzantium and 
the Anhypostasis-Enhypostasis Theory’, Theological Studies, 57 (1996), 431-46 and the reply to Shults’s article in 
U. M. Lang, ‘Anypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth’, Theological 
Studies, 49 (1998), 630-57. For a good discussion on the nature of Barth’s Christology, see George Hunsinger, ‘Karl 
Barth’s Christology: Its Basic Chalcedonian Character’, in John Webster, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 127-42; Jones, The Humanity of Christ, 19-26. 
67 Jones, ibid., 53. 
127 
 
4. Relationality and the imago Dei: Rethinking the Concept in Theological Anthropology  
The significance of the imago concept to theological anthropology demands that we revisit it. It 
is essential that we revisit the doctrine to shed light on the persisting options in a theological 
conceptualization of the human being’s unique being. After we grasp these options we will be in 
a position to secure a firm theological anthropology. In what follows then, I want us to rethink 
the imago Dei teaching in theological anthropology with our lenses again adjusted by our fellow 
profoundly cognitively impaired human beings who have consistently been stigmatized and 
marginalized. By doing so, I hope that our fresh illumination of the question will acquire us an 
alternative reading to the one we considered in chapter 2. To achieve this goal, I propose to 
follow Barth by drawing from his Church Dogmatics III and his 1934 debate with Emil Brunner 
in which he emphasizes the relational aspect of the image of God.
68
  
In their disagreement over the role and meaning of the imago Dei in the theological 
understanding of human being, Barth’s reply was basically aimed at undermining Brunner’s 
nature/grace dialectic.
69
 In order to proceed, we must say something about this nature/grace 
dialectic although briefly. To make a distinction between people who are just ‘responsible’ to 
God by definition of being humans made in the imago Dei, and the people who actually have 
conscious relationship with God, Brunner speaks of a distinction in the imago Dei in the ‘formal’ 
                                               
68 See Brunner and Barth, Natural Theology (1946). Barth’s views are also located in his Commentary on the Epistle 
to the Romans [1918] and Church Dogmatics I. (NB: It is widely believed that the second edition of Romans marks 
the decisive break with his earlier liberal thinking). Earlier discussions of the Barth-Brunner debate can be found in 
Paul Lehmann, ‘Barth and Brunner: The dilemma of the Protestant mind’, Journal of Religion 20 (1940), 124-140, 
and D. D. Williams, ‘Brunner and Barth on Philosophy’, Journal of Religion 27 (1947), 241-54. Generally see G. C. 
Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962); Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: 
A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, trans. Martin Rüter and Ilse Tödt; English edition by John W. de Gruchy, 
trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997); Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old 
Testament, 2 v. (London: SCM Press, 1961); Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian 
Interpretation. 2v. v2., Human Destiny (1943); Johs Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vv. 1-2 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1926); George Arthur Buttrick, The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: An Illustrated 
Encyclopedia (New York, NY: Abingdon, 1962); Theodorus Christiaan Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament 
Theology [trans. from Dutch] (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).     
69 The chief source of Brunner’s teaching on the imago Dei can be found in his Man in Revolt: A Christian 
Anthropology trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), esp. 82-113, 168-211, and 499-515. As 
Brunner notes, any discussion of the imago Dei must take note of the fact that this doctrine does not play a very 
important part in the Bible (See id., 499). In their 1934 debate Brunner argued for the indispensable role of the 
imago doctrine in articulating the universal being of sinful human beings apart from the redeeming and sanctifying 
grace of Christ, while Barth denied to the doctrine any non-Christological and pre-eschatological meaning.       
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imago Dei
70
 (or what he identifies as the humanum) and ‘material’ imago Dei. Here, Brunner 
was trying to express the simultaneity of being-human and being-a-sinner.  
He puts it thus:  
It is part of the divinely created nature of man that it should have both a formal and a material 
aspect. The fact that man must respond, that he is responsible, is fixed; no amount of human 
freedom, nor of the sinful misuse of freedom, can alter this fact. Man is, and remains, responsible, 
whatever his personal attitude to his Creator may be. He may deny his responsibility, and he may 
misuse his freedom, but he cannot get rid of his responsibility. Responsibility is part of the 
unchangeable structure of man’s being.71 
 
By the ‘formal imago’, Brunner means that which signifies the superiority of homo sapiens 
within creation, or the fact that humans were created to bear the image of God, that is, a person’s 
responsibility and capacity to respond to God’s love. ‘This function or calling as a bearer of the 
image’, Brunner says, ‘is not only not abolished by sin, rather indeed it is the presupposition of 
the ability to sin and continues within the state of sin’.72 In short, for Brunner, the formal imago, 
is retained by the sinner, since he or she remains a responsible being endowed with reason; 
whereas the material imago Dei is lost when ‘man lives in revolt’ against God through sin.73 For 
Brunner, then, formal imago is the Old Testament conception of the image. He says: ‘In the 
thought of the Old Testament the fact that man has been “made in the Image of God” means 
something which man can never lose; even when he sins he cannot lose it’.74 So sin is not 
capable of destroying the formal imago, thereby rendering humans responsible and inexcusable 
for the cosmological chasm (which is both ontological and epistemic) between God and His 
subjects. And, again, in contrast with the continuing integrity of the formal aspect, sin has 
successfully destroyed the material aspect of the image of God in humanity.  
                                               
70 In his later work, Brunner renounces this expression ‘formal imago’ to avoid giving further occasion for the 
misunderstanding ‘that he defends the Catholic doctrine of a double Imago (imago similitude)’, and in order not to 
‘give further offence to theologians who are unable to understand that something formal may have a rich content, 
and even theological relevance’ (see Brunner, Man in Revolt, 513).  
71 Brunner, Doctrine of Creation, 56-57. See also ‘Nature and Grace’, 23. Brunner claims that ‘Luther was the first, 
and only person to notice that there are these two fundamentally different conceptions of the imago in the Bible. The 
Fathers and the medieval theologians did distinguish the two ideas, but Brunner says that from the point of view of 
exegesis they were mistaken in dividing them between the two words Tzelem and Demuth in Gen 1:26’ (Brunner, 
Doctrine of Creation, 76).  
72 Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, 23. 
73 Brunner, Man in Revolt, 82 ff. 
74 Brunner, Doctrine of Creation, 57. 
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‘Materially’, Brunner says, ‘the imago is completely lost, man is a sinner through and 
through and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by sin’.75 It is in this sense (the material 
aspect), Brunner argues, that men and women have ceased to be bearers of the imago Dei – 
wholly, and not partially. ‘Man no longer possesses this Imago Dei […]’.76 Human beings are 
sinners and there is nothing in them that is not defiled by sin. Brunner argues that ‘the justitia 
originalis’ (original righteousness) ‘has been lost and with it the possibility of doing or even of 
willing to do that which is good in the sight of God’.77 Consequently, ‘free will has been lost’.78 
With the loss of original righteousness, a person’s being becomes perverted and disrupted, and 
even though sinful humans remain ‘persons’, they cross over and become ‘anti-personal 
person[s]; for the truly personal is existence in love, the submission of the self to the will of God 
and therefore an entering into communion with one’s fellow creature because one enjoys 
communion with God’.79 Thus, while the ‘quod of personality,’ comprising the ‘humanum of 
every man,’ continues untouched, ‘the quid of personality,’ the ‘personal content of the person,’ 
is ‘negatived through sin’.80  
Barth pursues his goal, not by undermining the distinction between the ‘formal’ and 
‘material’ aspects of the image of God, but by pointing out Brunner’s dialectical depiction of the 
imago Dei. For Barth, this is the jugular of the argument and he strategically attacks it first. 
However, Barth is ready to make two concessions: First, Barth concedes to Brunner that even as 
fallen beings, humans retain their humanum, that is, their personal structure of existence as 
subjectivity and responsibility. In other words, their quod of personality. For Barth, this is not a 
problem, since asserting a remnant of the ‘formal’ image within the set of purely formal 
possibilities is like saying ‘Even as a sinner man is man and not a tortoise’.81  
Secondly, Barth is also ready to concede that the ‘formal’ aspect is also ‘the point of 
contact’ for divine grace. But he stipulates that these concessions should be allowed only if it 
does not make favorable humanity’s capacity for reception of divine revelation over against non-
                                               
75 Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, 24. 
76 Brunner, op. cit., 58. Here Brunner’s approach resembles the one taken by Irenaeus in the 2nd century. Although 
Brunner objects to Irenaeus’s method, namely the notion that image (tselem) and likeness (demuth) meant two 
different parts of the imago Dei, he highly commends Irenaeus’s scholarship and does not really object to Irenaeus’s 
fundamental conclusions. (See Brunner, Man in Revolt, 504-505).  
77 Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, 22. 
78 Ibid., 22  
79 Ibid., 24. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Barth, ‘No!’, 79. 
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humanity’s capacity for reception. To make such a prejudgment would lead to the exclusion of 
non-human beings. It is here that Barth believes Brunner exceeds this stipulated use of the 
‘formal’ aspect, for he makes it the precondition for grace. In Barth’s view, for the ‘formal’ 
aspect to occupy one side of the nature/grace dialectic, it has to be filled out with ‘material’ 
content. According to Barth, then, this content is disguised in Brunner’s ‘formal’ imago from the 
beginning and is the natural knowledge of God. As Brunner has pointed out, this knowledge is 
available to sinful humanity in the contingent order of nature, in the historical experience of 
communities, and in the dictates and indictments of the conscience. But Barth does not dismiss 
incomplete and imperfect knowledge of God. He argues that this knowledge too is real 
knowledge of God, and has its own relevance to salvation. Thus Barth:  
And if we really do know the true God from his creation without Christ and without the Holy 
Spirit – if this is so, how can it be said that the imago is materially “entirely lost,” that in matters 
of the proclamation of the Church Scripture is the only norm, and that man can do nothing towards 
his salvation? Shall we not have to ascribe to him the ability to prepare himself for the knowledge 
of God in Christ at least negatively?
82
 
 
Barth is implying that this negative self-preparation is natural knowledge of humanity in failing 
to obey the created (and obvious) ordinances installed by God. Barth does not deny a natural 
knowledge of God’s will that preconditions one to receive divine grace, but instead objects that 
such knowledge comes through the created ordinances. He also does not see the point of 
redemption if humanity’s natural knowledge of God is a precondition of divine grace. It seems 
that this apparently ‘formal’ aspect actually exercises real limitation on grace by making grace 
potentially apprehensible to human reason. Thus Barth strongly rejects Brunner’s splitting the 
imago Dei into formal and material categories, arguing that ultimately this renders grace 
unnecessary.  
In CD, III/2, Barth innovatively tackles the subject of Biblical anthropology at length. 
Here he proposes that the starting point in understanding the being of God and the being of 
humans is the locus classicus for the idea of humanity in the image of God, namely Genesis 
1:26-27. Expounding on this text, Barth bases his exegesis on the fact that tzelem, the Hebrew 
word for ‘image’, and demuth, the word for ‘likeness’, refer rather to the original than to the 
copy made from it. The substance of this text for Barth is the plural pronoun ‘us’ and the 
                                               
82 Ibid., 82. 
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dynamics within Godhead it signifies.
83
 Barth interprets this pronoun to indicate that within God 
there is a differentiation and relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’.84 In other words, Barth 
sees a very close, intimate face-to-face relationship within Godhead. This kind of relationship 
becomes the defining element in the imago Dei in which God creates man. Commenting on 
Genesis 1:27, Barth writes:  
Is it not astonishing that again and again expositors have ignored the definitive explanation given 
by the text itself, and instead of reflecting on it pursued all kinds of arbitrarily invented 
interpretations of the imago Dei?...Could anything be more obvious than to conclude from this 
clear indication that the image and likeness of the being created by God signifies existence in 
confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction of man and man which is that of male and 
female…?85 
 
A few sentences prior to these words Barth emphasizes the relational essence of the image of 
God thus: 
It is expressed in a confrontation, conjunction and inter-relatedness of man as male and female 
which can not be defined as an existing quality or intrinsic capacity, possibly or structure of his 
being, but which simply occur. In this relationship which is absolutely given and posited there is 
revealed freedom and therefore the divine likeness. As God is free for man, so man is free for 
man; but only inasmuch as God is for him, so that the analogia relationis as the meaning of the 
divine likeness cannot be equated with the analogia entis.86 
 
Thus for Barth, Gen. 1:26 means that there should be in humans ‘a genuine but harmonious self-
encounter and self-discovery; a free co-existence and co-operation; an open confrontation and 
reciprocity like that which exists in the Godhead’.87 Barth does not elaborate on what he means 
by an open confrontation and reciprocity. It is therefore difficult to deduce from this what he 
would say about those individuals among us who cannot reciprocate when engaged by their 
fellow human beings in relations. Barth holds that man is in God’s image because his 
relationship to the woman is like the harmonious confrontation between the Persons of the Holy 
Trinity. But what partnership is this which has its being in God and its created analogy in 
                                               
83 III/1, [Study Edition] eds., G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (London: T. & T. Clark, 2009), 189. 
84 Ibid., 192. 
85 Ibid., 195. 
86 This very pronounced and categorical emphasis on the imago Dei being an exclusively relational phenomenon is 
perhaps tied to and stems from Barth’s concern that the concept has potential to obscure the mediating role that 
belongs to Christ alone. In the original preface to his Church Dogmatics Barth bluntly writes: ‘I take the analogia 
entis to be the crucial invention of the antichrist …’. As pointed out by Hoekema, since a human being cannot 
function without a certain structure, must we conclude that, ‘structure and function are both involved when we think 
of man as the image of God’? (Hoekema, Created in God’s Image, 69). See chapter 3 for a well argued case for a 
trinitarian communal ontology made by John Zizioulas in his Being as Communion, 16-17.  
87 III/1, 185. 
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humanity? For Barth, its nature is indicated by the words of Gen. 1:26, ‘Let us make man in our 
image’. Barth argues that this verse refers, at least, to the Trinity, in which there is a mutual 
divine perichoretic movement. This is the creative basis for humanity’s existence. 
And what is it in a human that corresponds to this mutual inter-penetration and 
indwelling within the Holy Trinity? Here Barth makes much of the fact that both in Gen 1:26 and 
5:2 the call to make humans in the image is coupled with the words, ‘Male and female created he 
them’. So Barth argues that God is able to say that humans are created in His image because, as 
in the Trinity there are an ‘I’ and a ‘Thou’ confronting each other, so also man does not exist as a 
solitary individual, but as two persons confronting each other. Here, Barth makes what I think is 
a hugely important claim on the uniqueness
88
 of humans with significant implications: that 
humans are created in the imago Dei because they stand over against God in a way similar to that 
in which the Persons of the Holy Trinity confront one another. Barth says:  
Neither heaven nor earth, nor water nor land, nor living creatures from plants upward to land 
animals, are a “Thou” whom God can confront as an “I”, nor do they stand in an “I-Thou” 
relationship to one another, nor can they enter into such a relationship. According to the first 
creation saga, however, man as such exists in this relationship from the very outset.89    
  
This claim, contrary to critics of speciesism and the unique place of humanity, clearly elevates 
human beings to a different plane than the rest of creation. For Barth, it is not until what he calls 
‘the first creatures with independent life’ that we begin to glimpse a true counterpart alongside 
and before God in the sphere of the rest of creation.
90
  
In other words, for Barth, the rest of creation may co-exist with humans on a ‘full-scale’, 
but not in ‘true confrontation and reciprocity which are actualized in the reality of an ‘I’ and a 
‘Thou’.91 So, only humans can exist in confrontation with God and as a genuine counterpart to 
his fellows. For him, it is humans who are created ‘first and alone’ in the imago and ‘after the 
likeness’ of God.92 In order to grasp the general biblical understanding of this concept, it is 
advisable to maintain a simple sense of ‘God-likeness’ given in Gen. 1.26. Barth makes an 
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important point: ‘it is not a quality of man’.93 In other words it is not something that human 
beings are, or have in themselves that allows them to be created in the image of God. So again 
the imago Dei as claimed by Joseph Fletcher, is not a capacity for ‘intelligent causal action’.94 
There is no point, then, in asking which of a human being’s ‘peculiar attributes and attitudes’ the 
image consists.
95
 All persons, whether impaired cognitively and/or physically or not, are 
uniquely created in the image of God and thus elevated above the rest of creation.  
In what appears to be a further attempt to buttress his claim of the uniqueness of human 
beings above the rest of creation, Barth seems to make a case for theosis which we said in 
chapter 3 is akin to Eastern theology. Here, Barth makes a dramatic claim: that God willed the 
existence of a being ‘to which His own divine form of life is not alien’.96 Indeed, Maritain claims 
that ‘God is spirit and the human person proceeds from Him in having as principle of life a 
spiritual soul capable of knowing, loving and of being uplifted by grace to participation in the 
very life of God’.97 
So it seems like Barth is saying that it is only in participating in the divine life that we 
humans, with all our ‘non-deity and therefore differentiation’, can be real partners who are 
capable of action and responsibility in relation to God.
98
 Humans then, as Barth argues, are a 
creaturely repetition … a copy and imitation, and a bearer of this form of [divine] life. Thus 
Barth: ‘Man [and not the rest of creation?] was created as this being’.99 The denial of this 
uniqueness of human life has perhaps paved the way for a new tradition within moral philosophy 
where a ‘quality-of-life’ ethic is replacing ‘sanctity-of-life’. In turn this has allowed some 
shocking proposals within biomedical ethics.
100
  
But what does this divine form of life consist in? Barth seems to think that it consists in 
that which is the obvious aim of the ‘Let us’. For Barth, the command ‘Let us’ was held back 
until now, and for producing it only at the point of creating human beings as the triune God’s 
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counterparts. In other words, in God’s own being and sphere there is a counterpart, that is, ‘a 
genuine but harmonious self-encounter and self-discovery; a free-co-existence and co-operation; 
an open confrontation and reciprocity’.101 Again for Barth, human beings are the ‘repetition of 
this divine form of life; its copy and reflection’.102 So, as is the case in the divine realm, humans 
act as the counterpart of their fellow humans and have in them also a counterpart. In short, the 
co-existence and co-operation in God Himself is repeated only in human-to-human relations.
103
 
In sum: the analogy between God and humans is simply the existence of the I and Thou in 
confrontation. It is first constitutive of God the creator, and then for human beings created by 
God.
104
 This is an important point: given Barth’s thinking here, it is not surprising, then, that he 
did not consider the imago to have been eradicated by sin.  
However, in his earlier writings, Barth had followed Luther more closely than Calvin in 
arguing that the imago Dei was totally effaced through the Fall. In his later writings, Barth had 
adjusted that view by positing that humanity could not lose the image because they never 
possessed it in the first place. Barth says: ‘We certainly cannot deduce from this that man has 
lost it through the fall, either partially or completely, formally or materially. …What man does 
not possess he can neither bequeath nor forfeit’.105 Thus Barth argues that humanity was not 
created to be the image and likeness of God, but rather created in the image of God. I agree. The 
image, like personhood as perhaps understood in contemporary bioethics today, is not something 
that is added to humans. Human beings are persons created to be the image of God. Simply put, 
they are the image of God. So when we ask whether someone suffering from a cognitive 
impairment is a ‘person’ we directly question the creator of that person. 
To understand Barth’s reading of the imago, it is important to grasp that for him the ‘I-
Thou’ confrontation is first of all ‘constitutive of God, and then for man created by God’.106 And 
so for him, ‘to remove it is tantamount to removing the divine from God’.107 In the same manner, 
for the image to have been effaced by sin, Barth thinks this would have been tantamount to 
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removing the ‘human from man’.108 Consequently, without the image, there would be no human, 
even though the human exists to bear the image. It is now possible to see a connection between 
Barth’s concept of covenant as the ‘internal basis of creation’ and the imago as the ‘internal basis 
of humanum’.109  
For Barth, ‘partnership’ is the concrete and historical foundation for the existence of the 
human as creature. Creatureliness, then, is abstract humanity while being-in-relation is concrete 
and actual humanity. The difference between Barth and Brunner is becoming more evident. On 
the one hand, Brunner adheres to an Augustinian and Thomistic teaching when he considers the 
image to be the abstract and formal element, and the human the concrete and material element of 
human existence. On the other hand Barth is hesitant to speak of the doctrine of the imago Dei as 
a problem of uniting the formal (ontic) and the material (relational). So for Barth, humans exist 
even before they know they exist. Once again this existence of humans is always creaturely, and 
is always, as mentioned, in a polarity of sexual being. Again, Barth holds Gen. 1.27 to be an 
exegetical and theological commentary of Gen. 1.26. As Anderson says, this subjectivity is not 
merely a function of the image, based on a formal possibility. Instead, co-humanity is itself the 
imago as humanity under the determination of the divine Word.  
If we think Barth’s move here is radical, Barth himself thinks he is in good company in 
the apostle Paul himself who daringly equates ‘the man Jesus, who is the Messiah of Israel, with 
the Son of God, and the image of God’.110 This radical Pauline assertion of Christology gives 
Barth theological clues for his exegesis of Gen. 1.26-27. The earthly being of the human 
creature, therefore, manifests a ‘similarity or analogy to God’s own being’,111 and it is only 
because Jesus is himself the image of the invincible God (Col. 1.15), and not merely a creaturely 
expression of it, can we understand that all fallen humans exist under this determination. Barth 
puts it thus: The ‘humanity of Jesus is…the repetition and reflection of God Himself, no more 
and no less. It is the image of God, the imago [D]ei’.112 Thus, what is true of Jesus subsequently 
is also true for humanity in general. This is because to be ‘with Jesus’, says Barth, ‘is man’s 
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ontological determination’.113 Barth emphasizes that the ‘particularity of man as compared with 
other creatures is contained in this ontological determination of his [man’s] being’.114 
We have said that Barth admits that a formal image of God which is not destroyed by sin 
remains in humanity. But what, he asks, has this to do with any supposed capacity in the human 
creature for revelation or any natural receptivity for the divine Word, as long as it remains purely 
formal, and does not trespass into the sphere of the material? Barth says: 
If a man had just been saved from drowning by a competent swimmer, would it not be very 
unsuitable if he proclaimed the fact that he was a man and not a lump of lead as his ‘capacity for 
being saved’? Unless he could claim to have helped the man who saved him by a few strokes or 
the like!115 
 
Barth believes that Brunner’s concept of ‘formal’ has no anthropological significance without 
this material limitation. In other words, this ‘form’ would not constitute essential human being 
and unique dignity unless it sheltered a material ‘capacity for revelation’.116 Such an 
abandonment of theological realism provides a certain measure of intelligibility to the odd 
statements Brunner made. For example he says: 
Without a certain measure of intellectual gifts it is impossible to be human. Without that mind 
which at its zenith is called genius, man cannot even understand the fact that he is man, and he 
cannot make decisions in the sense of personality. The mind, as we have already said, is the basis 
of being person. One does not need to have a great mind to be a person who truly believes and 
loves; but if one has no mind – as an idiot – one cannot even believe. The presupposition for the 
understanding of the Word of God is understanding in general, the understanding of words, in the 
general, purely human sense. What that poor creature which, in the extreme case, so far as we 
know, has not a spark of intelligence means in the Family of God, we do not know; we only know 
that it is inaccessible to the message of the Word of God, thus that in this life it cannot become a 
believer, because it cannot understand human speech. It is, however, more than probable that even 
the most vacant idiot can be approached in some way or another by real love, and thus is not 
without a glimmer of personal being. In spite of this, such cases are extreme instances, whose 
significance we cannot understand.117  
 
Such an account of persons is at work in Brunner’s arguments, unequivocally disqualifying as 
persons, those humans who lack ‘personality’, on the basis that they are without ‘calling’. But 
Brunner seems to equivocate when he continues to say that ‘that poor creature which, … so far 
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as we know, has not a spark of intelligence’ belongs, supposedly, to ‘the Family of God’.118 To 
this prevarication, O’Donovan correctly questions Brunner:  
Is not the “Family of God” a community of persons? Do the boundaries of this community extend, 
for Brunner, beyond persons to nonpersonal creatures that are the objects of personal care and 
affection, of which household pets are the typical examples, and does the ‘idiot’ belong to the 
Family of God in this sense?
119
  
 
Brunner admits not to know the meaning of the ‘idiot’ in the ‘Family of God’, and like Joan 
O’Donovan says, his agnosticism most likely prevents him from placing the ‘idiot’ beyond the 
pale of person. This is captured in the conclusion of this passage thus: ‘it is … more than 
probable that even the most vacant idiot … is not without a glimmer of personal being’.120 But 
does this ‘glimmer of personal being’ qualify our fellow cognitively impaired human beings as 
persons? Brunner is silent. The ethical consequence, then, of Brunner’s shift of focus is ‘a loss of 
universality in the application of the concept of person’.121  
Barth clearly captures this weakness in Brunner’s ethics and quite properly puts a few 
challenging questions to Brunner: 
Is the revelation of God some kind of “matter” to which man stands in some original relation 
because as man he has or even is the “form” which enables him to take responsibility and make 
decisions in relation to various kinds of “matter”? Surely all his rationality, responsibility and 
ability to make decisions might yet go hand in hand with complete impotency as regards this 
“matter”! And this impotency might be the tribulation and affliction of those who, as far as human 
reason can see, possess neither reason, responsibility nor ability to make decisions: new-born 
children and idiots. Are they not children of Adam? Has Christ not died for them?122 
 
So Barth is concerned with whether the formal possibilities of a fallen nature espoused by 
Brunner are not actual capacities that then prove obligatory to divine grace. If this is the case, 
Barth quite properly worries about those fellow humans who apparently lack these specific 
capacities (e.g. demented individuals, persons in PVS, profoundly intellectually impaired 
individuals etc). So Barth correctly rejects any formal understanding of the image of God that 
fails to be properly inclusive. He rejects any formal understanding that excludes some ‘children 
of Adam’ because they lack the defined capacities of the humanum and for revelation. 
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To Barth, for Brunner to avoid this pitfall of rejecting some ‘children of Adam’, he must 
‘stick to [his] statement that man is (‘materially’) ‘a sinner through and through,’ with the 
consequence that the ‘formal factor’ cannot be anything like a remainder of some original 
righteousness, an openness and readiness for God’.123 O’Donovan adequately captures this point 
for us. She states:  
Only by surrendering its hidden revelational content can Brunner’s ‘formal factor’ perform its 
modest but legitimate service of indicating the universal being of sinful mankind. But in thus 
limiting itself, the concept forfeits its anthropological weight as an expression of man’s unique, 
inalienable dignity. The functional deflation of the ‘formal factor’ signals the collapse of the 
nature/grace dialectic in its epistemological and ontological aspects. No longer can the persisting 
structure of sinful human subjectivity, conceived as responsibility, constitute the necessary 
condition or ‘point of contact’ for God’s gracious self-revelation to man.124 
 
‘If’, Barth says, ‘nevertheless there is an encounter and communion between God and man, then 
God himself must have created for it conditions which are not in the least supplied (not even 
‘somehow,’ not even ‘to some extent’!) by the existence of the formal factor’.125 The ‘point of 
contact’ in human beings can only be occupied by the material aspect of the imago Dei. This 
position which sin prevents human beings from occupying is now occupied by Jesus Christ in 
our place. What benefits, then, ensue from Barth’s Christological realism? Again O’Donovan 
lucidly captures this when she says: 
Barth’s Christological realism is a significant theological gain in the ethical realm, particularly in 
the realm of judgments concerning those individual beings at the borders of human life: the 
unborn child, the severely defective infant, the very old and senile, the comatose patient. For it 
forces upon us the consideration that these individuals are human beings created in the image of 
God, that they have a share in human uniqueness because elected in Jesus Christ, the objects of 
God’s judgment and mercy. It forces this consideration upon us by disallowing all immanent 
conceptions of human being, either structural or qualitative, which would place such creatures 
beyond the pale of humanness. It stands as a refutation of the favourite argument of the 
technicians and humanists of our age: that only those beings are ‘persons’, are uniquely human, 
that manifest the qualities of subjectivity, of personality. Against this argument it pits an 
uncompromising theological understanding of the particularity and uniqueness of human being in 
terms of its transcendent determination by God’s covenant of grace in Jesus Christ. It sets forth 
human uniqueness as the incomprehensible particularity of God’s elective Will, the transcendent 
mystery of ‘the person’ as the mystery of God’s gracious action.
126
 
 
At the end, we sympathize with Barth’s transcendental-relational understanding of human being 
as opposed to Brunner’s immanent-structural view because it leaves us with no option, but to 
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‘inquire into our obligations to those members of the human community at the extremity of need 
and helplessness, who evade our qualitative standards of humanity’.127 To reject this inquiry is to 
condemn ourselves through inexcusable human arbitrariness.
128
 
4.1 Critical Issues in Barth 
Barth’s understanding of the imago Dei is a timely corrective to an overemphasis on the structure 
of human beings, particularly on rationality as the essential aspect of the imago Dei. Indeed it 
can easily be argued that Barth’s theological anthropology and his concept of the image of God 
as concrete human existence in the form of co-humanity so that the formal is the relational 
represent the most innovative advance in the doctrine of the imago Dei since Augustine. While 
Barth’s objection to Brunner’s concept of the imago Dei successfully pinpoints Brunner’s 
problematic anthropology, it does not positively resolve the problem of theologically 
conceptualizing human being. However, we notice that Barth’s relational and Christological 
concept for understanding the essential being of persons, emerges in his insistence on faith as the 
‘point of contact’ for divine revelation. Furthermore, we will recall that Barth conceded to the 
formal aspect having a legitimate role in representing the continual being in sin and faith. This 
concession leaves room for the possibility of a concept of human being as ‘subjectivity’, 
‘personality’, and ‘responsibility’. What Barth is certain of, then, is that Brunner’s structural 
concept cannot carry the theological import attached to it.  
Barth’s perspective, of course, is not without its critics. For example, in Barth’s terms, 
some have asked: can the image of God be renewed, and is his view of the imago Dei an 
adequate reproduction of the biblical data? Anthony Hoekema thinks not. Instead, Hoekema 
argues that any view of the imago Dei as purely relational, and therefore purely formal (i.e. the 
capacity for confrontation and encounter), is an inadequate reproduction of the biblical data. 
Surely, Hoekema wonders, is the imago Dei not more than a mere capacity?
129
 While Hoekema 
agrees that the possibility of an ‘I-Thou’ relationship with God and others forms part of our 
likeness to God, that likeness must show itself in concrete actions and attitudes, and not just in a 
formal similarity of capacity. In these respects, then, Hoekema concludes that Barth’s conception 
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of the image of God falls far short of the biblical doctrine of man.
130
 I think Hoekema has 
misread Barth.  
To Barth, human beings are to reflect God in their love of him and others, and by the way 
they live. This should be the ‘concrete action and attitude’ Hoekema is demanding. In this 
communion, which is not an abstract affair, justified humans enter a special partnership with God 
through Christ, in which they share their humanity with God and they partake in God’s life 
through grace.
131
 Thus as we said, the summons: ‘Let us’ was delayed until the creation of 
humans. And notice that it is only humans who possess this capacity to participate in the divine 
nature/life (see 2 Peter 1.4). This emphasis is important to Barth’s dynamic understanding of the 
imago and it seems to demonstrate why humans are elevated above the rest of creation. Recall 
that for Barth, only humans are a repetition of the divine form of life, and only humans are a 
copy and reflection and not a prototype. Thus in their differentiation, only humans are capable of 
replaying the complex and intimate perichoresis that exists in the triune life. But surely is this not 
speciesism? I think not.  
I think a correct reading of Barth could not conclude that his view amounts to speciesism. 
In fact Barth is adamant that ‘[m]an is not their (other creatures) Creator; hence he cannot be 
their absolute lord, a second God’.132 Barth continues: ‘[i]n his dignity and position he can only 
be God’s creaturely witness and representative to them’.133 Contrary to the popular view about 
the meaning of ‘dominion’ as used in Genesis, Barth correctly thinks humans, who are 
themselves embodied creatures have an important role to play within creation. Although there is 
not denying their creatureliness, Barth thinks a human being can be ‘a primus inter pares (first 
among equals) among those over whom he ‘rules’.134 For Barth, humans do not possess the 
power of life and death, and so their lordship over the rest of creation is with limitations.
135
    
Also, one could say to Barth that a transcendental-relational understanding of human beings does 
not meet the challenge posed by Brunner’s account of the imago Dei which seeks to safeguard 
created structures. Thus Brunner rightly challenges us to articulate the created structure of human 
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being.
136
 But we are rejecting Brunner’s formalistic-transcendental approach to articulating 
human structure, not because we are denying all structure to human beings, but because we are 
saying that what makes humans unique and worthy of protection cannot be articulated by 
structural and qualitative concepts which marginalize some humans.  
In sum: Barth develops a more adequate account than Brunner of the form of human 
being by developing a series of analogies drawn from God’s inner Trinitarian being, God’s 
covenantal relationships with humanity in Christ, Christ’s saving work and our humanity. These 
analogies
137
 demonstrate how the divine co-existence, co-inherence, and reciprocity of Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit is repeated in God’s election of all human beings, regardless of physical or 
cognitive ability. Had Brunner taken his starting point not in the dialectical separation of form 
and content which mirrors his bifurcation of God’s being as Spirit and as Love, but in a 
transcendent-relational understanding of human being, then, perhaps he would have had less 
difficulty imagining the humanity of those individuals at the so called margins of personhood. 
5. The Turn to Embodiment: Who Are ‘We’? And Why It Matters 
 
So far we have examined two competing visions of the imago Dei concept. Firstly, in chapter 2 
we suggested that the view espoused by the Christian tradition has and continues to marginalize 
some human beings as not properly human. Secondly, in the preceding section, we have 
suggested a ‘relational’ reading of the imago as an alternative to the one held by the Christian 
tradition. The ways of human imaging of God are many and varied in scripture, but none of them 
are disembodied. Instead the whole person in community is created and renewed in ‘the image of 
God’. In this section I am suggesting that we have allowed ourselves to think of personhood in 
terms quite divorced from our biological nature or the history of our embodied self. If this is true, 
I am suggesting that to be complete, the rationality-relationality turn needs to be complimented 
by the turn to human embodiment. To advance this suggestion I will examine the theological 
anthropology of Karl Barth concerning persons and their embodiment. Some moral philosophers 
would like us to believe that intellectually disabled people are not persons. Thus some of them 
categorize humans in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us’. As an example, moral philosopher Jeff McMahan 
would like to think that in contrast to ‘them’ there is ‘us’. Conversely for Barth there is only we 
                                               
136 O’Donovan, ‘Man in the Image of God’, 459. 
137 See generally III/2, §44 and §45.  
142 
 
and/or us. What distinguishes Barth and McMahan? Although they seem to be far apart, both 
answer our question by determining what human beings are. However, as we shall see, they part 
ways when McMahan sees humans as only a ‘capacity for self-consciousness’, while Barth 
thinks of human beings holistically, that is, as ‘bodily soul and ensouled body’. I will examine 
their thoughts one at a time beginning with a brief sketch of McMahan’s position. 
5.1 Jeff McMahan on who ‘We’ are 
 
McMahan sets out to develop an ethics of killing.
138
 Necessarily, then, it is essential that we first 
establish what kinds of entities human beings are. In what follows I sketch in brief what I 
interpret to be McMahan’s view of what we are and his reasons for holding this view. McMahan 
assumes paradigmatic instances of ‘us’, as yet undefined, and sets out to discover what properties 
are important to identify individuals ‘like you and me’. Thus McMahan is interested in those 
cases ‘whose metaphysical or moral status … is uncertain or controversial’.139 For him, these 
include: ‘animals, human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, anencephalic infants, 
congenitally severely retarded human beings, human beings who have suffered severe brain 
damage or dementia, and human beings who have become irreversibly comatose’.140 All these 
beings, he says, are in one way or another ‘at the margins’ of human life.141 I am still puzzled 
that McMahan includes intellectually disabled persons, or in his words the ‘congenitally severely 
mentally retarded’,142 and the severely brain injured in the same list with animals. I say it is 
puzzling because these persons are clearly human beings. Obviously some may not agree with 
me.
143
 The moral status of persons at the so-called margins of personhood (neonates and 
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cognitively impaired individuals) is a real issue and so serious and well-reasoned discussion is 
inevitable. In the next section we will attempt to convincingly defend against this otherwise 
strange belief and then offer what I suggest is a promising account of what it is to be a person.  
McMahan derives his philosophical use of the term ‘person’ from John Locke, hence 
personhood begins and ends at certain points in time and is to some extent a quantitatively 
measurable quality of being human.
144
 McMahan’s threshold for personhood, then, includes 
properties that are not steady throughout a human being’s life. So, in McMahan’s words, 
‘roughly speaking, to be a person, one must have the capacity for self-consciousness’.145 This 
means that to speak of a person is to speak of a ‘being with a rich and complex mental life, a 
mental life of a high order of sophistication’.146 To McMahan, then, to say that ‘we’ are persons, 
is to speak of individuals who possess certain psychological properties. The issue of who ‘we’ 
are, for McMahan, is two pronged: it is possible to ask what it takes for individuals to continue to 
exist or we may ask what sort of thing we are essentially.
147
 After skillfully disposing of what he 
takes to be the three most common views of personal identity (that we are souls, that we are 
human organisms, and that we are bare psychological capacities),
148
 McMahan suggests a 
particularly sophisticated, and strongly psychologically-grounded view of moral status. 
McMahan firmly believes in sentience: according to him, human beings are essentially embodied 
minds.
149
 So for him we begin to exist with the onsent of (the capacity for) consciousness in ‘our’ 
organism. Applied to cognitively impaired individuals and neonates, the view ends up with a 
rather remarkably minimal status for such human life. So such human persons have no status; 
attributing any is analogous to a category mistake.  
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McMahan follows a version of Derek Parfit’s idea of personal identity which he attempts 
to expand. Parfit has claimed that personal identity is based on psychological continuity which 
McMahan calls the ‘Psychological Account of Identity’(PA).150 In Parfit’s words, this 
psychological continuity consists of ‘the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness’.151 McMahan suggests an alternative understanding of psychological continuity 
that makes it explicitly a matter of degree. He thinks that even when interpreted as such, 
psychological continuity could be the criterion of identity.
152
 This is because for McMahan, and 
contrary to Parfit and others, ‘there is identity whenever psychological continuity holds to any 
degree. McMahan’s PA treats psychological continuity as an all-or-nothing relation.153  
So McMahan following Parfit is not worried about a strong connectedness between some 
Person(1) who existed in the past to Person(2) who will exist in the future and who will benefit 
from any present actions and planning of Person(1). Instead, for McMahan, what matters is that 
Person(1) has relations of psychological connectedness and continuity with Person(2), what he 
speaks of as ‘prudential unity relations’.154 To McMahan, tradition holds that identity is the only 
such relation.
155
 To Parfit, the prudential unity relations are psychological connectedness and 
psychological continuity. McMahan calls a ‘natural mistake’, the thought that identity is the sole 
prudential unity relation. For him, in all actual cases, there cannot be psychological continuity 
and connectedness without identity. Furthermore he claims that identity presupposes 
psychological continuity.
156
  
However, in the case of what he calls ‘Division’, McMahan thinks psychological 
continuity and connectedness diverge from identity.
157
 Thus we are inclined to believe that in 
this and other cases, it is not ‘identity, but the relations that underlie identity, that ultimately 
matter’.158 For Parfit, in that case of Division, Person(1) ceases to exist. Addressing a person 
about to undergo Division, He says: ‘You will lose your identity. But there are different ways of 
doing this. Dying is one, dividing is another. To regard these as the same is to confuse two with 
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zero. Double survival is not the same as ordinary survival. But this does not make it death. It is 
even less like death’.159 Here Parfit appeals to a sense of the term ‘survive’ that he introduced in 
his earlier work, where he claimed that there can be survival without identity.
160
   
McMahan agrees with Parfit that Division shows identity is not what matters. In other 
words, they both claim that identity is not what rationally grounds our special concerns about the 
future – what McMahan calls ‘egoistic concern’.161 However McMahan differs from Parfit about 
the ‘nature of the relations that are constitutive of personal identity’ and about ‘the prudential 
unity relations’162 Thus McMahan extends Parfit’s account by the claim that a consciousness is 
the same consciousness if there is any degree of psychological connectedness, and it is sustained 
by physical and functional continuity. This means that enough of the same brain must continue to 
exist and work to support the same consciousness. McMahan admits that the latter is not very 
well established, but it is also less important morally, as psychological continuity without 
physical continuity is not something we yet need to take into account in practical ethics.  
When we think about the critical questions of when we begin to exist and the conditions 
of our ceasing to exist, we consider what it is that grounds our rational egoistic concerns for the 
future. For McMahan, a person ceases to exist when it ‘ceases to be the case that there will be 
someone existing in the future with whom he will be psychologically continuous’.163 So again 
for him it is obvious when psychological continuity ceases to hold: it is when for example an 
individual suffers brain death, lapses into PVS, or experiences any interruption to the cerebral 
hemispheres. But what does McMahan’s PA imply for cases of for example progressive 
dementia, such as occurs in Alzheimer’s disease, where the psychological connectedness 
diminishes over time?  
Here, McMahan distinguishes between what he calls the ‘Patient at Onset’ and the 
individual in the later stages of the disease whom he calls ‘Demented Patient’.164 So according to 
his PA, the Patient at Onset and the Demented Patient are not the same individual. McMahan 
thinks that according to the PA, although there is not a precise point at which psychological 
connection is lost, the ‘person’ of the demented individual will clearly have ceased to exist when 
                                               
159 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 262. 
160 Derek Parfit, ‘Personal Identity’, The Philosophical Review 80 (1971), 3-27. 
161 McMahan, EoK, 41, 43. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 43 
164 Ibid., 493. 
146 
 
her mental capacities are not capable of even the most rudimentary forms of thought or 
perception.
165
 I will argue that this conclusion is prohibitive and it perpetuates the 
marginalization of especially individuals with dementia and more generally cognitive 
impairment. Thus although the psychological continuity of an individual may be lost, and their 
mental capacity not be able to perform simple cognitive skills, as we shall see, because an 
individual is created to be God’s image which is not located in any capacity intrinsic to herself, 
and because she is both in a circumincession of relations that mirror the Holy Trinity and is 
bodily soul and ensouled body, the same person prevails. I will suggest that we cannot discount 
our embodiment in identifying who we are.  
McMahan argues that prudential unity relations
166
 must in one way or another be related 
to that which has physical, functional, and organizational continuity over time. Recall that for 
him, we are embodied minds and ‘we do not begin to exist until our organisms develop the 
capacity to generate consciousness.’167 Here, the immediate ethical implications for the morality 
of abortion are obvious. And for our present purpose, it means that individuals who do not 
possess, or lose this consciousness are no longer persons. To McMahan, prudential unity 
relations are particularly weak at infancy because the brain is not well developed. Thus rational 
basis for egoistic concern increases only as the brain becomes more highly developed. 
Additionally, cognitive impairment also weakens prudential unity relations which implies that 
when intellectual disability is both congenital and very profound, an affected individual will 
never possess strong prudential unity relations. For McMahan this alone makes cognitively 
impaired people very different from the rest of ‘us’.  
For McMahan, in addition to personhood, interests are also a basis for moral 
consideration. He makes a distinction between a being’s simple ‘interests’ (i.e. goods over its 
whole life) and what he calls ‘time-relative interests’ (i.e. goods it has rational egoistic concern 
for at a particular time).
168
 The difference between the two is that the latter takes into account the 
degree to which the bases for egoistic concern hold between the time of having the interests and 
when the goods/bads will be realized; that is, it takes into account the strength of the prudential 
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unity relations of the individual. So those with weak prudential unity relations have weak time-
relative interests. The death of a fetus, then, infants or very young children and those individuals 
McMahan calls ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ is less bad than that of an adult human 
because it is considered less bad to frustrate their time-relative interests than those of any of ‘us’. 
This is because their time-relative interests are weaker. These conclusions have implications for 
the status of personhood which Eva Kittay properly captures when she says: 
Strong prudential unity relations and the psychological capacities that enable them also coincide 
with the definition of personhood, that is, the complex, sophisticated psychological capacities that 
include self-consciousness, rationality, and autonomy. “We”, then, are persons. Conversely, weak 
prudential unity relations arising from psychological functioning that falls short of these complex 
and sophisticated psychological capacities belong to those who are not persons.169 
 
In short, for McMahan, the ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ are not persons because, as 
Kittay concludes, they fail to meet the following criteria: (1) As traditionally philosophically 
defined, these individuals fall outside the descriptive boundaries of personhood and (2) they fail 
to be persons on metaphysical grounds, which similarly require psychological capacities that 
they seem to lack.
170
  
McMahan states that there are four distinct categories into which may fall most instances 
of killing for which there may be a reasonable justification.
171
 I cannot take the space to rehearse 
all of them.
172
 However, the third category consists of cases in which, for McMahan, ‘the 
metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial’.173 Thus when 
McMahan applies the Time-Relative Interest Account to assess the wrongness of killing it yields 
serious counterintuitive conclusions. Recall our push against animalizing profound cognitive 
impairment in chapter 2. There we said that according to McMahan’s Time-Relative Account it 
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is not wrong to kill an animal than one of ‘us’. Also, recall that individuals who belong to ‘us’ 
are those with psychological characteristics which make their life more worthwhile.
174
  
We have said that the conclusions about intellectually disabled persons do not chime well 
with common belief. However, McMahan believes we cannot but accept the following 
conclusions
175
 and revise our commonsense beliefs: (1) based on certain psychological capacities 
that define who ‘we’ are, ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ do not have greater claims to 
having their time-relative interests satisfied and not frustrated than do animals, including the 
interest not to be killed. Why so? First, this is because McMahan thinks their lives contain and 
are capable of containing less good than those with strong prudential unity relations, and second, 
because they fall below the threshold of respect that governs relations to persons. And (2) claims 
of justice based on the idea that ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ are unfortunate and 
should be compensated for their misfortune are mistaken, since these individuals are not 
unfortunate.
176
  
The controversial results of McMahan’s theory are clear: again, we determine the killing 
of human beings who have minimal psychological unity, such as fetuses, infants, and 
‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’, on the grounds of their time-relative interests. For 
McMahan, congenital, rather than progressive cognitive impairment is important, as those who 
once were persons may continue to be covered by the morality of respect. However, in this 
situation, there is no telling what decisions families and society in general take when the 
financial burden of caring for those whose agency has failed is no longer unbearable.
177
 So for 
McMahan, killing human beings who have no more capacity for rich psychological unity than 
non-human animals is no more wrong than killing animals. Although he argues that killing 
animals is a serious matter, McMahan argues that the harm involved (i.e., the frustration of time-
relative interests) can be outweighed by other interests.  
                                               
174 Again, as mentioned in chapter 2, I think separating ‘them’ from ‘us’ based on a set of desirable characteristics is 
the same harmful nationalism that McMahan abhors as virulent nationalism (See McMahan, EoK, 221).  
175
 Here I am following Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, 106. 
176 I will revisit this issue of justice in chapter 5. I agree that cognitively impaired persons are not owed justice 
because they are ‘unfortunate’. Instead I will argue that they are owed justice because they are persons like the rest 
of those McMahan calls ‘us’. 
177 Here McMahan seems willing to extend the basis on which we make our decisions about those whose agency is 
failing beyond medical indications to social indications with obvious implications for all intellectually impaired 
individuals and to neonates.  
149 
 
We have been rehearsing McMahan’s theory regarding the nature of personhood and the 
grounds of the moral status of those he calls ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ and in 
extension other intellectually impaired persons. We have said that for McMahan, relational 
properties are generally not relevant and only intrinsic psychological capacities count towards 
moral personhood. Thus ‘we’ (those possessing certain rational qualities) are psychological 
capacities tethered to a bodily form. Further we have said that he views species membership as 
irrelevant for moral consideration and indeed equates privileging species membership with 
dangerous nationalism. Consequently, for him ‘congenitally severely mentally retarded’ 
individuals (and those beings whose moral status is ‘controversial’) are excluded from moral 
personhood, and their deaths are less significant as their killing is less wrong than those of 
‘persons’. I suspect then that for McMahan, merely being human is not in itself a reason for 
ascribing someone a right to life. On this point, I suggest that McMahan is wrong. As Bernd 
Wannenwetsch properly points out, there is something special and unique about being a member 
of the species homo sapiens.
178
 Human beings are human beings by virtue of the fact that they 
are human beings, and the benefactors of a special relationship with God. If this is so, I suggest 
that the beginning point for all discussion on personhood in connection with profound cognitive 
impairment is the fact that human beings are persons by virtue of the Adamic inheritance. So to 
be a person is not at all defined by what an individual can or cannot do but by whose he/she is 
and where she/he is from. In sum: for McMahan, different criteria of personal identity over time 
correspond to different conceptions of what kind of entity humans essentially are. Thus the 
criterion he sketches: again, that prudential unity relations must be related to an entity which has 
physical, functional, and organizational continuity over time, suggests that we are essentially 
‘embodied minds’.179 
5.2 Karl Barth: The Human Person as the Soul of the Body  
 
After engaging with McMahan, we are now ready to offer a more inclusive path to what human 
beings truly are. In what follows, I am suggesting we need a theological account of human nature 
that strongly affirms human embodiment and so is capable of serious engagement with 
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intellectual disability, rejects dualism and abstract materialism, and has a respectful attitude 
towards science. Such an account is found in Karl Barth’s theological anthropology. Barth 
strongly believed that ontology has a decisive importance in understanding the human person, 
and this fact is portrayed in his treatment of the issue at great length in Church Dogmatics III/2 
§46, where he presents an account of human ontology that is trinitarian and based on God’s 
partnership with human beings. It is from this paragraph that we will attempt to determine the 
particular place of embodiment through his unique treatment of the soul-body relation.  
When we speak of embodiment, it must be understood we are not saying that human 
embodiment necessitates a body that is simply a physical object wholly describable by a 
scientific account.
180
 Instead, human embodiment includes concepts of human ‘sensuality, 
emotionality, movement, desire, and feeling’.181 And as Steven Pinker says, embodiment is not 
restricted to the idea of the body as an animate machine or piece of meat, for example.
182
 So as 
Michael Spezio says, it is fine to say that the body is physical if this term is used as a ‘descriptor 
that does not restrict understanding to scientific physicality’.183 And the physicality of the body 
should not be taken to imply the disembodiment of the nonphysical human mind or soul.
184
 I am 
suggesting that the radical connection between body and soul (mind), affirms human 
embodiment and also that human persons have no possibility apart from or except for their 
bodies. Let us now turn and sketch what we mean when we speak of a soul-body relation. 
5.2.1 The Soul-Body Relation: A Case for Embodiment 
 
The concepts ‘body’, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ as used in Scripture do not express a clearly defined 
anthropology.
185
 Indeed, Barth acknowledged that even the Old and New Testaments do not 
contain a true anthropology or a doctrine of the relation between soul and body.
186
 On the other 
hand, Brunner, a contemporary of Barth, argued that these terms should be taken as more or less 
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equivalent expressions which refer to the human person as a ‘whole’.187 However, Brunner’s 
judgment should be received with caution for Scripture contains specific references which seem 
to imply significant distinctions among the terms. The source of ambiguity in the attempt to 
describe the human person as the sum of these concepts and the confusion that surrounds the 
meaning of these terms is the absence of a structured human ontology in Scripture. Indeed, the 
debate over the concepts of trichotomy and dichotomy in the history of doctrine encapsulates this 
fundamental ambiguity.  
Barth addresses the problem of the relation of the soul and body in a manner that is 
strikingly different from that of his contemporaries and of present-day theologians. Considered 
within the framework of generally understanding humanity, Barth’s principle of theological 
anthropology is at first glance very provocative. If McMahan thinks ‘we’ are ‘embodied minds’, 
Barth claims that all human beings are ‘bodily soul, and also besouled body’.188 This means that 
the human person, through the Spirit of God, exists in a definite order, that is, ‘man is the 
subject, form and life of a substantial organism, the soul of his body – wholly and simultaneously 
both, in ineffaceable difference, inseparable unity, and indestructible order’.189 This order 
implies precedence and subsequence, and it will become more appropriate, when it is used to 
describe the being of the individual human person.  
In this move, Barth captures the remarkable union and differentiation of the body-soul 
relation.
190
 For Barth, then, a human being is not simply a soul that is tethered to a body, but is 
an ‘embodied soul’. In short, to be a human person is to be embodied. This means that the person 
is ‘wholly and simultaneously both’191 soul and body. Here, Barth moves against an abstract 
dualism which bifurcates soul and body,
192
 an abstract materialistic monism
193
 which thinks 
human persons merely on the basis of ‘corporeality’, and abstract monistic idealism of the kind 
he thinks could be found within the Greek doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and that treats 
body as garment, symbol, or even obstacle.
194
 All these errors miss the relation of soul and body 
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because they miss the point of connection (a point I will come back to) – that humans are as they 
have spirit.
195
  
Barth understands a person’s body to be that person’s ‘material body’,196 which is 
‘visible, outward, and earthly’.197 The body, then, he says, is ‘sensuous’, ‘empirical’ and 
available to study in ways that the soul is not.
198
 For Barth, the body represents the objective 
aspect of human nature, determining the ‘manner’ and ‘nature’ of its existence.199 This means 
that although all earthly entities are material bodies of this sort, they are not all merely material 
bodies. Further, although this entails a duality, Barth argues that these determinations and 
elements of being human are not identical neither are they reducible.
200
 Some material bodies 
can become ‘besouled’ and thus transcend their mere materiality as ‘organic bodies’.201 An 
organic body is, therefore, understood as ‘an object in relation to a subject’: that is, the soul. The 
soul, then, is understood primarily as the subjective life of a material organism.
202
 Thus Barth: 
‘Soul is life, self-contained life, the independent life of a corporeal being. Life in general means 
capacity for action, self-movement, self-activity, self-determination. Independent life is present 
… where there is a specific living subject’.203 On this point, among others, Barth’s ontology 
seems similar to that of Aristotle.
204
 However we must be careful to draw parallels too quickly 
and superficially, for Barth explicitly rejects Aristotle’s ontology.205  
For Barth, the human person only lives in the relation of the soul to the body which, 
precisely by being ensouled, becomes the body in the biblical sense of the word. In sum, Barth 
says, if ‘materialism’ denies the human person this ensouling, he or she would be ‘subjectless’, 
and conversely if ‘spiritualism’ denies the body significance, the human being would be 
‘objectless’.206 Thus Barth: ‘I cannot answer for myself without at the same time answering for 
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my body’.207 This is only possible because the soul is the formative ‘centre’ which makes human 
life into an ‘independent life’ over against God and other human beings.208 Barth is keen to stress 
the independence of humans, an independence that finds expression in an individual’s own 
perceiving, thinking, willing, desiring, and active existence. So for this reason, every human 
being, whether profoundly cognitively impaired, in a coma, in PVS, or suffering from any other 
disability, must be regarded as ‘distinctive and unsubstitutable in the eyes of God and mostly 
other people’.209 Furthermore, a human being is never merely a psychological entity that has a 
bodily form and thus should never be degraded into a mere object that others can treat like a 
thing (see Ps. 139).  
Recall we are saying that the rationality-relationality turn does not necessarily account for 
profoundly intellectually impaired individuals because I am arguing that relationality assumes a 
degree of reason which facilitates reciprocity. Thus this ‘turn’ needs to be augmented with 
human embodiment. Let us examine this claim further. For Barth, the soul would not be soul if it 
was not bodily soul, and body would not be body if it was not ensouled body. The soul, then, is 
not an abstract, spiritual element and the body a tangible entity. We are saying that such a 
dualistic view is derived from ancient Greek philosophy,
210
 and has grave implications for how 
we understand personhood. Unfortunately contemporary society is facing such a strain of 
dualism which sees the body as raw material to be manipulated by modern science. A symptom 
of this is the sharp rise of issues such as informed consent in bioethics today, and the increasing 
tendency to think of a person as not ‘being’ a person but of having personhood. Personhood, 
then, has become just another quality that is tacked to being. Barth rejects this view which sees 
the body as an enemy of rational control requiring confinement. Instead, for him a person is 
ontologically constituted as a properly ordered and unified duality of body and soul that is 
created, preserved and regenerated by the Holy Spirit and so constituted as God’s covenantal 
partner.
211
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So the soul gives life to that particular body, which is the person, but, as Barth is quick to 
add, it is not the source of the life, for God alone is the source of life.  So if God withdrew ‘what 
He alone can and does give’, man’s body would be a ‘purely material body’.212 If the body is not 
the body of the soul, it is not a body, but organic matter – indeed, a corpse. For Barth, then, body 
and soul are the duality of human existence. Yet we must be quick to affirm their coinherence, 
which was so important to him. In his anthropology, Barth is not satisfied with noting the unity 
and duality of the human person, but he would like the reader to take note of the order present in 
the body-soul relation. Again, looking through Christological lenses, Barth argues for the priority 
of the soul as the director of personal life over the body.
213
 Here Barth is in agreement with most 
theological anthropologies: ‘man is soul’.  
This move worries some like Jürgen Moltmann who argue that Barth is Platonic and 
Cartesian in preserving the lordship of the soul over the body.
214
 However, judging by his 
interpretation of §46, I think Moltmann misread Barth. Thus it is inaccurate to view Barth’s 
ontology as one of hierarchical domination. Moltmann assumes a sharp distinction between two 
moments that simply do not exist in Barth’s ontology. Although Barth does use hierarchical 
language, does it necessarily denote an abusive dominating/dominated relationship? I think 
not.
215
 In fact contrary to Moltmann’s reading,216 I think Barth has a different understanding of 
the ‘indestructible order’ that governs the body-soul relation. Again, Barth’s strong 
Christological method comes into play when he claims that the person is ‘the soul of his body’.  
Barth does not think there is ‘chaos’ in Jesus’ ‘interconnexion’ (of soul, body, Word and 
act). For him it is a ‘cosmos’: that is, a ‘formed and ordered totality’ in which there is ‘a higher 
and a lower, a first and a second, a dominating and a dominated’.217 So the order entails that the 
soul leads, commands and controls while the body follows, obeys and is controlled. However, 
Jesus is ‘not only His soul but also His body’.218 Indeed, Jesus is a whole man because he wills 
and fulfills himself. ‘He lives in sovereignty. His life of soul and body is really His life. He has 
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full authority over it’.219 Barth’s language should not be construed to mean that he gives primacy 
to the soul. In fact, Barth rejects Docetism by arguing that the Bible portrays the resurrected 
Christ as a whole body-soul entity
220
 who exists in continuous identity with the pre-resurrection 
Jesus.
221
 For Barth, only a holistic presentation of human ontology presents an adequate 
understanding of Jesus’ person and work. As mentioned, unlike the ancient Greeks, Barth holds 
that the soul is the sign of life but rejects the idea that it is the source or cause of life.  He agrees 
that the soul is only the bearer of life and hence any anthropological ontology must take the 
whole person as its starting point.  
For Barth, rationality is the evidence of the hierarchical relation manifest in human nature 
generally. Thus it might seem counterintuitive when Barth defines the human person as ‘a 
rational being’.222 But note that Barth is not referring to vernunft (our intellectual powers). 
Instead, he means that man is rational because having Spirit, he is ruling soul and serving body. 
Barth thinks vernunft is misleading because it refers only to the capacity to ‘understand’ 
(vernehmen), which is only one among the many capacities of humans. Furthermore vernunft is 
often mainly used to denote merely the human capacity to ‘think’. Thus for Barth, vernunftwesen 
(‘rational being’) is given the comprehensive sense of the Latin ratio and the Greek logos,223 by 
which we understand a ‘meaningful order’. This means that when we say a human being is a 
vernunftwesen (substance of a rational nature), what Barth means is that it is ‘proper to his nature 
to be in rational order of the two moments of soul and body, and in this way to be percipient and 
active being’.224 Thus Barth says we talk of man as a rational being with regard not only to his 
soul but also to his body. This is because in virtue of his soul, his body also fully participates in 
his rationality, as long as it [the body] finds itself in that meaningful order.
225
 Thus in the body-
soul relation, ratio or logos is no less proper to the body than to the soul, and dwells no less in 
the body. So as mentioned it is still accurate to speak of intellectually impaired individuals as 
substances of a rational nature.  
But what about the nature of Barth’s ontology are we to draw from such language? Is 
Barth a soul/body substance dualist or is he a monist? Barth is neither a substance dualist nor a 
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monist. Although he is often characterized as the former, this, I think, is the result of 
misinterpretation of his views and an occasional ambiguity in his language. In fact Barth objects 
to the idea of substance dualism,
226
 that is, that a person consists of two distinct substances. 
Instead, as we have been saying, he strongly affirms a holistic union of body and soul in a 
person.
227
 Barth’s stand, then, can be properly described as ‘concrete monism’.228 However, in a 
somewhat puzzling move, Barth asserts that his view could also be understood as ‘the concrete 
and Christian dualism of soul and body’.229 Barth gives primacy to human subjectivity with the 
soul, but for him the soul is not a separate substance or part of human nature.  
But what kind of ontology could be described as both dualist and monist? Barth’s faithful 
interpreters do not seem to agree on this very issue, and both sides are capable of drawing 
evidence from his Church Dogmatics.  However, I am taking a different position. In contrast to 
the dualism that permeates much of human history
230
 and traditional Christian theology, some 
interpreters draw attention to Barth’s holistic language.231 These interpreters seem to think that 
identifying Barth with this ‘holistic’ stand absolves him from leaning on either the side of 
reductive monism or that of substance dualism. Although holistic language provides a different 
and possibly better vocabulary for discussing human ontology, I think it may still fall short of 
offering a satisfactory solution to the question of body-soul relation.
232
  
Other interpreters take a different angle by affirming some form of dualism in Barth’s use 
of the traditional body-soul language and his equally strong emphasis on the duality inherent in 
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human nature.
233
 However, if I am reading Barth’s ontology correctly, the reason this issue 
appears to be ‘sticky’ is because it is seems to be based on the wrong question. How so? By 
focusing on the ‘problem’ of human nature, some interpreters may be expecting a ‘solution’ that 
can provide an adequate doctrine of the body-soul relation. But I think Barth is focused on a 
relatively different aspect of the issue, which according to him is the only possible basis for 
anthropology: that is, Christology. In short, for Barth, the question is how this ‘true man’, ‘born 
in the likeness of man’ (Phil. 2:7; cf. Heb. 2:14, 17), which has always been affirmed by the 
Church against every sort of docetism, can be the only way to true knowledge of human beings.  
However, as Berkouwer says, this should not be taken to imply that we can merely ‘read 
off’ our anthropology from our Christology.234 As fallen entities, we are obviously different from 
Jesus. Barth, then, is right to point out that we cannot begin with a definition of human nature (as 
if we already understand it) and then posit that Jesus shared in this human nature. Instead, it is 
the opposite: Jesus being the ‘whole man’ must be our prototype. So we must say we are persons 
because Jesus through the incarnation first possessed human nature. That, in this debate, is 
Barth’s focus. Briefly, let us recall our previous reference to Moltmann. Here, it is important to 
note that for Barth, giving primacy to the body on the other hand would undermine Jesus’ person 
and work. Thus the unity of the two moments is not dissolved by the hierarchy, and there can be 
no valuing of the soul at the expense of the body. Further, Barth points out that this rational 
ordering of the two moments so evident in Jesus is not obvious in persons. Instead it is concealed 
in the tensions and contradictions of human life.
235
 Here Barth’s language is not always as 
careful as one might wish, and he does seem sympathetic to substance dualism. However he 
finally weighs in against both the parallelism of Gustav Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, and others, 
and the interactionism of Hans Driesch and Heinrich Rickert. Barth accuses their accounts of 
human nature of talking only about ‘the soul and body of a ghost and not of real man’. Instead 
for him body and soul are ‘two moments of the one human activity’. So ‘man himself as soul of 
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his body is subject and object, active and passive’.236 Barth is not a dualist and is committed to a 
human embodiment that is not merely materialism.  
Barth makes a statement that is essential to our move here. He says: ‘That he is body 
makes it possible for another as such to enter his consciousness, for him to posit another as 
possible’.237 In other words, the way in which we engage our fellow human beings and 
particularly those who cannot reciprocate in person-to-person relationships is by being bodily 
present to each other. I think Robert Spaemann put its properly when he asks: ‘[b]ut what 
criterion do others have for my identity? Only an external criterion – namely, the identity of my 
body as a continuing existence in space and time’.238 Thus Locke erred to imagine that personal 
identity is constituted wholly by self-consciousness and memory. Yet, although we said that 
persons are singular in unparalleled fashion, like Spaemann, we do not think that self-
identification can occur solipsistically.
239
 Thus relationality, like identification implies the 
‘existence of others and the possibility of being available to their knowledge’.240 This move 
properly captures what we are claiming here: that severely cognitively impaired persons are 
available to our knowledge by being bodily present to.  
Recall also we mentioned Duns Scotus speaking of the ‘solitude’ of the person. 
Spaemann thinks this ‘solitude’ is tied up with the notion of ‘incommunicability’ emphasized by 
Aquinas. He says that ‘solitude’ is not spoken of in ‘qualitative terms’, which would mean that 
‘its uniqueness was in the end contingent’.241 Instead this ‘solitude’ is defined by a ‘place’ in the 
universe which it alone occupies.
242
 This place is defined by a situation relative to all other 
places. In short all persons cognitively impaired or not, are defined by relation to everything else 
that can never be that person.
243
 And this should not, as Spaemann says, be mistaken for a 
‘delivery of external observation alone’.244 Thus Spaemann: ‘the person knows the uniqueness of 
his or her place and of the unsubstitutability of its relation to everything else, and so of his or her 
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essential uniqueness’.245 It follows that: since this is a ‘relational uniqueness, it cannot be 
conceived apart from the external aspect of the person, mediated primarily through the body’.246 
We also said that Moltmann misreads Barth in thinking Barth’s ontology as one of 
hierarchical domination. We are saying that interconnection of soul and body does not exclude 
particularity. The essential distinction is that soul animates and body is animated.
247
 So for Barth, 
the soul-body interconnection is possible only because the Spirit has person. Although Barth says 
that even animals have spirit, he admits we do not know how animals have spirit, i.e., what it 
means for the animal that through the Spirit it is the soul of a body.
248
 We can know, however, 
what it means for human beings. This is the task of the next section.  
5.2.2 The Spirit as Basis of the Soul-Body Relation 
 
Barth’s interpretation of the relation of spirit to body and soul is unique. He says: ‘Man exists 
because he has spirit’.249 Barth’s formula is simple: an individual exists because ‘he is grounded, 
constituted and maintained by God as the soul of his body’.250 The Spirit, Barth says, is not 
something a person is, in the sense that a person is both body and soul. Instead, a person has 
spirit or, as he says, ‘spirit has him’.251 This means the Spirit does not belong to the human by 
virtue of creaturely being, as soul and body do. Rather, the Spirit belongs to God and is given to 
the human person as an endowment. The Spirit, therefore, is immortal and, when the body dies, 
it returns to God, its original source.
252
 So, in the broadest sense, Spirit is God operating on His 
creatures. The Spirit, then, in Barth’s argument, is life-bearer, animating the body-soul duality. 
Thus Barth: ‘[m]an without God is not; he has neither being nor existence’.253 Barth is aware 
how such a claim may be read, and so he quickly adds, and this is important, that an individual’s 
constitution is not ‘purely determined’ by whether they have God or not.254 Let us not mistake, 
for Barth, however, there are consequences for being without God. He says: ‘man cannot escape 
God, because he always derives from Him’, and ‘as he is not without God, he cannot understand 
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himself without God’.255 Barth sharply distinguishes between the human soul and the divine 
Spirit by which it is made alive. The consequences of the above are threefold: First, this means 
we can deny neither soul nor Spirit to non-human creatures. Second, the human person is both 
determined an ensouled creature as a non-human creature, but a human person is further 
determined to respond to God’s Word and to share God’s destiny of immortal existence. Third, 
the Spirit may not be viewed as a component of human ontology.
256
  
To Barth, the Spirit’s role in the body-soul relation is crucial. It is in the Spirit that human 
persons are constituted as body-soul entities and in which their capacity to enter into a 
covenantal partnership with God is established. For Barth, the presence of Spirit is inevitable 
since he has a strong Christological methodology, and there can be no consideration of Jesus’ life 
without acknowledging the ‘unique relation’ he shared with the Holy Spirit.257 The Spirit is the 
mediator of the soul-body communion. In this the Spirit also unites the person with Christ, 
through whom she participates in the eternal communion of the Triune God, while also finding 
communion with other persons. Communion here means ‘sharing and participating in the being 
of another, without the loss of identity by either partner’.258 Thus in true fellowship the identity 
of the participants is not effaced but enhanced for it is in embodied encounter with another, and 
not in isolation, that an individual’s identity is constituted.259   
Two points should serve to conclude this section: First, recall we mentioned Ramsey and 
his insistence that in medicine the ‘patient’ whose body is manipulated is also a ‘person’ who is 
embodied. Here I am suggesting that in the same manner, in cognitive impairment, the point that 
should be commonly advanced by entertaining human embodiment is that the individual is also a 
person who is embodied. Cahill captures this point best when she says:  
the self is constituted by the person’s materiality as much as by his or her intellectual, spiritual, 
and psychological dimensions. The body enters into the subjectivity of the person, mediates that 
subjectivity to the world, and is a medium through which the world and other persons interact with 
the subject as embodied self.260 
 
And in the words of Merleau-Ponty, ‘the body expresses total existence, not because it is an 
external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence comes into its own in the 
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body’.261 Again bodies are not just pieces of meat, and when we engage an animated human 
body, we engage ‘the spatiality and temporality of selves’,262 the Person[1] herself, and not only 
a body. It is the unity of self (ensouled body, bodily soul) that we encounter. This unity extends 
to a unity of all the ‘physical parts and processes of the body in their personal and social 
meanings’.263 This point is important for contemporary body issues in biomedical ethics like 
mutilation, modification etc., because as Spaemann says, persons are singular in an unparalleled 
fashion. The second is a borrowed lesson: it is from Jesus’ response to a lawyer who enquired 
about who his neighbour was. Note that Jesus did not offer an answer in the terms the question 
was posed to him. The lawyer sought criteria, but Jesus offered none. Instead, Jesus offered a 
story to illustrate how we are to discharge our obligation of neighbour-love. Thus, as Oliver 
O’Donovan says, ‘the truth of neighbourhood is known in engagement; we act in commitment to 
someone as a neighbour, and thus prove the neighbourhood’.264 In the same manner, the term 
‘person’ must carry with it the implication of the original meaning of ‘neighbour’. This means 
that we constantly find ourselves with somebody ‘next to’ us, like us, equal to us, acting upon as 
we upon them, as much as subject to whom we become object as he is object to our subject.
265
 
But how do we act upon our fellow humans who are incapable of engaging in relations through 
their relational attributes? By both parties being bodily present to each other. This is because we 
are all bodily soul and ensouled body. For both parties, without this ensouling we would be 
‘subjectless’, just as conversely we would be ‘objectless’ should the significance of our bodies 
be denied.
266
 As an object, an individual is ‘somebody’ which separates her from every other 
infra-mundane being. So only she is simultaneously object and subject, which is true for all 
persons, cognitively impaired or not. In profound cognitive impairment, then, I am suggesting 
that the embodiment model can bring – a holistic (body-soul (mind) relation) view of the person.  
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I set out to augment what I am calling the rationality-relationality turn. I have said 
that as far as our purpose in this study is concerned, relational anthropologies (wherein 
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intellectual capacity is assumed) do not account for intellectually disabled persons. To account 
for these persons, I have suggested that another move towards human embodiment is needed 
within relational anthropologies. We said that within recent tradition this next move is 
adequately represented in Barth’s theological account of human nature which has a number of 
the elements required: a commitment to metaphysical freedom, a strong affirmation of human 
embodiment, and a respectful view of science.  
I have attempted to bring a theological view of human embodiment toward understanding 
personhood in light of fellow severely cognitively impaired human beings. To such persons, we 
have said that dualism marginalizes and integration is inclusive. In doing so I hope to particularly 
emphasize the social significance of this view:
267
 (1) Embodiment is significant for theological 
ethics of cognitive impairment because of the posture of compassion we must adopt toward such 
individuals. But we must emphasize that we are not thinking here of pity, but a total 
identification with the suffering of those ‘next’ to us. Only then can we learn to be a good 
‘neighbour’ to human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, anencephalic infants, congenitally 
severely intellectually impaired, those who have suffered severe brain damage or dementia, 
human beings who have become irreversibly comatose, those who are injured, vulnerable, and all 
those who are at the so called margins of human life. (2) The second significance flows from the 
mentioned ‘total identification’. It is the knowledge that suffering comes to all, and whether or 
not our accidental properties are currently profoundly or subtly marked, physical death is 
inevitable. With that realization, we become more alert to the vulnerability of every human 
being, and the need for a redemptive inclusion of all human beings created in the imago Dei. (3) 
The third significance proceeds from the total identification and the universal knowledge of 
human suffering and death. Thus it is morally important to ensure that a ‘genuinely inclusive 
social practice of health care’, which alleviates suffering and acknowledges the universality of 
death and ‘interdependence of health and bodily life with other social, personal, and spiritual 
goods’.268 The task of the next two chapters is to interrogate this important practice of genuine 
inclusion of all human beings in the goods of justice and health care. 
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CHAPTER 5 
From ‘Charity to Rights’: Rethinking Persons at the Edge of Moral Personhood, Justice and 
Liberal Theory 
 
We are met here to reaffirm the fundamental right of the mentally retarded to a life of decency and 
dignity. In this affirmation we are not speaking as citizens of any country, though we come from 
many countries; we are not speaking as adherents to any faith or creed, though we hold many faiths 
and creeds; we are not speaking in the terms of our own language, though we speak in many tongues. 
We are making an affirmation that transcends all nationalities, all races, all creeds, and faiths, and 
tongues. 
 
     -- Henry Cobb, ‘From Charity to Rights’, Presidential Address, 1968. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recall one of the conclusions reached in chapter 1: the Christian tradition has often marginalized 
intellectually impaired persons by connecting the imago Dei with a disembodied rationality. The 
suggestion I develop in this chapter is that most theories of justice are also culpable of 
marginalizing persons with cognitive impairments. This culpability stems from the fact that 
contemporary approaches to social justice are typically expressed through the social contract 
theoretical mechanism, in which justice is applicable to and binding upon rational, responsible 
parties. In short, the general idea is that individuals have reason to accept ‘political principles 
that they would choose if they were reasonable, rational, informed of all relevant facts, and 
shielded from all irrelevant facts’.1 This ideal of liberal justice, then, conflicts with the ideal 
which holds that all citizens of the polis are owed justice whether or not they are capable of 
rational agency. In connection to this I make two claims: Stanley Hauerwas captures it best when 
he asks: ‘If a society were even partially successful in ‘eliminating’ retardation, how would it 
regard those who have become retarded?’2 Hauerwas’ concern is not misplaced. This is because 
with the advent of, for example, the human genome project (HGP) cognitively impaired people 
are at risk of being discriminated in liberal society.
3
 The second claim is that these theories of 
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justice not only exclude cognitively impaired persons, but also deny them ‘citizenship rights’. By 
this I mean that their membership in a moral community of individuals deserving equal respect 
and dignity is denied. Furthermore, is it not quite ‘unfair and unjust [and] exploitative’, to 
exclude certain citizens from the scope of equal consideration simply because they lack the 
capacity for moral reciprocation?
4
  
Before I explain our task in this chapter, let me comment briefly on both of the claims 
and explain why this exploration is necessary. The theories of justice in the social-contract 
tradition are among the most dominant theories of justice currently available. Here, ‘rational 
people get together, for mutual advantage’, deciding to leave their ‘state of nature’ and to govern 
themselves by law.
5
 John Rawls, now the standard-bearer for accounts of justice, argues that the 
social contract traditions are better placed than the various forms of Utilitarianism in articulating, 
probing, and organizing considered judgments about justice.  However, up to and including 
Rawls, it is safe to say that no major theory of justice in the Western philosophical tradition 
made disability, and particularly intellectual disability, a prominent issue.
6
  
Why has this been the case? Perhaps part of the answer has to do with the recent medical 
and technological advances which have made medical treatment and social arrangements more 
accessible. Thus, although the number of severely impaired persons who had any hope of long-
term survival was small, it has now increased. Today, however, there are some who think that 
things have changed considerably and it is normal for the adequacy of a theory of distributive 
justice to be weighed against its success in dealing with justice for the disabled.
7
  Assuming that 
this is indeed the case, a significant problem remains in that the bulk of theorizing on justice 
addresses almost exclusively the concerns of those with physical disabilities, and little attention, 
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until recently,
8
 was given to the status of those with intellectual disabilities. Thus a majority of 
theories of justice in the Western tradition are culpably inattentive to the many obstacles that 
stand in the way of intellectually impaired person’s access to justice.  
Rawls, in his work Political Liberalism, admits that the social contract theory excludes 
cognitively impaired persons. He acknowledges that the three unsolved problems of social 
justice, that is, nationality, species membership, and disability, present a special difficulty for his 
contractarian theory.
9
 Rawls considered the first problem as solvable,
10
 and the latter two he 
called problems ‘on which justice as fairness may fail’.11 However, he calls for further 
examination to determine how these two might be solved.
12
 Martha Nussbaum and Brian Barry 
argue that Rawls’ social contract theory excludes the intellectually disabled also by its reliance 
upon Hume’s account of the circumstances of justice, upon the idea of justice as mutual 
advantage and upon the assumption that all citizens are fully cooperating members of society. 
Particularly Nussbaum also argues that the contractarian’s view of the citizen as ‘free, equal and 
independent’ is troublesome from the point of view of including intellectually impaired people.13  
Nussbaum, like her mentor Rawls, also reiterates the three unresolved problems, and 
particularly acknowledges that cognitively impaired individuals are persons ‘but they have not as 
yet been included, in existing societies, as citizens on a basis of equality with other citizens’.14 
Furthermore, she says, ‘[t]he problem of extending education, health care, political rights and 
liberties, and equal citizenship more generally to such people seems to be a problem of justice, 
and an urgent one’.15 According to Nussbaum, then, the social contract theory needs to be 
examined and supplemented, a task she hopes to achieve through her ‘capabilities approach’.16 
Furthermore she hopes to resolve the tension described above by excising the ‘social contract’, 
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the aspect of the liberal theory she thinks marginalizes intellectually impaired persons to replace 
it with Rawls’ idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’.17 To Nussbaum the advantage with her 
capabilities approach is that it does not use the social contract apparatus to fulfill the liberal 
standard of justification.  
To situate our discussion, let us, for example refer back to the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) which introduced significant changes that ought to make persons with disabilities, their 
families, advocates, and professionals take note and seek ways to prepare for the changes. This is 
because the sequencing of the human genome has allowed, and will increasingly allow, scientists 
to identify genes that contribute to or even directly cause impairments. Although this seems like 
a positive development, it also raises other issues like ‘genetic discrimination, eugenic 
interventions, violations of privacy, decreasing social supports, unsound legal responses, and 
other ethical, legal, or social consequences’ that may directly or indirectly diminish the quality of 
life of persons with intellectual disabilities and their families.
18
  
Thus the possibility, with the advent of HGP, of treatment, prevention and cure of 
cognitive impairment is again intimately connected with our duties to prevent harm and avoid 
injury to others. Often in the nascent ethical debate on cognitive impairment, concerns are raised 
from the point of view of what the possible effects may be on carers and impaired persons.
19
 One 
argument that surfaces again and again is whether or not the possibility that has opened up with 
genetic screening, which is increasingly becoming a part of regular medical practice, would 
ultimately amount to social pressure on prospective parents to undergo procedures to ensure no 
child with impairment is born.
20
 If parents may resist the pressure for genetic screening, so it is 
said, the refusal to prevent a life with cognitive impairments may lead to shift in thinking about 
resource implications for this family. In short, if impairments are preventable why should society 
pay for additional support for the new born person if parents had been educated on their choices 
and made an informed decision about not undergoing genetic screening?  
 
                                               
17
 I return to this point later. 
18 Matthew J. Stowe, H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, et al., ‘Looking to the Future: Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities in the Genetics Era’, Journal on Developmental Disabilities, 13 (2007), 1-64. 
19 Stowe, Turnbull et al., ‘Looking to the Future’, 1-64. 
20 See Brian Brock, and Stephanie Brock, ‘Being Disabled in the New World of Genetic Testing: A Snapshot of 
Shifting Landscapes’, in eds., John Swinton and Brian Brock, Theology, Disability and the New Genetics (London: 
T. & T. Clark, 2007), 29-43. 
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In this chapter, I challenge this line of argument. This argument may capture quite 
accurately the state of alarm in some groups of society in the face of future genetic 
developments; I also find it implausible to assume that informed choices establish obligations or 
rights against or for claims of support. Are similar cases not with us, yet they do not prompt us to 
argue in favour of withdrawing support from families of, say, individuals who suffer from 
debilitating diseases? And is it not difficult to imagine, for example, say, emergency responders 
asking if a driver involved in an accident wore a seat belt or not before offering help? In other 
words, our duties to others rest on assessments of need and vulnerability, not on the agent’s 
ability to make informed judgments within reason (this does not preclude that we try to avoid 
mentally ill people making decisions with harmful consequences to themselves and others).  
I will tackle the issue as one of social justice in order to defend protection against 
coercion as required by the principle of justifiability to all. In liberal theory an individual’s 
rational agency is highly valued. Thus the ability to act for reasons bestows dignity on individual 
persons, which renders them ‘inviolable’,21 which in turn places restrictions upon coercion 
particularly state coercion in the political realm. This means that because an individual’s rational 
agency is valuable and should be preserved, to force someone to act against his/her own reasons 
is to harm that person. If this is so, and given the proliferation of genetic testing procedures 
among the general population, the liberal democratic state has strong reasons for protecting 
disabled citizens against discriminatory side effects of genetic testing. However, liberal 
democracy is still found wanting when it comes to protecting its most vulnerable citizens,
22
 
which raises some questions: why is it that liberal morality that prides itself in the autonomy and 
equal respect of each individual and that objects strongly to discrimination, is left empty-handed 
when we consider intellectual disability?
23
 Why do we take care of cognitively impaired 
persons? By care, we do not only speak of the important task undertaken by those who daily look 
after disabled persons. Instead we mean society’s and the individual’s duties to prevent harm and 
avoid injury to others. This study, then, is an exercise of practice seeking theory, and it will 
attempt to identify the root of liberal theory’s weakness, and offer a theological alternative.  
The core of this chapter takes up Rawls’ self-critical statement and responds to 
Nussbaum’s proposal to revamp the liberal theory of justice. Philosophers Rawls and Nussbaum 
                                               
21 Stark, ‘RHD’, 111. 
22 Reinders, FoD, 106. 
23 Ibid.  
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present diverging theories of liberal morality. However, I argue that both Rawls’ ‘contractarian 
theory’ and Nussbaum’s ‘capability approach’ fail to adequately account for the moral standing 
of profoundly cognitively impaired people in the polis. Additionally, I shall argue that by 
grounding inherent worth of human beings in capability, Nussbaum’s capabilities view fails to 
fully recognize human dignity.
24
 Instead I will argue that the worth of human beings does not 
depend at all upon the capacity for rationality.
25
 Furthermore I claim that nothing we possess in 
the form of psychological capacities such as autonomy and rational agency are prerequisites for 
claims of justice. By this I mean that these capacities are not necessary to qualify for the ‘moral 
consideration of personhood, a good quality of life or membership in a moral community of 
individuals deserving equal respect and dignity’.26 Consequently, those who argue otherwise27 
marginalize those with cognitive impairment from the moral consideration of persons. This 
exclusion, as are previous exclusions based on sex, race, and physical ability, is morally 
revolting.  
This chapter will be divided into four sections. In section I, I will briefly examine the 
issue of contested language of rights, and in section II, I will examine the social contract theory 
in general. In the third section I will consider a secular grounding of rights. Here I will engage 
with Rawls’ and Nussbaum’s accounts of social justice. I will argue that their views capture the 
typical pattern of argumentation for any liberal theory. My argument will address Rawls’ 
contractarian theory with its focus on mutual advantage as presented in his books A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism. After explaining Rawls’ own account, I assess where his theory 
falls short. I then engage with Nussbaum, one of Rawls’ disciples, albeit one who disagrees with 
his theory. Here I will examine how she attempts to expand liberal political theory with her 
‘capabilities approach’. As we will see both Rawls and Nussbaum think that people who are 
cognitively impaired should be included in a theory of moral standing, but I will suggest their 
attempts fall short. After showing the shortcoming of both Rawls’ and Nussbaum’s efforts to 
resolve the problem of cognitively impaired individuals in social justice, in the third section, I 
                                               
24
 See Nussbaum’s defense of her account of human dignity in ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’, in 
Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics. 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter14.html (retrieved 13 June 13, 2011).  
25 Eva F. Kittay holds the same view in ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics 116 (2005), 100-31. 
26 Ibid., 100. 
27 See Jeff McMahan, ‘Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996), 3-
35; Id.  The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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will propose a theistic grounding of rights and worth. In this fourth section, I will engage with 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Hans Reinders but finally follow Karl Barth in my conclusion.  
2. The Contested Language of Rights 
 
Is a secular grounding of human rights possible? This is the primary question in this section. 
However, before we examine the question, it is important to mention that today there is a 
polemic that is hostile towards the well established language of rights. In this study, it is not my 
intention to dive too deep in the stormy waters that are the question of the language of rights. 
Because it is an issue we cannot ignore, I intend to very briefly probe the contours surrounding 
this hostility. Afterwards I will state the course I intend to chart.
28
 The idea of human rights is by 
no means a crystal-clear idea, and although the push against it is multi-pronged, it mainly comes 
from Christian theologians. Rights have been understood in many different ways, which 
consequently leads to different understandings of what, if any, they are. Largely, those who are 
opposed to rights-talk equate it with a perverse possessive individualism correlative of liberal 
and capitalist social orders which have no place for understanding justice as right order.
29
 
Further, contemporary right order theorist
30
 jettison rights language on grounds that inherent 
rights result from nominalist philosophical developments which resulted in the sheer assertion of 
subjective rights as ends in themselves.  
Specifically, Oliver O’Donovan thinks that the disagreement over rights language has 
three heads: a political, conceptual and historical problem.
31
 For O’Donovan, ‘the historical 
problem about the origins of the language of rights derives its importance from the conceptual 
problem: of “two fundamentally different ways of thinking about justice”, which is basic?’32 The 
question, then, is should we think of justice in ‘unitary’ or ‘plural’ terms?33 This, for O’Donovan, 
raises the problem about the ‘moral status of human nature’.34 In short, O’Donovan’s complaint 
                                               
28 I closely examine Oliver O’Donovan in ‘The Language of Rights and Conceptual History’, Journal of Religious 
Ethics 37 2(2009), 193-207, and then follow Wolterstorff, Justice, 1- 4 and Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and 
Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96-101, 
(Hereafter WHD).   
29 See e.g. the work of Oliver and Joan O’Donovan and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
30
 For example see generally the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, Oliver and Joan Lockwood 
O’Donovan. 
31 See esp. O’Donovan, ‘The Language of Rights’, 194-95. For a full treatment of this issue see O’Donovan’s 
response to Wolterstorff’s Justice in ‘The Language of Rights and Conceptual History’, 193-207. 
32 Ibid., 193. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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is that Wolterstorff attempts to locate the implicit recognition of rights in Scriptures depends 
very heavily on not what is ‘stated’, but on what is ‘implied’. From my reading of Wolterstorff, I 
am not convinced by O’Donovan’s argument. Here, I am more sympathetic to Wolterstorff, 
especially on the idea of someone being wronged. This is an idea constantly found in the Bible, 
and I take it to mean that the victim had prior rights. Furthermore, is the Bible not constantly 
calling for the protection of the widow, orphan and stranger (Deuteronomy 24:17)? Coming from 
exile, the former slaves are instructed to not pervert justice due to the least in society. In short, 
for the purpose of my study, I hold to there being non-conferred rights. For me, the language of 
rights and of being wronged gives a voice to Kelly and others like her who have, for too long, 
been marginalized and oppressed. It enables them to bring their own moral condition into the 
picture.
35
 Justice is long overdue to them.   
What is the basis of a rights claim: is it rationality, sentience, or mere life? Are ‘rights 
prepolitical (dominant human rights tradition) or artifacts of laws and institutions (as held by 
Kant)’?36 Do rights belong only to individuals, or also to groups? And what is the relationship of 
rights and duties? All these and others, form a core of legitimate questions surrounding the 
disputed issues of rights. All have their staunch defenders. For example some argue for different 
concepts like central capabilities,
37
 and others like Annette Baier argue for ‘care’ instead of 
justice. Baier, however, does not altogether reject rights language. She says that she opts for the 
ethics of care because it is challenges ‘the individualism of the Western tradition’.38 Some are 
opposed to the talk about rights but not justice per se. These persons may have a legitimate claim 
when we consider some rights-claims like the U.N. Declaration to Human Rights Article 24.
39
 
Others are opposed to rights-talk for political reasons, and some for social reasons.
40
 Rights-talk, 
then, is judged inherently individualistic and possessive.
41
 Indeed, Jeremy Bentham said that 
‘talk about rights is nonsense’, and ‘talk about natural rights is nonsense on stilts’.42  
                                               
35 Wolterstorff, Justice, 9. 
36 Nussbaum, WHD, 97. 
37 See Nussbaum in Ibid. 
38
 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 24. See 
generally chapter 2 ‘The Need for More than Justice’ (18-32). 
39 Article 24 states that everybody has a right to periodic vacations with pay. How we implement it if some people 
are not working stands to be demonstrated. 
40 Wolterstorff, Justice, 2-3. 
41 See Stanley Hauerwas, ‘On the Right to be Tribal’, Christian Scholar’s Review 16 (1987), 238-39. 
42 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. s.v. ‘Jeremy Bentham’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85-88.  
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For the present purpose, I will examine the issue of justice for cognitively impaired 
persons on the basis that justice is ultimately grounded in inherent rights. So, again, in following 
Wolterstorff, I argue that, in contrast to justice as right order,
43
 there are rights that are not 
conferred. Where humans are concerned, non-conferred rights are intrinsic to our ‘possessing of 
certain properties, standing in certain relationships, performing certain actions, each of us has a 
certain worth’.44 I hasten to add that I do not deny that rights language may have been misused, 
but like Wolterstorff, I argue that misuse does not undermine the necessary priority of justice as 
inherent rights to just are right order. At the core of my examination, is a desire to join a small 
but growing number who highlight the neglected citizens in the polis. For me, the crucial point is 
that rights are ‘normative social relationships’45 that are not, for the most part, generated by the 
exercise of will on one’s part. This means that a ‘right is a right with regard to someone’.46 Thus 
we encounter individuals who already possess this normative bond to us.
47
 In short, they already 
have a right to certain goods, which dictate our attitude to them. So a person is due respect 
because of the dignity and worth they already possess before us.  
My hope is that the stand I take here roughly begins to address the remarkable gap 
represented by social contract theory which requires recipients to reciprocate for social benefits 
received. For why would citizens freely consent to cooperate with one another if the scheme was 
not similarly advantageous for all?
48
 Furthermore, why would productive citizens contract to 
cooperate with unproductive citizens whose inclusion in the cooperative scheme brings no 
additional resources to the common store? Wolterstorff calls it the ‘normative bond’.49 The bond 
between individuals permits them to bear a legitimate claim on how they treat each other. Thus it 
is ‘on account of her worth that the other comes into my presence bearing legitimate claims 
against me as to how I treat her’.50 Again, the rights of the other against me are ‘actions and 
                                               
43 This is a theory espoused by those who argue that human rights are conferred by agreements. See generally the 
work of Oliver O’Donovan and Joan O’Donovan. Particularly see Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Id., The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).   
44 Wolterstorff, Justice, 36. 
45 Ibid, 4. 
46
 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See broadly David Boucher and Paul Kelly, eds., The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 
1994). 
49 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 85-92, esp. 87. See also id., Justice, 
4.  
50 Wolterstorff, Justice, 5. 
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restrains from action that due respect for her worth requires of me’.51 This means that if I fail to 
treat him as he has a right to my treating him is to demean him, and to treat him as if he had less 
worth than he does.
52
 In short, that is the course I intend to chart in this stormy waters of rights 
language. I realize that I have been skimming the surface. However, the crucial question for our 
present purpose is whether a secular grounding of rights is possible. Before we turn and examine 
the work of Rawls and Nussbaum who ground justice in liberal theory, in an effort to answer our 
question, it is helpful to situate it in the broader thematic movements of the social contract. 
3. The Social Contract   
 
Western tradition is rich with many approaches to social justice. However one of the most 
prevalent has been the idea of the social contract. Our study here is not historical, and so I do not 
intend to give an interpretation of the social contract in toto. My intention is to set a foundation 
for the theory I will be criticizing by mentioning the key players and then briefly focusing on 
John Locke’s theory of the social contract, which is the most influential of the tradition. The key 
thinkers of the social contract are Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and 
Immanuel Kant.
53
 Locke’s theory of the social contract stands out as the tradition’s most 
influential theory. Our main source of his theory can be found in the Second Treatise of 
Government, where he explicitly says that he intends to provide an alternative to the view that 
‘all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence, and that men live 
together by no other rules than that of the beasts, where the strongest carries it ....’54 Although 
Locke’s is the most influential theory, it is also one of the most difficult to fit into one single 
coherent picture. So we will try to bring out aspects that are significant to our purpose here. For 
Locke, human beings in the State of Nature,
55
 are naturally, ‘free, equal, and independent’.56 
They are free because there is no natural ruler of any, and each is naturally entitled to self-rule.
57
 
                                               
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See On the Law of War and Peace, Leviathan (1651), Second Treatise of Government, Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739-40) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751, 1777), Theory and Practice (1793) and The 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797) respectively. 
54 John Locke, Second Treatise c1689, §§1-2 (in Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 384. 
Hereafter Locke,  II. The First Treatise will be denoted by Locke, I. 
55 This is the hypothetical situation without political society. More on this when we discuss Rawls ‘Original 
Position’. 
56 Locke, II, §§ 95-99. 
57 Ibid., §4, 287. 
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Equal in the sense that all jurisdiction is ‘reciprocal, no one having more than another’;58 and 
independent in that all are free and entitled to pursue their personal projects without being in a 
hierarchical relation with anyone else. Indeed, taking after Richard Hooker, Locke argues that 
this equality is the foundation of the ‘mutual love’ amongst human beings. So, since human 
beings are equal, they ought to love one another. Further, it is also on equality that humans ‘build 
the duties they owe to one another, and from whence humans derive the great maxims of justice 
and charity’.59 For Locke, then, individuals owe each other the duties of benevolence and 
beneficence. This means that we should not seek to satisfy our desires without at the same time 
willing the satisfaction of like desires in other human beings.
60
  
Contrary to Hobbes, Locke’s idea of the State of Nature is quite a different type of place. 
Thus Locke’s argument concerning the social contract and the nature of an individual’s 
relationship to the political authority are different too. For Locke, this state of liberty is not a 
licence to individuals to destroy themselves or any other creature. For Locke, the State of Nature 
is governed by a law which obliges every individual, through reason, that since all are equal, and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.
61
 This 
means that Locke concurs with Hobbes on the question of individuals possessing similar powers 
of body and mind. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke connects this equality closely to moral 
entitlements. He says: ‘being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of 
Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to 
destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures 
are for ours’.62  Locke seems to think that similarity of power is sufficient for the reciprocal 
status of ends-in-themselves, and for the wrongness of treating another as a means.  
Locke also thinks that human beings have natural dignity. For him, we are God’s 
creation, and thus are invested with ‘Dignity and Authority’;63 humans are ‘curious and 
wonderful’, pieces of ‘workmanship’.64 Thus Locke argues that human beings being thus, they 
desire ‘a life fit for the Dignity of Man’,65 a life ‘suitable to the dignity and excellence of a 
                                               
58 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid., §5, 288.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., §6-7, 288-89. 
62 Ibid., §6, 289. 
63 Locke, I§44, 190. 
64 Ibid., §86. 
65 Ibid., §15, 295  quoting Hooker. 
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rational creature’.66 However, all humans are needy and cannot stably achieve such a life without 
others. Therefore, ‘we are naturally induced to seek Communion and Fellowship with others, this 
was the Cause of Mens uniting themselves, at first in Politick Societies’.67 This means that 
dignity legitimately entitles individuals, and these entitlements can only be achieved through 
cooperation. When Locke comes to articulate the social contract, he seems to turn in a different 
direction. For him the State of Nature is much richer than a state of war á la Hobbes. Thus 
Locke’s account of the contract focuses on mutual advantage as the goal with which the parties 
agree to accept the authority of laws and institutions. The contracting parties in the State of 
Nature, agree to accept limits to their freedom ‘for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living 
one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against 
any that are not of it’.68 Today, most contractarians draw from only one aspect of Locke’s theory, 
namely the fiction of a contract for mutual advantage in the State of Nature, leaving aside both 
his doctrine of natural rights and his related emphasis on benevolence and human dignity. In its 
simplest (perhaps oversimplified) form, then, the social contract theory requires its recipients to 
reciprocate for all benefits received. Thus, every citizen to the contract must have the ability to 
make real contributions to achieving mutual advantage for all the parties together.
69
 Thus all 
contractarian theories depend on some account of rationality in the bargaining process. We are 
now ready to engage with John Rawls’ procedurally based philosophy of justice. 
4. A Secular Grounding of Rights: Is it Adequate? 
4.1 Rawlsian Approach to Social Justice70 
 
The theory of John Rawls holds a venerated place in social contract theory, and is arguably the 
standard-bearer for accounts of justice.
71
 Early in his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls pledges 
allegiance to the social contract tradition saying that his aim is to present a conception of justice 
                                               
66 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1964), 31.  
67 Ibid., Hooker again. 
68 Locke, I§95, 348-49. 
69 Nussbaum, FJ, 66. We will return to this point, for this is one of the many theoretical and practical commonplaces 
that Nussbaum challenges in her critique. 
70 I draw here upon Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justices (2006), and Stark, ‘Respecting Human Dignity’ (2010). See 
also Samuel R. Freeman ed., Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and 
Thomas Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003); Hans S. Reinders, The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society (2000). 
71 Compare with David Gauthier’s neo-Hobbesian contractarian theory of morality in id., Moral by Agreement 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social 
contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant’.72 Rawls continues: ‘The guiding idea is 
that the principles of justice … are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality’.73 Rawls seems to 
preempt potential objections when he defends his use of the term ‘contract’ by concluding that: 
‘[f]inally there is the long tradition of the contract doctrine. Expressing the tie with this line of 
thought helps to define ideas and accords with natural piety’.74 By presenting yet another account 
of his views, I intend to set a foundation for the question I want to raise, which is what Rawls 
thinks about the place of the cognitively disabled in society. First I will briefly sketch the 
components of his theory and then examine what he has to say about the moral standing of the 
intellectually impaired.  
Rawls’ theory diverges from all preceding social contract views in two important ways. 
First, unlike the historical tradition, Rawls does not think that human beings have any natural 
rights in the state of nature. Instead, he believes in ‘pure procedural justice’, in which the correct 
procedure defines the correct outcome.
75
 Thus from an Original Position situated behind a ‘veil 
of ignorance’, all parties are equally rational and similarly situated to convince each other to 
abandon the state of nature by accepting their collectively contracted ideas regarding basic tenets 
of justice.
76
 Secondly, Rawls views the role of moral elements in the contract procedure 
differently. For him, the moral assumptions of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant are exemplary. Indeed, 
his Veil of Ignorance supplies a representation of moral impartiality that is closely related to the 
Kantian idea that no person should be used as a mere means of the ends of others. This link 
between classical social contract doctrine and the core ideas of Kant’s moral philosophy is the 
genesis of profound tension in Rawls theory. Although Rawls is deeply committed to moral ideas 
of equal respect and reciprocity, it is fair to say that Rawls does not think his project diverges 
from the social contract tradition, as he reconstructs and interprets it. Where there are significant 
divergences, Rawls directs the reader to underlying similarities.  
                                               
72 Interestingly Rawls skirts Thomas Hobbes’s version in Leviathian, saying that, ‘for all its greatness’, it raises 
special problems. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), n. 4, 11. (Hereafter TJ). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 16; Cf. 121. 
75 See ibid., 86 where Rawls says: ‘[P]ure procedural justice obtains where there is no independent criterion for the 
right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it 
is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed’. 
76 Ibid., 139. 
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Rawls’ Kantian social contract theory is a hybrid theory. His approach to political 
justification has three components: the device of the social contract, the idea of an overlapping 
consensus, and the method of reflective equilibrium. Consider first the social contract. The 
question for Rawls is, ‘what are the conditions under which the parties to a fair contract are 
reasonably bound to accept the principles of justice that it generates?’ Rawls answers this 
question by developing his own version of contract theory as a hypothetical choice theory. He 
argues that whatever principles of justice chosen by parties regarded by the Original Position 
solely as free and equal moral persons in circumstances that are fair, are just.
77
 Thus the name for 
his view: ‘justice as fairness’.78 Rawls models this criterion by means of the Original Position, 
which is his highly abstracted version of the classical contractarian’s State of Nature. The term 
State of Nature describes an imaginary condition before the foundation of political government.
79
 
In short, people are compelled to make a contract with one another. In exchange for such goods 
as peace, security, and the expectation of mutual advantage, people agree to give up the private 
use of force and the ability to take another man’s property.80 The contract is entered between 
people who are understood to be, as Locke put it, ‘free, equal, and independent’.81  Thus, in a 
procedure that bestows no prior advantages on any individual, we arrive at a set of rules that duly 
uphold the interests of all, or so it should be.  From the tradition, then, we inherit a ‘procedural’ 
understanding of political society whose central pillars are the ‘equal worth of persons and the 
value of reciprocity’.82  
To ensure that the hypothetical situation, Original Position, is fair, between free and equal 
moral persons, the parties are imagined to deliberate behind the epistemological limitation of the 
‘Veil of Ignorance’. In short, then, in the Original Position, parties are deprived of certain 
information, such as their social status and natural abilities, gender and race, age, the conception 
                                               
77 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, in Samuel Freeman, ed., John Rawls: Collected Papers 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 310. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See for example Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1652), Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762). See esp. 
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bereft of a social contract. Id., Leviathan (1651), (in ed., Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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80 Nussbaum, FJ, 10. 
81 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1679-80?), ch. 8§ 95 (in ed., Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed., 1967).  
82 Nussbaum, FJ, 10. 
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of what makes for a good life, and even their disabilities. This ensures that the agreement 
reached, upon principles of justice, is not affected by social fortune or natural accident.
83
 To 
ensure a just distribution of ‘primary goods’84 needed by all free and equal persons, despite their 
differences, Rawls argues that the parties to the Original Position would choose two principles.
85
 
In short, the first principle permits the most extensive system of equal rights and basic liberties 
for all. The second mandates that social and economic inequalities be permitted only if they first 
arise under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and, second, maximally benefit the least 
advantaged.
86
 The parties in the Original Position are assumed to be rational and disinterested in 
each other’s well being. Under these conditions, Rawls argues that individuals can choose 
principles to govern a just society. These principles are themselves chosen from initial conditions 
that are intrinsically fair.  
Now let us consider the idea of public morality as overlapping consensus.
87
 The main 
differences between Rawls’ Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, is that he shifts from a 
moral to a political conception of justice. In the former, he conceives ‘justice as fairness’88 and 
develops it as a ‘comprehensive moral doctrine’.89 After establishing which principles are just, 
the task that remains is to see whether or not the conception of justice containing these principles 
is stable. It is necessary to establish this because today’s democratic society is characterized by 
the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’, given that is, that citizens in such societies tend to hold diverse 
moral, philosophical and religious doctrines which are incompatible. So how can a modern 
society characterized by such plurality be stable? Rawls’ answer: it is possible for such a society 
to be stable because it can be justified as a ‘freestanding view’ that can be supported from within 
any of the comprehensive doctrines to which citizens adhere.
90
 According to Rawls, justice as 
fairness can be supported by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines likely to gain followers in a 
democratic society. Thus each reasonable view can support justice as fairness for its own sake, or 
on its own merits.
91
  
                                               
83 Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, 310. 
84 The primary goods include basic rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and the social bases of self 
respect (Rawls, PL, Lecture V, 181). 
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For Rawls, this type of support constitutes an overlapping consensus. Rawls argues that a 
society characterized by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines meets 
the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’, which says, ‘the exercise of political power is fully proper 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens are 
free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason’.92 Finally consider the method of reflective 
equilibrium,
93
 which Rawls uses as a method for characterizing the contractual situation. Rawls 
says that the principles yielded by that situation will differ according to how the situation is 
described.
94
 This means that an individual needs a justification for his favoured description. Thus 
the method of reflective equilibrium fulfills this justificatory role. Rawls surmises that the 
Original Position is the contractual situation which results if we were to achieve reflective 
equilibrium. In short, the principles generated by the original position are, compared to principles 
that would be generated by some other choice situation, the ones that best match our considered 
judgments about justice. 
4.2 Rawls Kantian Contractarianism 
4.2.1 Why Suspend the Question of Disability? 
 
Let us look, now, at Rawls’ Kantian social contract theory and particularly his curious 
suspension of the question of disability.
95
 Rawls’ theory is compelling because it does not try to 
create morality out of nonmorality.
96
 Instead, it starts from a very attractive model of the moral 
point of view, that is, the combination of the prudential rationality of the parties in the Original 
Position with the informational restrictions imposed by the Veil of Ignorance which is intended 
to give us a schematic representation of a moral position that real people can occupy at any time, 
if they can sufficiently ignore the pressing claims of their own interests. Again, Rawls’ Kantian 
theory is sometimes in tension with its classical predecessor. Thus four problematic areas arise: 
(1) the theory’s use of income and wealth to index relative social positions, (2) its use of a 
Kantian conception of the person and of reciprocity, (3) its commitments to the Circumstances of 
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Justice and (4) to the idea of mutual advantage as what makes cooperation superior to 
noncooperation.
97
  
For our purpose, let us specifically consider Rawls’ Kantian conception of the person and 
of reciprocity. Rawls is clear that he wants the issue of disability postponed to the ‘legislative 
stage’, after society’s basic political principles are already designed. This means that Rawls 
recognizes the problem posed by the inclusion of persons who are impaired, but he argues that 
this problem should be solved at a later stage. But why, and how does this move affect his 
contractarianism? In Rawls’ contractarianism, the contracting parties are taken throughout to be 
rational adults, similar in need, and capable of a ‘normal’ level of social cooperation and 
productivity. In both Political Liberalism and A Theory of Justice, the parties in the Original 
Position know that their ‘various native endowments such as strength and intelligence’ lie ‘all 
within the normal range’.98  
In the former work, the parties represent citizens who are described as ‘fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life’.99 In addition Rawls insists: ‘I have assumed 
throughout and shall continue to assume, that while citizens do not have equal capacities, they do 
have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the moral, intellectual, and physical capacit ies 
that enable them to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete life’.100 In his 
theory, Rawls considers the ‘fundamental question of political philosophy’, to be ‘how to specify 
the fair terms of cooperation among persons so conceived’.101 Thus the assumption of normal 
capacities allows us ‘to achieve a clear and uncluttered view of what, for us, is the fundamental 
questions of political justice: namely, what is the most appropriate conception of justice for 
specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as 
normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life?’.102 This is what Rawls 
believes about persons.  
In so doing, it is now clear that his theory marginalizes from the situation of basic 
political choice all physical and mental, and both permanent and temporary forms of need and 
dependency that human beings may experience. And this is not by accident; it is a deliberate 
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design, because remember he does recognize the problem that including these persons who suffer 
unusual impairments, poses to this theory. Thus he recommends tackling it later after political 
principles have been chosen. The effect of the postponement is felt in Rawls’ theory of political 
distribution. His account of the primary goods, which is introduced as an account of the needs of 
citizens who are ‘fully cooperating’, does not seem to entertain the extraordinary social 
adjustments that are needed to include as fully as possible people with physical and cognitive 
impairments. Additionally, regarding the understandings of ‘liberty, opportunity, and the social 
bases of self-respect’, the theory is calibrated towards the needs of the ‘fully-cooperating’ 
individuals. Consequently, the unique needs for a ‘barrier-free-environment’ and special 
educational treatment do not seem to matter at the initial stage, when the basic political 
principles are chosen.
103
   
4.2.2 The Fully Cooperating Assumption 
 
Consider the fully cooperating assumption. Without a doubt Rawls understands the concept of 
the ‘fully cooperating’ in way that excludes people with severe physical and cognitive 
impairments. It is not surprising, then, that all the extraordinary needs of individuals with 
impairments will be considered only after ‘society’s basic structure’ has already been set in 
place.
104
 Rawls is not blind to the fact that his theory caters only for some cases while leaving 
others on the wayside. Indeed, he interestingly thinks that although the need to focus attention to 
individuals who are not ‘fully cooperating’ in his sense is ‘a pressing practical question’;105 recall 
he thinks we may reasonably postpone it until political institutions are constructed. Rawls’ work 
contains numerous statements of the fully cooperating assumption. Here is a representative 
example. Rawls says: 
Since we begin from the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, we assume that persons as 
citizens have all the capacities that enable them to be cooperating members of society. This is 
done to achieve a clear and uncluttered view of what, for us, is the fundamental question of 
political justice: namely, what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the 
terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal and as normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life? By taking this as the fundamental question 
we do not mean to say, of course, that no one ever suffers from illness and accident; such 
misfortunes are to be expected in the ordinary course of life, and provision for these contingencies 
must be made. But given our aim, I put aside for the time being these temporary disabilities and 
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also permanent disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to prevent people from being 
cooperating members of society in the usual sense.
106
 
 
Immediately following this passage, Rawls again speaks of persons as ‘normal and fully 
cooperating’,107 and then refers to the problem not yet dealt with in his theory as so far 
developed, ‘the question of what is owed to those who fail to meet this condition, either 
temporarily (from illness and accident) or permanently, all of which covers a variety of cases’.108 
Additionally, Rawls sharply distinguishes between variations in capacity that place ‘above’ or 
‘below’ a ‘line’, drawn between those who have ‘more’ and those who have ‘less than the 
minimum essential capacities required to be a normal cooperating member of society’.109 
Rawls is unclear on who the non-cooperating are. Although he sometimes equates person 
with the fully cooperating,
110
 for Rawls, persons, citizens and the fully cooperating seem to be 
the same individuals. Yet, for the purposes of understanding justice as fairness, Rawls is explicit 
that the attributes definitive of persons are rational agency. For Rawls, persons have two moral 
powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. Thus, 
his understanding of the person, along with equating persons with the fully cooperating, seems to 
entail that having cognitive capabilities constitutive of personhood is sufficient for qualifying as 
fully cooperating. He says, ‘the next step is to take the two moral powers as the necessary and 
sufficient condition for being counted as full and equal member of society in questions of 
political justice. Those who can take part in social cooperation over a complete life … are 
regarded as equal citizens’.111  
Here, Rawls seems to indicate that the dual moral powers are enough for being fully 
cooperating. However, his statements of the fully cooperating assert that those persons who are 
cognitively impaired and severely physically disabled in a way that does not affect their moral 
powers, are not fully cooperating. Rawls says, ‘I have assumed … that while citizens do not have 
equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum, the moral, intellectual and 
physical capabilities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of society over a 
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complete life’.112 Is it the claims of human non-persons that are set aside by the fully cooperating 
assumption or is it also the claims of severely impaired persons? The text is not definitive.  
Let us draw two conclusions and raise some questions from the discussion so far. First, it 
is abundantly clear that Rawls does not see it faulty to ‘design basic political principles’ without 
considering ‘abnormal’ impairments into account. Secondly, it is clear that Rawls equates the 
distinction between the ‘normal’ and the ‘atypically impaired’ with that between the fully 
cooperating and those who cannot be fully cooperating.
113
 Thus it is reasonable to conclude that 
the people whose extraordinary needs Rawls wants to defer are those with physical and cognitive 
impairments and human non-persons. Nussbaum rightly takes Rawls to task here. She asks: First, 
‘why does Rawls think that cases of persons with cognitive impairments need to be postponed, 
and what part in his decision is played by each of the four problematic aspects of his theory?’ I 
agree. In fact I would think that Rawls’ sense of the limitedness of human agency led him to 
artificially frame laws behind the veil of ignorance. And second, is Rawls ‘correct to think that a 
Kantian social contract theory like his must defer these cases?’114 We will take up the latter 
question. The best way to answer this question is to return to the source himself. So let us now 
turn and examine Kant’s own grounding of the worth of individuals, and the implications for 
Rawls’ contract theory if it is undergirded by Kant’s grounding proposal.  
4.2.3 On the Capabilities Approach: Kant’s Grounding Proposal115   
 
By revisiting Kant, my goal is to show that Rawls’ theory is hindered by its reliance on 
Kantianism, which poses problems for the full and equal inclusion of people with profound 
intellectual impairment. The dignity of individual persons, which renders them inviolable, is 
mostly the premise of choice for those who attempt to ground human rights. In turn, most of such 
attempts employ what is popularly known as the ‘capacities approach’. The property, on which 
the relevant sort of dignity supervenes, is some capacity that human beings possess, normally 
rendered as reason, rational agency, moral agency, capacity to form or implement a plan of life, 
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etc. Immanuel Kant remains the typical representative of this approach; consequently we should 
look no further than what he says. Kant attributes to human beings three of fundamental 
capacities or what he calls ‘original predispositions’: ‘animality’, ‘humanity’, and 
‘personality’.116 Animality belongs to us merely as living beings. However, our purpose here 
does not require us to delve into its specific intricacies. Instead, we will focus on the latter two. 
Allen Wood says: ‘the predisposition to personality is the rational capacity to respect the moral 
law and to act having duty or the moral law as the sole sufficient motive of the will’.117 And then 
he continues: ‘the predisposition to humanity lies in between the predispositions to animality and 
personality. It encompasses all our rational capacities having no specific reference to 
morality’.118 In short, humanity is the capacity for rational agency.119 For Kant, humanity in a 
human being makes that being worthy of being treated as an end. But why is humanity the end in 
itself, rather than personality, that he claims to be an end in itself as that which grounds 
obligation and rights? After all, personality ‘seems “higher” than humanity in that it has essential 
reference to the moral value, moral responsibility, and the “positive” concept of freedom, where 
includes none of these’.120 Wood says that what Kant means by ‘humanity’ holds the key to this 
answer.
121
  
According to Wood, Kant holds the humanity of individuals to be the thing that makes 
them be treated as an end. Furthermore Wood interprets Kant as thinking this to be the only thing 
about human beings that gives them equal worth. Kant says: ‘The essence of things is not 
changed by their external relations; and that which, without taking account of such relations, 
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alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he must also be appraised 
by whoever does it, even by the supreme being’.122 Thus Wood thinks that Kant’s argument of 
humanity being an end in itself has to be interpreted as implying, ‘that all the normal 
(comparative and competitive) measures of people’s self-worth – wealth, power, honor, prestige, 
charm, charisma, even happy relationships with others – are expression of an utterly false sense 
of values’.123 This means that, in Wood’s interpretation, ‘the worst rational being (in any respect 
you can possibly name) has the same dignity or absolute worth as the best rational being in that 
respect (or any other)’.124 Wolterstorff thinks that this paraphrase of Kant’s doctrine by Wood 
demonstrates on its face how implausible Kant’s doctrine is, for the paraphrase contradicts the 
doctrine it formulates. So when Wood speaks of ‘the worst rational being’ and of ‘the best 
rational being’, it seems to imply that rational beings come in different categories of worth.   
Consider the capacity to set ends through reason, as contrasted with acting on impulse, 
which is the property of individuals at the core of Kant’s attention. For Wood, ‘rational nature 
apparently comes in degrees’. In other words, ‘people have varying amounts of technical skill, 
pragmatic intelligence, or moral wisdom. Their actions exhibit various rational successes and 
failures. Even their rational capacities tend to develop as they mature and may be impaired in 
various ways by injury, disease, or old age’.125 Immediately following this passage, Wood 
observes that ‘being an end in itself cannot come in degrees, since a categorical imperative or 
practical law either has an objective ground or it does not. Kant’s position therefore has to be that 
anything possessing the capacity to set ends and act according to reason is an end in itself, 
however, well or badly it may exercise the capacity’.126 At this point, Wolterstorff rightly puts 
both Kant’s theory and Woods interpretation to task: He wants to know, if rational agency 
bestows worth to an individual, why is it that possessing that capacity to a greater degree, and 
exercising it better does not give a human being greater worth?
127
 Is it not true, then, that if 
having a capacity is a good thing, then having more of it is better than having less of it, and 
exercising it well is better than exercising it poorly? Again, why would these differences not 
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‘impart corresponding differences in worth to the persons who possess and exercise the 
capacity’?128  
Here, I concur with Wolterstorff. Furthermore, Kant agreed that different exercises of the 
capacity differ in their moral worth. What, then, prevented him from holding that these 
differences in the worth of various exercises of the capacity impart differential worth to the 
agents themselves? Wood, demonstrating that he is aware of the tension responds: ‘if the good 
will is the only unqualified good, it might be wondered, how can Kant regard a person with a bad 
will as the equal of the person with the good will?’129 The solution that seems appealing to 
Wood, and which he attributes to Kant too, is based on what Kant says next about moral 
humility. Wood says that for Kant, moral humility and moral law go hand in hand. This means 
that an individuals’ inner worth is determined by how close one comes to measuring up to the 
moral law. Thus Wood says that Kant’s consistent position is that though ‘the inner worth of a 
person, measured solely by comparison to the moral law, may be greater or less according to 
one’s virtue in fulfilling the law one gives oneself, … the worth of the person never varies in 
comparison to others, since the good and the bad alike possess the dignity of humanity’.130 This 
solution does not seem helpful. This is because for Kant, the moral worth of a person is an 
absolute matter, not relative.
131
 As Wolterstorff says, an individual may be morally better than 
others, but still that does not tell what her moral worth is. To determine her moral worth, we 
must determine how she measures up against the moral law, and not against her fellows.
132
  
We have been dwelling on Kant’s thought to finally say that Rawls’ proposal is 
inadequate. Let us examine some reasons for this conclusion, but first some basic questions: ‘Do 
all and among all creatures, only human beings who possess the capacity for rational agency?’ 
Secondly, ‘does possessing that capacity give one a worth that, on the one hand, is greater than 
the worth of any animal and, on the other hand, is sufficient to account for what we recognize to 
be natural human rights?’133 Again, we must begin by mentioning that not all individuals, (e.g. 
infants and cognitively impaired people) possess the capacity for rational agency. Wood is aware 
of the problem this is to Kant’s theory, and so he underlines the fact that Kant consistently 
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although not always says that we must treat humanity in persons as an end. Actually what we 
would expect him to say is that ‘we must treat persons as ends on the ground of their 
humanity’.134 Does our language make a difference here? The answer depends on what Kant 
holds about the abstract entity humanity. Does he think that it is this entity we must respect 
rather than concrete human beings? Wood does not think so. He says: ‘rational nature is 
precisely what makes you a person, so that respecting it in you is precisely what it means to 
respect you’.135 This means that it is not humanity as such that must be respected but humanity in 
individuals. Respecting humanity in persons is the same as respecting the individual on the 
ground of his humanity. At the end, they are the same; respecting humanity in someone and 
respecting someone because of his humanity.  
The capacity for rational agency was of great worth to Kant. Thus, we are to always treat 
any being who possesses that capacity as an end, whether human or whatever. Kant’s theory 
raises some concerns, for it does not consider a section of the citizenry. The first concern is in 
regard to persons who used to possess the capacity but now for some reason have lost it and will 
never regain it (e.g. persons suffering from advanced dementia). Should we suppose that their 
capacity is of ‘less worth’ than those who actually possess the capacity, but still worth some? 
Second are the infants who have never possessed the capacity, but will hopefully, with 
maturation possess it. Again, are we to suppose their capacity to be of ‘less worth’ than those 
who possess it, but still quite a bit? If that is the case, as Wolterstorff says, any being of that sort, 
be it human or whatever, also merits some respect. But whether it is enough to ground human 
rights is another question altogether.
136
  
Wolterstorff thinks it is possible to find some relation to the capacity for rational agency 
that infants and cognitively impaired persons and all other human beings possess. Furthermore, 
he thinks we should not stop here in our pursuit of ‘thinned-out relations’ to the capacity. Why 
not extend this ‘thinned-out relations’ to entities that, thought never capable of rational agency, 
but are ‘prized’ but someone in the exercise of rational agency?137 He asks: ‘Does not the worth 
of the capacity for rational agency also give some worth to beings that stand to it in this relation 
– not as much worth as that of those who exercised the capacity in their prizing of these things, 
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but still quite a bit?’138 Wolterstorff thinks there is no reason why we should say ‘no’ to the 
question.
139
 Further, he argues that if we insist on the capacity for rational agency, ‘then it is not 
human rights that are grounded but the rights of those who possess the capacity’.140 Kant’s idea 
that each human being is an end, and thus may not be violated for the purposes of a great social 
benefit, are valuable ideas that could, in a suitably extended form, be used by any theory of 
justice for people with disabilities. I suggest that Kant’s capacities approach has an intrinsic fatal 
flaw which permeates all versions of the capacities approach as well. Whatever capacity is 
selected, it will turn out that some human beings are left out. There does not seem to be a way 
around the problems Kant’s approach presents. Thus I think issues of impairment and disability 
expose the entire structure of Rawls’ contract theory. Nussbaum also thinks so. She says that 
although Rawls’ theory has some moral elements that go very deep, because of their particular 
Kantian shape, they altogether outstrip the particular limitations of the social contract doctrine, 
which she says ‘derives from its basic picture of why people live together and what they hope to 
gain therefrom’.141 Thus Nussbaum attempts to ‘expand’ the contract theory. It is to her approach 
that we now turn. 
5. Martha Nussbaum’s Capability Approach 
5.1 Limitations of Rawlsian Social Contract and the Capabilities Approach 
 
So far, in this discussion, we have said that the social contract theory, with its emphasis on 
individual freedom and equality of opportunity, has been instrumental in expanding justice. 
However, we have said that it is increasingly common to contend that contract theory, 
understood as a process of bargaining for mutual advantage stands between citizens with 
disabilities and justice.
142
 Prompted by this concern, some scholars have proposed expansions or 
alterations of emphasis within the framework of social contract theory,
143
 for example, by urging 
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the greater salience of agency,
144
 or by advancing an alternative account of cooperation that leads 
to jurisprudence of trust.
145
 Others have advanced alternative theories to the social contract as a 
means of mediating the place of persons with disabilities in society.
146
 Prominent among these 
are various feminist proposals for ethics of care.
147
  
Philosopher Martha Nussbaum contributes to these attempts by developing a solution that 
addresses the shortcomings of social contract theory and its resultant trio of ‘unsolved problems 
on which justice as fairness may fail’.148 Nussbaum, proffers a significantly expanded account of 
her earlier versions of the ‘capabilities approach’.149 I will begin by expounding on the 
theoretical foundation and basic concepts of the approach, as Nussbaum argues it out in FJ, then 
I will examine her application of the approach to our present purpose. Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach is both subtle and complex. The fundamentals of that theory are these. At the core of 
the theory are ten human capabilities.
150
 These are regarded as ‘core human entitlements’ which 
provide the ‘philosophical underpinning’ that should be respected and provided by all States to 
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all citizens as a matter of minimal justice.
151
 For Nussbaum, these capabilities are essential 
because being able to exercise all of them at a threshold level is a uniquely human mode of 
existence. Nussbaum’s theory lacks faith in social contract theory’s ability to adequately 
accommodate cognitively impaired persons, and thus hopes to expand liberal political theory in 
order to include concepts of cooperation and care, thus providing justice to those previously 
disregarded groups.   
Nussbaum takes aim at the core of Rawls’ account of the Original Position, which models 
the conviction that ‘the fundamental problem of social justice arises between those who are full 
and active and morally conscientious participants in society, and directly or indirectly associated 
together throughout a complete life’.152 For Nussbaum we must place front and center what 
Rawls relegates to the margins, because, ‘the margins are in fact the center’.153 She says: 
The parties are being asked to imagine themselves as if they represent citizens who really are 
“fully cooperating … over a complete life”, and thus as if citizens have no needs for care in times 
of extreme dependency. This fiction obliterates much that characterizes human life, and 
obliterates, as well, the continuity between the so-called normal and people with lifelong 
impairments. It skews the choice of primary goods, concealing the fact that health care and other 
forms of care are, for real people, central goods making well-being possible…. More generally, 
care for children, elderly people, and people with  mental and physical disabilities is a major part 
of the work that needs to be done in any society, and in most societies it is a source of great 
injustice.  Any theory of justice needs to think about the problem from the beginning, in the design 
of the basic institutional structure, and particularly in its theory of the primary goods.
154
  
 
Nussbaum links liberal political tradition with Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach and 
Aristotle’s sense of people as political animals. She also does not embroil herself with the 
capacity for reciprocity argument, and thus avoids a performance criterion which marginalizes 
cognitively impaired persons. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, then, is meant to provide a 
threshold for the possibility of a good life. The approach is an alternative to the ‘economic-
Utilitarian approaches’ to quality of life in international development and policy circles. So as a 
self proclaimed liberal, Nussbaum hopes to present the capabilities as a ‘source of political 
principles for a liberal pluralistic society’.155 Further, these capabilities are set in the ‘context of a 
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type of political liberalism that makes them specifically political goals and presents them in a 
manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding’.156  
Nussbaum does not intend to completely jettison the social contract theory, and admits 
that her approach shares some ‘intuitive ideas’ with the Rawlsian version of Contractarianism. In 
fact she intends to ‘extend and compliment’ Rawls’ theory, with these new problems (disability, 
nationality, non-human animals) in focus.
157
 Thus, Nussbaum views herself as ‘resurrecting’ 
older political theories in the Grotian natural law tradition, while she continues to pursue and 
develop orthodox contractarian theories.
158
 Nussbaum argues that presented in this manner, the 
capabilities can become ‘the object of an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise 
have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good’.159 In short, the capabilities are 
presented as a solution to the problems posed by a utilitarian political doctrine. However, she 
says, the approach is not a complete account of social justice and does not thus answer all of the 
problems raised by Rawls’ theory.160  
Unlike Rawls who focuses on procedural justice, Nussbaum although outcome-oriented, 
does not immediately reach for outcomes. Instead, she claims her approach designs a procedure 
that models certain key features of fairness and impartiality, and relies on these procedures to 
generate an adequately just outcome. Her capabilities approach, then, requires a just society to 
guarantee basic dignity to disabled persons, inhabitants of other nations, and animals. Recall that 
the idea of mutual advantage is central to the social contract theory, where individuals depart the 
Original Position
161
 in Rawls terminology in order to gain a mutual benefit. In the capabilities 
approach, Nussbaum endeavors to moralize and socialize from the very beginning the account of 
the benefits and aims of social cooperation.
162
 Although Nussbaum’s approach being an 
outcome-oriented rather than a procedural approach, as she claims, does not employ a 
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hypothetical initial situation, she envisages human beings as cooperating out of a ‘wide range of 
motives, including love of justice itself’.163 Nussbaum avoids the pitfall that traps Rawls when he 
endorses Hume’s Circumstances of Justice. This means that she does not assume that only the 
Humean Circumstances of Justice obtain. In short, she does not believe that justice is only 
possible in circumstances in which there is ‘rough equality’ between persons.164 Rawls seems to 
believe otherwise, and his endorsement of Hume results in serious tension with other elements of 
his theory.
165
 For Nussbaum, the capabilities apply to everyone and not only to all human beings, 
disabled or not, but to non-human animals as well. Nussbaum emphasizes that there are 
similarities between her approach and Contractarianism in discussing whether social contract 
theory can be modified to include cognitively impaired persons.
166
 Nussbaum’s theory generally 
values the autonomy, potential and dignity of all citizens, and she views each as each 
individual’s own end. Thus, her approach provides an elegant normative theory of human rights 
as a means of ensuring human flourishing. In contrast to Kant, however, she grounds this status 
in our animality and not on rationality.
167
   
Let us now closely examine the point of dignity. Does Nussbaum’s theory really include 
all persons as ‘truly human’? The quick answer is ‘No!’ However instead of simply offering this 
as a dictum and moving on at once, I propose looking at what Nussbaum submits is the main 
difference of her capabilities view, in that it approaches the question of justice ‘from a different  
vantage point’ starting with a robust theory of the good and a more expansive non-Kantian 
political account of the person.
168
 I will interweave my treatment of this issue with her 
engagement with disability. Nussbaum thinks her own view captures human dignity better than 
the contract does. But does it?  
 
5.2 Capabilities Approach, Disability and Human Dignity: Aristotelian/Marxian, not Kantian 
Nussbaum’s approach to justice ‘starts from the notion of human dignity and a life worthy of it’. 
Its basic ‘moral intuition’, she argues, concerns the ‘dignity of a form of life that possesses both 
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abilities and deep needs’.169 Nussbaum gives dignity a key role in her political conception of 
justice and says that ‘a hallmark of minimum social justice is the availability, to all citizens, of 
ten core “capabilities”, or opportunities to function’.170 Thus for Nussbaum, human beings have a 
worth that is indeed inalienable because of their capacities for various forms of activity and 
striving, that partly make up ‘a life with, or worthy of, human dignity’.171 In this section I will 
examine the content of Nussbaum’s conception of dignity for humans and specifically in regard 
to cognitively impaired persons. Again, Nussbaum does not directly thrash out its content or the 
exact way in which she uses it in her theory. Thus there are several unanswered questions 
regarding her conception of dignity, which I will raise and explore later in this section. 
Consider how Nussbaum’s capabilities approach engages disability. Nussbaum argues 
that the state is obligated to provide each person with the means through which to exercise each 
of the ten core capabilities. The crucial value for Nussbaum is to bring every citizen up to 
‘species-typical thresholds’. This means that she expressly rejects welfare metrics, like the GNP, 
which assess individual wellbeing through broad-based economic categories.
172
 Instead, the 
capabilities approach requires that every individual be treated as an end in himself, rather than as 
the instrument or agency of the ends of others. Through her capabilities approach Nussbaum 
engages disability by depicting the lives of three cognitively impaired children.
173
 She believes 
that none of these three children is likely to be ‘economically productive’ to be able to 
compensate society for educating them.
174
 Her approach, then, would distribute resources to 
develop the potential of these individuals and others like them, but only to the extent that they 
can attain species-typical threshold levels. Whatever the resources it takes to achieve this 
threshold can be justified by the fact that impaired persons start off further away from the 
standard capabilities possessed by the majority of citizens.
175
 Furthermore, society is obligated to 
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fill the gap that social contract theory leaves when it rejects cognitively impaired persons as 
unable or otherwise improper to serve as contracting parties.  
When Nussbaum considers the notion of dignity, her argument fundamentally departs 
from contractarianism, and thus Rawls’ Kantian conception of the person which also holds 
dignity to be basic. Unlike Kant who contrasts the humanity of human beings with their 
animality, Rawls does not do so. Instead, Rawls makes personhood reside in (moral and 
prudential) rationality, not in the needs that human beings share with other animals.
176
 By 
contrast, Nussbaum sees rationality and animality as ‘thoroughly unified’.177 Thus adopting the 
Aristotelian idea of political animals and Karl Marx’s idea that human beings are creatures ‘in 
need of a plurality of life-activities’,178 Nussbaum rightly holds that rationality is simply one 
aspect of the animal, and, at that, not ‘the only one that is pertinent to a notion of truly human 
functioning’.179 Nussbaum argues that there are many different types of animal dignity, and all 
deserve respect. Although the human kind, for Nussbaum, is characterized by a kind of 
rationality, rationality is not ‘idealized’ and set in opposition to animality.180 So adopting the 
Aristotelian conception of the person, Nussbaum argues that the ends of justice are now able to 
focus on guaranteeing basic dignity for all people, but particularly for those who are 
marginalized. Including the marginalized within the circle of those with dignity provides a better 
reflection about common intuitions about justice than alternative accounts.
181
 Nussbaum argues 
that Kantian rationality-based dignity does not demonstrate that non-impaired individuals do not 
exhibit rationality over a lifetime. For Nussbaum, taking into consideration infancy, sickness, 
injury and old age, no individual can be considered fully rational and independent throughout 
their entire life.
182
  
Nussbaum argues that human dignity is inviolable and equal for all human beings. Here 
she is not very clear about what this is based on, nor about how the human dignity is 
distinguished from the dignity of other animals. However, for her, the inviolability of human 
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dignity means that all individuals deserve to have the capabilities needed to flourish. Thus 
Nussbaum thinks that the concept of a human being is a normative idea. She says: 
First of all, the notion of human nature in my theory is explicitly and from the start evaluative, 
and, in particular, ethically evaluative: among the many actual features of a characteristic human 
form of life, we select some that seem so normatively fundamental that is life without any 
possibility at all of exercising one of them, at any time, is not fully a human life, a life worthy of 
human dignity, even if the others are present.
183
 
 
By this, Nussbaum seems to say that self-respect and dignity are the basis for capabilities. 
However, earlier, Nussbaum says that her capabilities approach avoids the problem (of 
determinate content of dignity) insofar as it considers the account of entitlements not as derived 
from the ideas of dignity and respect but rather as ways of fleshing out those ideas.
184
 It is 
difficult to reconcile Nussbaum’s claims about the role of dignity in her approach. However, it is 
clear that, for her, possessing each of ten functional abilities capability is a prerequisite to being 
‘truly human’ and to having a ‘good life’ fully entitled to resource distribution. Accordingly, 
Nussbaum’s framework does not seem to include all citizens.185  
5.3 Why Nussbaum’s Proposal Does not Work 
 
In what follows, I offer objections to Nussbaum’s argument. The first concerns dignity’s role in 
Nussbaum’s approach. The second has to do with her ‘capabilities approach’, the third with her 
sixth capability, ‘practical reason’. And finally the fourth is concerned with her use of the 
‘overlapping consensus’. Consider dignity’s explicit role in her capabilities approach. It is clear 
that Nussbaum does not want dignity to increase with each capability an individual obtains.
186
 
Instead, for her, dignity seems to be somehow entwined with the capabilities, but not fully 
resulting from them. This means that dignity is non-aggregative. Thus amassing capabilities does 
not bestow more dignity to an individual. But she repeatedly says that having the capabilities is 
necessary for a life worthy of human dignity. Furthermore, for Nussbaum, individuals are worthy 
of human dignity whether or not they have capabilities. But to add to the confusion, it still is not 
clear what role dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory when she provides ‘an approach that focuses 
on human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able to do and to be, in a way informed 
                                               
183 Nussbaum, FJ, 181. 
184 Ibid., 174. 
185 Ibid., 181. More on this point in the next section. 
186 Ibid., 344-5. 
195 
 
by an intuitive idea of the dignity of the human being’.187 She continues: ‘I identify a list of 
central human capabilities, arguing that all of them are implicitly in the idea of a life worthy of 
human dignity’.188 In this passage, Nussbaum seems to say that the capabilities are ‘informed by’ 
dignity while at the same time saying that the capabilities are already ‘implicit’ inside of the 
concept of dignity. So is Nussbaum referencing two different senses of dignity or does dignity 
play more than a role in her approach? This is a confusing set-up, and it is not helped by the fact 
the Nussbaum does not articulate her understanding of dignity in her work. Thus, her numerous 
comments on dignity seem incompatible, namely that somehow dignity precedes the capabilities 
while at the same time resulting from them. From my reading, the problem seems to rest in her 
language, and it is obvious, then, that further clarification is needed. 
I am also concerned about Nussbaum’s capability approach. Although her theory seems 
to accommodate the flourishing of people with disabilities in ways that social contract model 
appears unable to sustain, her theory may not be as generous to people with disabilities as it first 
appears to be.
189
 This is because it marginalizes citizens with some intellectual disabilities. 
Furthermore, by logical extension, Nussbaum’s approach excludes some ‘individuals with non-
intellectual disabilities as well as certain lower functioning individuals without disabilities’.190 
Our present purpose does not require a full discussion of the latter two. Recall the passage that I 
quoted earlier: ‘…we select some (features of a characteristic human form of life) that seem so 
normatively fundamental that a life without any possibility at all of exercising one of them, at 
any level, is not a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity, even if the others are 
present’.191   
It is clear that Nussbaum does not include all persons in her framework. This is because 
to be considered ‘truly human’, all individuals must exercise each of the ten capabilities. 
Specifically Nussbaum cites the case of persons in persistent vegetative state (PVS). Because 
‘enough’ of these characteristics are impossible, she says that that ‘life is not a human life at 
all’.192 Nussbaum thinks that the life of a person in PVS is not a ‘life any more’, or in any 
‘meaningful way’, because ‘possibilities of thought, perception, attachment, and so on are 
                                               
187
 Ibid., 70. 
188 Ibid. 
189 See broadly Silvers and Francis, ‘Justice through Trust’, 74; Michael A. Stein, ‘Disability Human Rights’, 
California Law Review 95 (2007), 40-76.     
190 Ibid., 77. 
191 Nussbaum, FJ, 181.  
192 Ibid. 
196 
 
irrevocably cut off’.193 To qualify her point, Nussbaum says that we do not say this if ‘just one or 
more of the perceptual modalities is cut off’, instead, we say this ‘only if the entirety of a group 
of major human capabilities is irrevocably and entirely cut off’.194 Thus, for example, for her, 
anencephalic children are not human. But remember that, for Nussbaum, bodily health (adequate 
nourishment) is a key value.
195
 Is Nussbaum, then, discounting the bodily presence of a person in 
PVS? I suspect she would answer by saying that that life ‘is so reduced as to be not worth 
living’.196 For me, that still does not account for the embodiment of all persons. Consequently, in 
her attempts to be inclusive, Nussbaum has actually marginalized other equally profoundly 
cognitively impaired persons. For example, some persons suffering from dementia
197
 cannot be 
said to be thoughtful, perceptive, and sometimes they are not even capable of attachment. On 
such citizens, Nussbaum is silent. In fact she seems to indicate that her concern is not with the 
possibility of ‘mere human life, but good life’.198 But why should exercising a list of capabilities 
be the measure of ‘good life’? Again, individuals who do not meet the threshold of the central 
capabilities are not fully human. Nussbaum makes this point in several places. For example she 
evaluates the life of Sesha Kittay as someone for whom a ‘flourishing human life’ that is ‘worthy 
of human dignity’ is out of the question.199 Eventually Nussbaum seems to marginalize some of 
those she claims her theory includes.  
The capability theory seems designed to escape paternalism.
200
 However, by promoting 
species-typicality as the standard for capabilities, Anita Silvers and Michael Stein think that 
Nussbaum’s proposed value scheme could attract ‘oppression’.201 I think they are right. For 
example, those citizens who seem ‘irremediably’, and by their very nature, to fall short of having 
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standard (i.e., ‘normal’) capabilities are ripe for being stigmatized by reason of their failure.202 
Furthermore, Silvers and Stein argue that a capabilities approach may in practice find it either 
difficult or impossible to set threshold standards while remaining positive or at least neutral 
about whoever cannot be brought up to these standards.
203
 Thus, although Nussbaum sets forth 
her capabilities approach in terms of agency, it is possible that there will be social pressure to 
‘exercise capabilities and their associated functioning is a familiar phenomenon’.204 Recall we 
said that the sequencing of the human genome has allowed scientists to identify genes that 
contribute to or even directly cause impairments. Today the technological capability exists to 
enable parents to access genetic testing which determines the condition of their unborn child. 
Thus social pressure is being brought to bear on these parents to terminate the pregnancy of a 
child deemed disabled rather than carry the pregnancy to full term and become a ‘burden’ to 
society later. In short, assimilation policies can be dangerous for citizens like Kelly who cannot 
be assimilated.  
Now consider how Nussbaum’s approach pays tribute to the value of rational agency.  In 
the context of discussing whether social contract theory can be refurbished to include cognitively 
impaired people, Nussbaum is quick to emphasize the similarities between her proposal and 
Contractarianism.
205
 However, Nussbaum argues that the social contract needs modifications to 
accommodate cognitively impaired persons. For her a suitably refurbished theory cannot, as 
Rawls’ theory does, invoke the ideas of rough equality of ability, mutual advantage, or mutual 
independence. Further, it cannot, as Rawls’ theory does, regard resources as the proper objects of 
distribution. Instead, Nussbaum argues it would have to include something like the list of 
capabilities. Recall the reasons she gives is that the capabilities view is a more robust theory of 
the good and gives a more expansive account of the person.
206
 So is it still worth pressing the 
issue, and do we lose anything when the contract device is eliminated to include cognitively 
impaired people? Stark thinks that we do, and I concur.
207
  
I agree with Stark that the contract approach, unlike the capabilities approach, allows us 
to recognize fully the dignity of human beings who are capable of practical reasoning. Thus, 
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when Nussbaum rejects the contract apparatus in order to recognize the dignity of cognitively 
impaired people, she ends up with a view which falls short of recognizing fully the dignity of 
persons who possess the capacity for practical reasoning, one of the capabilities. How so?  We 
said that the list of capabilities is given by our intuitions about human dignity in both its animal 
and its rational manifestations. One of the items on the list is the capacity for practical reasoning. 
For Nussbaum, then, in a just society, all individuals are guaranteed the freedom and opportunity 
to exercise practical reasoning to the extent that one has it. Furthermore, this capacity enjoys an 
elevated status among the capabilities in that it constrains the ‘shape of principles and policies 
designed to ensure any of the other capabilities.
208
  
It is clear that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach mandates respect for the capacity for 
practical reasoning. However, the manner in which the approach is justified does not 
demonstrate proper respect for practical reason.
209
 Stark says that the list is ‘simply laid out’, by 
the theorist, on the basis of ‘intuitions about human dignity’. This is accompanied by, she says, a 
certain sort of ‘empirical investigation – checking the list against people’s actual informed 
desires’.210 So if rational agency is indeed valuable, if it is a source of human dignity, then it 
follows that ‘political principles backed by coercion must be justifiable to those capable of 
rational agency’.211 This means that if individuals are not ‘merely subjected to those principles’, 
then they must be shown to have reason to abide by such principles.
212
 The individual’s capacity 
for practical reason is in this case, neglected, and their dignity is violated. It is not enough that 
the content of principles of justice respect the capacity for practical reasoning. The principles 
themselves must be justified in a way that respects that capacity. The conclusion is that a device 
such as the social contract is needed to establish which principles rational agents, as such, have 
reason to accept.
213
 But is Stark pressing the question for nothing? Furthermore, does Nussbaum 
not have her overlapping consensus argument to fall back on? Nussbaum can claim that the list 
of capabilities can be the object of an overlapping consensus. Stark is willing to concede that if 
this is so, then there is a possibility for a reasonable agreement. Additionally, if it can be the 
object of reasonable agreement, then it is justified in a way that recognizes the value of rational 
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agency.
214
 In short, the claim is that we can jettison the contract device, for what is gained, that 
is, liberalism is made to be more inclusive of cognitively impaired persons. This would be good, 
were it not for two concerns that arise.  
This move brings us to the fourth concern, Nussbaum’s use of the ‘overlapping 
consensus’. I shall attempt to show that Nussbaum’s excising of the contract and placing 
justificatory work onto the notion of overlapping consensus does not work. We said that today’s 
democratic society is characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. This means that 
individuals are prone to disagree not only about the truth or falsity of moral principles but also 
about metaphysical status of moral propositions and the proper way to just ify those 
propositions.
215
 Consequently, for society to agree on a political conception of justice, that 
conception must be agreeable not merely to the moral substance of various philosophical and 
religious doctrines but to the ‘metaethical and justificatory commitments’ connected to those 
doctrines.
216
 Stark thinks that if a conception of justice as a whole is the proper focus of 
overlapping consensus, then the manner in which Rawls understands and uses that idea, cannot 
serve to fully justify principles of justice. These principles, she says, must be justified by appeal 
to a ‘constructivist procedure’ which itself is the object of overlapping consensus. If that is so, it 
means that Nussbaum, so far as her understanding of overlapping consensus follows Rawls, 
cannot depend upon overlapping consensus as a method of justifying her list of capabilities.  
Remember that overlapping consensus is constituted by reasonable agreement. However, 
exactly what a notion of ‘reasonableness’ entails is debatable.217 In this context, however, for 
Rawls, reasonableness bears considerable weight. He says reasonable persons will think it 
unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that 
are not unreasonable, though different from their own.
218
  Thus, ‘reasonable’ applies both to 
persons and comprehensive doctrines.
219
 On Rawls’ account, a reasonable person is committed to 
the ideal of society as a fair system of conception among free and equal persons. Further he/she 
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recognizes that all are equally subject to the ‘burdens of judgment’.220 I will not take time to 
examine the details of this conception of a reasonable person. We merely wish to establish that 
cognitively impaired persons are not reasonable persons in Rawls’ sense, because they lack the 
capacities to be called ‘reasonable’. Like the social contract, then, the overlapping consensus 
seems to depend upon an ideal of the citizen as one who is capable of acting for reasons. But is 
this ideal of the citizen, not one of the features of social contract theory that Nussbaum is 
unhappy with? I do agree with Nussbaum that the contract theory marginalizes cognitively 
impaired people. However, I side with Stark thus: if both the ‘contract’ and the ‘overlapping 
consensus’ essentially require the same notion of the citizen, why is it that the idea of 
overlapping consensus does not also exclude the interests of cognitively impaired people?
221
  
Justifiability to all, or the notion that just political principles are those that can be justified 
to all who are subject to those principles, is an idea commonly associated with liberal justice. 
This concept is undergirded by a particular assumption about the nature of citizens: they are 
capable of being justified to, which in turn means they are capable of rational agency.
222
 
Typically, the idea of justifiability to all is expressed through the device of the social contract. 
This ideal of justification is in conflict with the concept that all citizens are owed justice 
regardless of rational agency. Nussbaum is right when she argues that the contractarian’s view of 
the citizen as ‘free, equal and independent’ is troublesome when it comes to including 
cognitively impaired individuals. Thus we have said that she rejects social contract theory in 
favor of her capabilities view. However, some do not think Nussbaum’s approach adequately 
fulfills ‘the liberal principle of justification’.223 Why not? Is it because of the lack of emphasis on 
practical reason? I am concerned that Nussbaum has been criticized for presenting her 
capabilities in an intuitive way rather than giving an argument everyone can accept – so she is 
not respecting practical reason enough. But she has also been criticized for excluding cognitively 
impaired individuals – due to having a conception of the person that includes practical reason. 
But can any theory escape both of these horns?   
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Stark thinks that Nussbaum’s resulting theory does not, in the end, prove to be more 
inclusive of the cognitively impaired than is a social contract theory.
224
 She says: ‘we are ill 
advised … to make this adjustment [adjust liberal political theory to address claims of 
cognitively impaired] by rejecting the device of the social contract and placing the burden of 
justifiability to all on the idea of overlapping consensus’.225 Elsewhere Stark, then, proposes 
other ways to ‘widen the scope of liberal justice’.226 I will not pursue this idea of justifiability 
further. My purpose here is to show that Nussbaum’s theory is inadequate. Furthermore, Stark’s 
exchange with Nussbaum demonstrates that even those within the liberal camp do not think that 
Nussbaum’s theory adequately dissolve the tension between social contract and including 
cognitively impaired persons.   
We have been discussing the question of whether a secular grounding of rights is 
possible. In the process, we examined two foremost proponents of the liberal theory of justice. 
We have seen that Rawls himself foresaw the tension that is inherent in social contract theory 
and attempted to postpone the inclusion of the severely disabled thus further marginalizing them. 
We have said that Nussbaum attempts to expand the social contract theory through her 
capabilities approach whereby she excises the social contract, the device she thinks is 
problematic, and replaces it with overlapping consensus. Nussbaum says that because her list of 
core capabilities is supposed to be the basis of an overlapping consensus, her theory is designed 
to avoid any affiliation with any particular ‘major comprehensive metaphysical or 
epistemological view’ of the humans rather than another, such as the concept of ‘the soul, or of a 
natural theology, or of self-evident truth’.227 But is it possible to meet what Jonathan Glover calls 
‘Nietzsche’s Challenge’?228 In other words, ‘without reference to God, to identify something 
about each and every human being that gives him or her dignity adequate for grounding human 
                                               
224 Ibid., 123. 
225 Ibid. 
226 See Cynthia Stark, ‘How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy 15 (2007), 125-47. See also, Andrew I. Cohen, ‘Contractarianism, Other-Regarding Attitudes, 
and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007), 188-201. 
227 Nussbaum, FJ, 182. 
228
 See Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001).  Glover 
quotes a passage from Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals in which Nietzsche is reflecting upon what to expect 
when humankind no longer believes in God: ‘As the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness – there can be no 
doubt of that – morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next 
two centuries in Europe – the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles’. 
Glover then remarks, ‘A century later, many people share Nietzsche’s skepticism about religious basis for morality’, 
12.  
202 
 
rights?’229 Some think the challenge can be met, while many think it is impossible. Glover is one 
of the skeptics about a religious basis for, while Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita, himself a 
secularist, thinks we are ‘whistling in the dark’ if we suppose Nietzsche’s challenge can be 
met.
230
 Gaita was right. Consequently I suggest that liberal justice as a whole is weak and cannot 
dissolve the tension or adequately include cognitively impaired citizens. Thus I conclude that 
social contract theory and capabilities approach are defective and do not work. If so, we have 
reason, then, to look for a different way to ensure the full inclusion of cognitively impaired 
people under the umbrella of justice. To that end, I propose a theistic grounding of justice.  
6. A Theistic Grounding of Justice 
 
In this section I want to pursue a theistic grounding of rights for cognitively impaired persons. 
My purpose is not to argue for the theistic convictions themselves nor is my project here 
intended to argue for the truth of the theistic account. What I want to say is that the theistic base 
of my argument is best placed to undergird an adequate account of rights for cognitively 
impaired persons. So I intend to argue that regarding profoundly intellectually impaired persons, 
extant secular accounts, by contrast, may possess a true premise, but the tendered accounts are 
not successful. They simply do not work. This should not be taken to mean that I deny the 
possibility of grounding rights on a secular base. To advance my case, I will closely follow 
Nicholas Wolterstorff who argues that some rights inhere in human beings. What he means is 
that human beings have some rights simply by virtue of ‘the worth of beings of their sort’.231 
This claim lies at the core of Wolterstorff’s theory, and it requires considerable unpacking. These 
are the questions which will concern us: what kind of worth do humans have, how do they come 
to have it, and is it all and only human beings who have this kind of worth? Furthermore how 
does that worth ground rights? After drawing the main points together in a way that, I hope, will 
demonstrate the broad contours of the view, I will elaborate on the points where I depart from 
Wolterstorff.  
                                               
229 Wolterstorff, Justice, 324. 
230 The whistling in the dark appears in this context: ‘The secular philosophical tradition speaks of inalienable rights, 
inalienable dignity and of persons as ends in themselves. These are, I believe, ways of whistling in the dark, ways of 
trying to make secure to reason what reason cannot finally underwrite’. Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: 
Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice (London: Routledge, 2000), 5. 
231 Wolterstorff, Justice, 10-11. 
203 
 
6.1 Natural Inherent Rights    
 
Wolterstorff begins by demarcating the two conceptions of justice, justice as right order and 
justice as inherent rights, and the primary issue that distinguishes them. He argues the primary 
issue between these two conceptions of justice is not whether or not there are natural rights, but 
whether there are inherent rights. For Wolterstorff, ‘rights’ ‘are normative social relationships; 
sociality is built into the essence of rights’.232 A few pages later, Wolterstorff introduces what he 
calls his ‘principle of correlatives’: ‘If Y belongs to the sort of entity that can have rights, then X 
has a right against Y to Y’s doing A if and only if Y has an obligation toward X to do A’.233 
Wolterstorff holds this to be a necessary truth. Thus for him the real issue is not whether there 
are natural rights but whether or not there are natural inherent rights. In an extremely rich 
passage, He says:  
Here is the contrast. The inherent rights theorist agrees that many of the rights we possess on 
account of something conferring them upon us – some human agreement, some piece of human 
legislation, some piece of divine legislation, whatever. But he holds that, in addition, we possess 
some rights that are not conferred, some rights that are inherent. On account of possessing certain 
properties, standing in certain relationships, performing certain actions, each of us has a certain 
worth. The worth supervenes on being that sort: having those properties, standing in those 
relationships, performing those actions. And having that worth is sufficient for having the rights. 
There doesn’t have to be something else that confers those rights on entities of this sort.
234
  
 
I sympathize with Wolterstorff when he says that ‘natural rights’ are those rights that are not 
‘socially conferred’.235 This is, or should be, the common understanding of natural rights.  After 
Wolterstorff presents a reconstruction of the narrative typically associated with right order 
theorists, he offers his own-counter narrative. Space will not allow us to rehearse the details of 
these narratives.
236
 Let us set aside Wolterstorff’s preliminary work toward what is meant by 
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natural inherent rights, and closely examine his argument for the theistic grounding of human 
rights. 
6.2 Does it Work? A Theistic Grounding of Natural Inherent Rights 
 
The primary issue for Wolterstorff is the grounding of rights.
237
 This is evident in the way that he 
treats ‘secular’ theorists who attempt to ground a theory of natural inherent human rights. 
Wolterstorff’s objection to Kant, and in extension to all secular theories of natural human 
inherent rights, is not about their understanding of these rights, but rather about their failure to 
provide any justification or grounding for these rights. But despite Wolterstorff’s critique of 
Kant, both seem to be saying the same thing about what constitutes inherent rights. Both Kant 
and Wolterstorff seek to show that a theory of rights can be grounded in human dignity. 
Furthermore, Wolterstorff even endorses the categorical imperative. He says: 
[i]n short, Kant’s famous principle – act always in such a way as to treat human beings as ends 
and never merely as means, comes to the same principle I have been defending: always act in such 
a way as to allow respect for the worth of human beings to trump balance of life-good 
considerations.238 
 
But Wolterstorff argues that all secular justifications of rights are not successful and does not 
expect that they ever will. Although that is his view, Wolterstorff does not doubt that it is 
possible to give a ‘satisfactory secular account of the rights shared by all those human beings 
capable of functioning as persons’.239 Instead, what rightly concerns him are those human beings 
who are not capable.  
So what distinguishes Wolterstorff from his colleagues who advocate a theory of natural 
inherent human rights? Wolterstorff is, rightfully, not happy with their ‘secular’ attempts to 
ground such rights by appealing to some capacity possessed by individuals. He argues, as I have 
claimed in this chapter, that this will not work, whether for Kant or any other secular theorists. 
Remember we have said that for Wolterstorff the real issue that separates the two conceptions of 
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justice is not whether there are natural rights but whether there are natural inherent rights. The 
primary issue, then, that separates Wolterstorff from his secular colleagues who advocate a 
theory of natural inherent human rights is whether (and how) we ground such rights. 
Consequently, Wolterstorff sets out to do what he claims his secular colleagues, as well as most 
of his Christian colleagues, have failed to do – namely, to ground a theory of rights. So what 
works? These are the questions: what is worth, and does God bestow worth? What can ground 
inherent human rights?  
Consider the idea of human worth. Here we turn to how Wolterstorff attempts to explain 
the location of bestowed worth in a taxonomy of worth. The idea of worth is important to 
Wolterstorff because this is the key to his claim that the natural rights are inherent rights. For 
him, inherent rights are inherent to the worth that an individual has. Thus the rights of 
individuals are grounded in respect of their worth. He says: ‘To be a human being is to have 
worth’.240 So when we speak of the worth of something, there must be some ‘worth-imparting’ 
property or relation that anchors the rationale for ascribing worth. For example, I am a great 
admirer of fountain pens, specifically of the kind manufactured by Parker. To me, their simple 
design and smoothness in writing is of great worth. What is the property that gives these pens 
their great worth? It is their innovation, aesthetics, quality and great craftsmanship.  
But how does this relate to individuals? What is the property or relation by virtue of 
which we ascribe worth to human beings and ground inherent human rights? As we have seen in 
this study, secular theories of rights do ascribe dignity to human beings. However, we have said 
that they fail to single out or ground the property or relation that is ‘worth imparting’. Again, this 
is because secular theories attempt to justify the worth of human beings by appealing to rational 
agency which fails to ground the worth of persons. Recall the passage I quoted earlier from 
Wolterstorff:  
[o]n account of possessing certain properties, standing in certain relationships, performing certain 
actions, each of us has a certain worth. The worth supervenes on being of that sort: having those 
properties, standing in those relationships, performing those actions. And having that worth is 
sufficient for having the rights.
241
 
 
Wolterstorff attempts to provide a theistic grounding for the relation that imparts worth to 
individuals. He says: ‘What we need for a theistic grounding of natural rights, is some worth-
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imparting relation of human beings to God that does not in any way involve reference to human 
capacities’.242 Wolterstorff argues that ‘being loved by God is such a relation’.243 Indeed, for 
him: ‘being loved by God gives a human being great worth. And if God loves equally and 
permanently each and every creature who bears the imago Dei, then the relational property of 
being loved by God is what we have been looking for’.244 Wolterstorff argues that ‘if love 
bestows worth, it has to be love as attachment that does this’.245 He illustrates love as attachment 
with the example of the child Nathan who deeply loves (is attached to) his favourite stuffed 
animal -  no matter how ugly it may be. Nathan’s attachment to this ugly stuffed animal is 
supposed to clarify God’s love as attachment for individuals. For Wolterstorff, then, [b]earing 
that property bestows to each individual the worth in which natural human rights inhere.
246
  
But why does something have worth or excellence? For Wolterstorff this question brings 
two different questions to mind: an aspectual explanation of its worth or what he calls a 
philosophical explanation of its worth.
247
 The former focuses on some aspect that gives the thing 
being considered worth. Wolterstorff gives an example of ‘lemon grass soup’. He tells us that its 
flavour (or some very specific aspect of its flavour) gives the soup its worth. This means that 
there is some ‘aspect on which its worth supervenes’.248 However, when we ask why something 
has the worth that it does have, we may be asking a fundamentally different kind of question. 
Wolterstorff says: 
How do you explain the fact that all aspects of things are non-instrumentally good. How do you 
explain the fact that non-instrumental goodness is attached to it, supervenes on it? This “why” 
questions cannot be answered by probing inside the entity to locate explanatory aspects. It is at 
this point that general philosophical accounts of excellence enter the picture.
249
 
 
This is where Wolterstorff introduces the notion of ‘bestowed’ worth. So when grounding rights 
on a theistic base, Wolterstorff tells us that ‘being loved by God’ is what bestows worth on 
human beings. To support his theistic grounding of inherent rights, Wolterstorff’s ultimate 
appeal is to Christian Scriptures. Despite the criticism Wolterstorff has received on his 
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hermeneutics,
250
 it is important, however, to note that he does not claim that there is any explicit 
theory of human or natural rights in the Christian Scriptures. Rather, he claims, and I concur, that 
there is an ethical framework that assumes that something like rights are in effect. After critically 
considering other possible ways of grounding human rights, Wolterstorff finally settles on a 
theistic base. This means that the only solid foundation is a vision of human beings, who as 
creatures in the imago Dei, possess inherent worth and therefore have claims on one another to 
be treated in certain ways. I am conscious that I have glossed over much of Wolterstorff’s 
magnificent and breathtaking achievement. However, that roughly is his Christian theistic 
grounding of natural inherent human rights.  
6.3 Theistic Grounding of Rights: A Different Turn 
 
For my present purpose, I find myself sympathetic with Wolterstorff project. Further, his critique 
of other ways of thinking about human rights, and specifically the contemporary versions of the 
ancient traditions of eudaimonism is quite impressive.
251
 However, some commentators are not 
persuaded by Wolterstorff’s grand argument. In particular, Richard Bernstein terms 
Wolterstorff’s proposal for what grounds natural inherent rights as not convincing as a 
‘philosophical or theoretical justification’.252 I will not embroil myself in the particulars of these 
reactions, but will highlight a few that are relevant to our task here.
253
 What I want to do next is 
attempt to expand Wolterstorff’s theistic grounding of inherent rights in a different direction. 
Here I intend to engage with theologian Karl Barth, in his sermon ‘The Humanity of God’,254 and 
his Church Dogmatics II/2§32-35.   
I am not rejecting Wolterstorff’s proposal that God’s love as attachment can bestow 
worth to human beings. In fact I disagree with Bernstein’s criticism of Wolterstorff on this point. 
Bernstein claims that there are problems with understanding God’s love as attachment because 
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there are ‘degrees of attachment’. 255 So if Nathan may be attached to some of his other stuffed 
animals or toys, but not to the same degree to which he is attached to his ugly stuffed animal, 
Bernstein, rightly, thinks that in the same manner, God can be more attached to some people or 
individuals than others. But Bernstein thinks this poses a problem to Wolterstorff’s notion of 
love as attachment because it means that God can be more attached to some and not others. But 
precisely! I do not see a problem with stating that God is ‘more attached’ to some people than 
others. In fact, might Nathan, in his imaginary world, be more attached to those stuffed animals 
he thinks are smaller perhaps, weaker may be? It is not uncommon to see children favor the 
‘little guy’ in their child play. Furthermore, there are many passages in Scripture that suggest that 
God is attached to some individuals or peoples more than others. Is that not why God commands 
a special care for the most vulnerable of society – e.g., the widow, orphans and strangers? Does 
God not say that these vulnerable persons should not be denied justice due to them? I therefore 
do not see the basis of Bernstein’s concern. Indeed, that which he is concerned about God is 
exactly that which characterizes God. God is for the vulnerable and he ‘favors’ them more than 
all of his other creation. However, I do see a point in claiming that the very idea of love as 
attachment poses unfortunate consequences for the very meaning of inherent rights. This is 
because it is normal to think that that which ‘is inherent or intrinsic is a characteristic of 
something that is essential to it’.256 I return to this point shortly.  
Before I do, let us expand Wolterstorff’s suggestion. I will do so by proposing a ‘safe-
guard’ to theistic grounding of rights in a ‘worth-imparting relation of human beings to God that 
does not in any way involve a reference of human capacities’.257 What I am calling a ‘safe-
guard’ is two pronged, and includes: God’s election of all human beings and their subsequent 
embodiment (see Jeremiah 1.5). Consider the former. Being elected by God is such a relation; 
being elected by God gives a human being great worth. I am articulating a theistic grounding of 
human rights, especially for people with profound cognitive impairment who are otherwise as 
mentioned marginalized by other theories. I am arguing that if God elects each and every human 
being ‘equally and permanently’,258 then natural human rights are grounded in that election. To 
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adopt Wolterstorff’s words, ‘they inhere in the bestowed worth that supervenes on being thus 
[elected]’.259  
I am not arguing for the Augustinian-Calvinist Protestant theology of election, which 
holds on the notions of election and reprobation. Instead I am reading Barth, who is considered 
to have issued a massive correction of the Augustinian-Calvinist doctrine of predestination, to 
mean that Jesus Christ is the instrument of election.
260
 This means that God had never elected 
any individuals at all. God’s election of Christ, his subsequent death and resurrection paved a 
way for all human beings to join the elect by clinging to the elected one, that is, by being ‘in 
Christ’, ‘just as he chose (elected) us in Christ before the foundation of the world’ (Ephesians 
1:4). In short, the election of Jesus Christ to be the ‘royal’ human, carries with it an implied 
human ontology which corresponds to divine ontology. True humanity is realized in us ‘where 
and when we live in the posture of prayer’.261 All are elected but not all have actualized ‘true 
humanity’ by faith and obedience.262 But I digress, for I am not arguing for those convictions 
themselves.  
As mentioned elsewhere in this study, election is significant ontologically in terms of the 
nature of cognitively impaired persons. Furthermore, it is significant because it signals God’s 
first move towards humans in the ultimate act in Jesus Christ. Christ’s life, death and 
resurrection, and incarnation, have constitutive results: namely, election of all persons. This 
means that all persons possess an inviolable worth because they are elected. But how are all 
persons ontologically determined as elect in Christ? Barth argues that individuals are elect in 
Christ, as He is not just the Elected, but also the Elector. This means that the election of persons 
is not a human act. It is the work of Jesus Christ who is both the Subject of election and its 
Object.
263
 Furthermore the substance, essence, and result of this election is God’s covenant 
grace. Thus, to be elected is to be in the sphere of Grace. It should be noted that the ‘ontological 
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connection’ is not confined to persons within the Christian community, but is incidental for all 
persons.
264
  
What does this have to do with bestowing human dignity, and the grounding of inherent 
human rights, particularly when we think of cognitively impaired persons? We are saying that if 
we want to know what bestows worth to human beings, Barth directs us to a formula. For Barth, 
knowing the grounds of attributing worth to human beings created in the image of God entails 
knowing that particular God in whose image human beings are created. In short for Barth, the 
question is: ‘what do we know about God?’ This question is significant because it answers the 
secondary question of ‘what does this knowledge imply for all human beings?’ As mentioned in 
this study, Barth’s starting point is thoroughly christocentric. This means that, for him, to know 
God, we must know Jesus Christ. Barth says that Jesus is both ‘wholly’ human and ‘wholly’ 
God.
265
 It is safe, then, to pronounce that God has both humanity and deity.
266
 And to Barth, 
‘God’s deity does not exclude … God’s humanity’.267 Instead, God is recognized as human, and 
the implication this has on human nature.  
Indeed, Barth says that once we establish that God is human in the sense described, there 
follows first of all a quite definite distinction of humans as such. This distinction is possessed by 
every being which bears the human countenance.
268
 But what is this countenance? Barth says it 
‘includes the whole stock of those capacities and possibilities which are in part common to man 
and to other creatures, and in part peculiar to him, and likewise man’s work and his 
productions’.269 This distinction is not on account of anything individuals possess. Instead it is 
due them because they are the beings whom God willed to exalt as His covenant partners, not 
otherwise.
270
 Barth argues that because God is wholly human, it is due to human beings and it 
should not be denied them. In fact, Barth identifies the transcendent source of human dignity, as 
being the natural endowment granted to all people, regardless of their faith or moral aptitude. He 
says: ‘[o]n the basis of the eternal will of God we have to think of every human being, even the 
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oddest [physically and cognitively impaired?], most villainous or miserable, as one to whom 
Jesus Christ is Brother and God is Father’.271  
 
It follows that: 
‘On the basis of this knowledge of the humanity of God no attitude to any kind of fellow man is 
possible. It is identical with the practical acknowledgment of his human rights and his human 
dignity. To deny it to him would be for us to renounce having Jesus Christ as Brother and God as 
Father’.272  
 
I argue that it is this kind or relational property we have been looking for to ground worth and so 
natural inherent human rights. Consequently we must deal with all humans, (both cognitively 
and physically impaired, and ‘normal’), on this assumption. That is, as valuable and in 
possession of the stamp of divinity.
273
 Thus, having a relationship with God is what bestows 
worth on human beings. If all human beings have a relationship with God, as I am arguing, it has 
to be relationality that does this.  
Human embodiment is the second ‘safe guard’. But why embodiment? I suggest 
embodiment to safe-guard the meaning of inherent rights. If what is inherent or intrinsic is a 
characteristic of something that is essential to it, as I argue, then it would not be the entity we 
take it to be unless it has the characteristic we take to be inherent. What happens if the ground for 
an individual’s inherent rights is the worth that is bestowed upon him or her by a loving God 
who decides to withdraw the love from the individual? What happens then? Indeed, the 
Scriptures record instances where God seems to have withdrawn his love from groups of people 
or individuals (He appears to have done so with the Egyptians and King Saul when they 
disobeyed Him). But the individuals remain human (Homo sapiens), although they seem to, in 
this case, have lost what is required to ground inherent rights. This is where I think the idea of 
embodiment expands Wolterstorff’s proposal well. Being embodied is intrinsic or inherent and 
essential to being a human being.  
Such is my theory; but does it hold? To find out let us introduce two technical terms - 
phase sortals and substance sortals.
274
 We have said that embodiment is an inherent 
characteristic. But what kind of a sortal concept is it? Before we answer this question, let us 
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briefly unpack these two terms. Sortal concepts are, following P. F. Strawson, concepts which 
provide a principle for individuating and counting particulars.
275
 Thus they are classificatory 
concepts, and can be divided into the two mentioned types: phase sortals and substance 
sortals.
276
 The former designates a kind to ‘which an individual may belong through only part of 
its history’.277 For example, ‘adolescent’ is a phase sortal.278 Individuals are not adolescent when 
they begin to exist. However, they later enter into adolescence and eventually cease to be 
adolescent. All the while the particular individual remains the one and the same throughout the 
various transformations.
279
 By contrast, the latter designates a kind to which an individual 
necessarily belongs throughout its entire existence. Thus substance sortals indicate the sort of 
thing an entity essentially is. In short, the ‘sort of thing it must be if it is to exist at all and thus 
the sort of thing it cannot cease to be without ceasing to exist’.280 So for example, although an 
individual that was adolescent continues to exist without being an adolescent, individuals cannot 
exist without being embodied. Embodiment, then, is necessary to be such sort of an individual. 
Thus an individual cannot cease to be embodied and yet continue to exist. Embodiment is thus a 
substance sortal, and substance sortals necessarily apply to individuals throughout their entire 
histories. Indeed, substance sortals ‘specify necessary conditions for the identities of those 
individuals’.281 Thus ‘if x is a substance sortal, there are criteria for being x that any x must 
satisfy as long as it exists’.282 
McMahan thinks that the ‘criteria given by the substance sortal appear to state only a 
necessary condition for the continued existence of an individual of the kind x’.283 I can see why 
McMahan would take such a stand if his starting point for how one understands the notion of a 
‘person’ is the continued retention of the ‘capacity for self-conscious mental activity’.284 In short, 
for McMahan, a substance sortal can only give a necessary condition for something, not a 
sufficient condition. He and I disagree on which sortals apply to persons. I argue that bodily 
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276 For a further elucidation of these concepts, see P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 
(London: Methuen, 1959). 
277 McMahan, EoK, 6. 
278
 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid., 7. 
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presence of profoundly cognitively impaired persons is sufficient to support the continued 
existence of an individual x.
285
 For him, to meet the threshold, individuals must demonstrate 
rational agency. I disagree. For me, if ‘person’ is a substance sortal and I am a person, then 
among the conditions of my continuing to exist as one and the same individual will be the 
conditions of personhood, that is, as I have argued elsewhere in this study, the retent ion of a 
combination of rationality, relationality and embodiment.  
Thus humans would not be what we take them to be if this characteristic of being 
embodied was absent. So if the ground for all human being’s inherent rights is the worth that is 
bestowed upon them by being embodied on this earth and elected by God, it means that all 
humans have the worth that is required to ground inherent rights. Moreover, unlike attachment 
love, embodiment and election are not characteristics that can be withdrawn. But for the sake of 
argument, a person could say that, surely, embodiment is a characteristic of being human that can 
be withdrawn. This fact is true, but the ‘withdrawal’ of embodiment means the end of bodily 
existence, which means that dignity, worth, and inherent rights do not matter anymore! The 
circumstances have changed and perhaps society is now more concerned with a dignified manner 
of handling the bodily remains of the individual who was.    
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have been rethinking persons at the edge of moral personhood. In doing so, we 
have said that regarding the status of cognitively impaired persons in a moral community, these 
persons, their families and advocates have reason to be concerned in a liberal society. Again my 
aim is not to negatively characterize any liberal society. We said that the genesis of this concern 
is the perpetual marginalization of these persons from the polis, even though they are themselves 
‘political animals’. Although dominant and influential as theories of justice in contemporary 
society, theories in the tradition of the social contract are culpable. From this tradition we have 
examined the Rawlsian theory. We said that Rawls himself admitted that his theory was 
inadequate to solve the three problems of justice - nationality, and justice owed to (physically 
and cognitively) impaired persons, and non-human animals. However, we have said that Rawls 
was keen to postpone the issue of disability until the foundations of society in other areas of 
justice had been established. Next in the liberal tradition we examined the approach of 
                                               
285 Furthermore McMahan does not even believe that the ‘souls of the cognitively impaired are like those of other 
human beings’ (see id., CDMJ, 6). 
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Nussbaum, who we said attempts to expand Rawls theory without completely rejecting it. 
Nussbaum does not have faith in the social contract to handle the three unresolved problems of 
justice mentioned above. Of interest regarding her theory is the attempt to excise the device of 
the social contract and replace it with the ‘overlapping consensus’. Additionally, of particular 
interest in her ‘capabilities approach’, are ten core human capabilities regarded as underpinning 
the state’s obligation to provide all citizens with minimal justice. Nussbaum, we observed, is 
keen on interweaving the notion of dignity in her proposal. However, we said that her language 
might be a hindrance to what she is attempting to achieve. After engaging both political 
philosophers on the issues of rights, we concluded that their proposals do not work.  
To account for cognitively impaired persons as members of a moral community, I have 
suggested that what we need is a grounding of inherent human rights in something other than 
human capacities. So we turned to consider a theistic grounding of natural human rights. Here 
we engaged Nicholas Wolterstorff who says that a theistic grounding of natural human rights is 
possible with a relation of human beings to God that is not hinged on human capacities. 
Wolterstorff, then, proposes being loved by God as such a relation. According to Wolterstorff, 
the kind of love that bestows worth is ‘love as attachment’. This is the kind of relationship that 
does not reference human capacities. Although I did not reject entirely Wolterstorff’s proposal, 
as some have sought to do, I am nevertheless a bit concerned about aspects of his proposal. Thus, 
to in a way safe-guard his proposal, I went on to suggest expanding it to say that worth is 
bestowed by the relationship all human beings have by being elected in Christ and their 
subsequent embodiment. These two inherent aspects of what it means to be a human are the 
worth-imparting relation of all human beings to God that does not in any way involve 
psychological capacities such as rationality and autonomy as prerequisites for claims of justice, a 
good quality of life, and the moral consideration of personhood. So election and embodiment are 
the principal qualifications for membership in a moral community of individuals deserving equal 
respect and dignity. I recognize that by such a suggestion, I swim against the philosophical tide. 
However, to argue otherwise is to continue the marginalization and stigmatization of those with 
cognitive impairment from the moral consideration of persons. This exclusion is morally 
revolting and thus unacceptable.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Rethinking Care: On Learning to ‘Hold’ in Cognitive Impairment  
 
 
[T]he challenge of learning to know, to be with, and care for the retarded is nothing less than 
learning to know, be with, and love God … For the God we Christians must learn to worship is 
not a god of self-sufficient power, a god who in self-possession needs no one; rather ours is a 
God who needs a people, who needs a son. Absoluteness of being or power is not a work of the 
God we have come to know through the cross of Christ. 
 
        --Hauerwas, Suffering Presence 
 
  
1. Introduction  
Provoked by the historical tendency of the general issue of disability to overshadow the 
particularity of cognitive impairment within both critical disability theory and traditional moral 
theory, I have undertaken here the task of investigating the issue of theology and cognitive 
impairment. In particular, I have examined how we are to think of the ‘hardest cases’ of 
cognitively impaired persons. An anxiety about the danger posed by positions held by some 
moral philosophers has led us to ask these questions: What is the significance of the concepts of 
‘relationality’ and ‘embodiment’ to personhood, and what is the relationship of ‘self’ and 
‘body’? What are the boundaries of personal identity, and do the grounds of our moral obligation 
change when an individual lacks certain cognitive faculties that are often taken to be the basis for 
moral personhood? Are those with significant cognitive impairment moral persons and are 
cognitively impaired persons due the same justice as those who are not cognitively impaired? 
And how might society include cognitively impaired persons in extant theories of justice and 
foster enabling conditions of care that would enable these persons to develop a flourishing life? 
These questions were answered by researching the theological understanding of the 
personhood of profoundly cognitively impaired human beings. This was not a task in taxonomy, 
but an emphasis on the significance of embodiment in understanding profoundly disabled human 
beings. We then use Christological theology that draws upon the inner life of the triune God and 
human embodiment as a means for understanding profound cognitive disability. Drawing on this 
approach, it is possible to address the theological voices in the much neglected discourse on 
cognitive impairment, while drawing attention to the excellence of the work that has been done, 
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and is being done, by moral philosophers and by sociologists (within the disability rights 
movement) in cognitive impairment discourse. 
2. Looking Backward, Looking Ahead 
The chapters in this study began with a historical overview. In chapter 1 I analyzed how theology 
and philosophy have spoken about cognitive impairment and how the landscape has and is now 
changing. And in chapter 2 I examined how the concept of the imago Dei has been understood 
historically from a Christian West perspective. We have said that in the West the notion of the 
image of God was limited to ‘rational souls’ which we conclude is a perpetuation of the 
exclusion and stigmatization of cognitively impaired persons. The fundamental theological work 
has been done in chapter 3 and 4. In chapter 3 I examine the rationality-relationality turn which 
attempts to overcome the limits of the imago Dei as traditionally conceived. Here I considered 
through the theology of John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras, the relational approach to 
theological anthropology in which being human is not defined in terms of some capacity a 
person may or may not possess, but by an affective relational capacity and possibility. However, 
I concluded that in the case of profoundly cognitively impaired individuals, a theological 
anthropology founded on relationality needs to be expanded.   
Chapter 4 concluded the fundamental theological work and attempted to expand this 
relational theological anthropology by interrogating the vexing issue of personhood. Here I 
engaged with theologian Karl Barth. In this chapter I conclude by emphasizing the relational and 
embodied approach to theological anthropology. By following Barth, I suggested a theological 
anthropology that is, in addition to incorporating relationality and embodiment, sensitive to the 
place of the Holy Spirit in theological anthropology, and which is built upon the vantage point 
provided by a Christological paradigm. In chapter 5 our task was to interrogated the place of 
cognitively impaired people in contemporary liberal society. Christian theology is equipped with 
resources to address issues at the core of the fabric of society. Here, we have examined some 
issues at the interface of human dignity and justice. In this chapter we conclude that the 
alternative conception of humans, as embodied beings, suggested in chapter 4 should lead the 
Christian theological community to seriously consider some working framework of how to 
pursue justice. In chapter 6 we conclude the thesis with a practical section which rethinks the 
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question of care around the concept of ‘holding’ one another’s sense of self and identity in 
society through learning to become friends.  
3. So What Next?  
 
In the process of this study I have emphasized the need to reclaim the body and how crucial 
embodiment is to the question of what it means to count one a ‘person’. In fact the significance 
of the body to human identity has been emphasized elsewhere, including in the arts under the 
theme of the ‘body and self’. For example some artists in the twentieth century have opted to use 
their own bodies as the site, source, and subject of their work. What their projects have in 
common is an awareness of the body’s singular identity. Thus by using her own body the artist 
aims to communicate more directly that sense of the body as ‘self’. One such artist if Antony 
Gormley. Since 1981, this award winning English sculptor has used his own body as the model 
for his lead figure sculpture. ‘My body is the location of my being’, Gormley has said, ‘I turn to 
the body in an attempt to find language that will transcend the limitations of race, creed, and 
language, but which will still be about rootedness of identity’.1 Gormley’s work is a constant 
reminder that the body is the location of one’s being.   
Gormley’s latest artwork ‘Transport’ is located at the Canterbury Cathedral.2 Suspended 
above the altar where Thomas Becket was martyred, Gormley’s new work is in the shape of a 
human body. It is made entirely of antique iron nails taken from one of the Cathedral’s repaired 
roofs. The artwork has to do more than a lesson in recycling. While nails will have their own 
resonances for Christians, this artwork seems primarily a study in the human form. Gormley 
says: ‘We are all temporary inhabitants of a body. It is our house, instrument and medium. 
Through it all impressions of the world come and from it all our acts, thoughts and feelings are 
communicated’.3 Yet the strange thing is that many in contemporary society seem to dislike their 
bodies.  
 
                                               
1 Antony Gormley as quoted in Tom Flynn, The Body in Sculpture (London: Orion Publishing, 1998), 160. 
2 See Daily Mail at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-1352137/Antony-Gormley-unveils-new-artwork-
Transport-Canterbury-Cathedral.html (retrieved 2 February 2011).  
3 Ibid. 
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After his martyrdom some accounts indicate that Becket had worn a long hairshirt under 
his archbishop’s garments as a sign of penance.4 It was then taken as a further sign of Becket’s 
sanctity that he led such a life of self-mortification. This was a way of taming the body, that seat 
of so many carnal desires. However to think of the body as a snare and a trap is to miss how 
essential it is to human identity. It is odd that such negative thinking became so common since St 
Paul used the body to image the Church and vigorously defended what can be done to the body 
or in the body. He later issuing a command: ‘So glorify God in your body’ (I Cor. 6.20). Ours is 
an age which seems fascinated with the body beautiful but just not our own.  Gormley challenges 
our contradictory attitude towards the human body. We should love ourselves a bit more, and 
begin with the only body we have. How can anyone practice the love for neighbour without first 
loving themselves? Gormley’s work at Canterbury Cathedral is a reminder of the value of our 
bodily humanity, and an invitation to explore and celebrate it. The body retains a core element of 
mystery that resists even the most intrusive incursions of science and medicine. Hence we still 
lack a complete and all-embracing theory of the body. The body remains as vital to self identity 
in the modern period as at any point in history. 
4. But What Next Theologically?  
 
The task undertaken here has at least reminded us of another and larger task. It is the task Barth 
identified for theology as ‘the energetic revision of its anthropology … in the light of its 
eschatology’.5 Barth urged and undertook such a revision against the dualism of much of the 
Christian tradition and against the reductionism of both spiritualism (or idealism) and 
materialism. Furthermore, as we mentioned, he insisted that the person be reduced neither to 
‘soul’ nor to ‘material’ but honoured as embodied soul or ensouled body. In the preceding 
chapters I have attempted to say something about the doctrines of the imago Dei, relationality, 
embodiment, the body and soul, personhood and pastoral care in relation to cognitive 
impairment. Some of these doctrines have received more focused treatment while others have 
received less, and instead have been weaved into the entire study. Obviously it would take whole 
books to fully plumb the depths of each locus as we have only touched the surface of what 
                                               
4 David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, eds., English Historical Documents 1042-1189 (London: Eyre 
Methuen, 1981). 
5 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. III, 2., G.W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance eds., trans. Harold Knight et al. 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), 390. 
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insights the experience of cognitive impairment can contribute. We have mentioned some 
theological topics but only tangentially. There are also the subjects in practical theology, 
including ethics, healthcare allocation and pastoral care. Also health and illness, the doctrines of 
God proper, revelation, and theology of nature. We have made some comments on some of these 
topics, but they all deserve full treatment in light of the kind re-imagining of the person that we 
have attempted here.   
For Christian thought and practice to be inclusive, especially of people with severe 
cognitive disabilities in particular and disability in general, we must extend the task of rethinking 
the doctrine of embodiment in theology. So the task of rethinking remains. Furthermore, in the 
light of the eschaton, it will remain as long as we ‘know in part’ (I Cor. 13:12). At the end, that 
is to say, at the new beginning, with the redemption of our bodies, when whole selves as ‘flesh’ 
are not without God, when embodied existence is a simple but undeniable sign of God’s rule, 
‘when personal identity stretches from womb to God’s triumph on the other side of the tomb’,6 
then we will ‘understand fully’ (I Cor. 13:12); then we will understand both dependence and 
freedom, and what a person is.  
For now Christian theology has another significant task of what Hilde Lindemann calls 
‘holding one is personhood’.7 I am suggesting this task involves ‘holding’ especially the most 
vulnerable of society in loving care through friendship. Indeed ours is a case of practice seeking 
theory. Within the Christian community questions are not first asked of the needy. Instead 
Christians are called to act and then ask questions later. Recall the example in chapter 5 of 
emergency responders: they do not first ask questions of those needing help. Such is a Christian 
community’s ethos. This follows in the footsteps of the Good Samaritan and importantly it is the 
model set by Jesus Christ himself in his healing ministry. In the next section I intend to tie 
together the preceding chapters of this study. Here I seek to rethink the issue of care under the 
theme of ‘holding one in personhood’ as suggested by Lindemann. However, I propose to 
expand her suggestion to what I am calling ‘society-to-person holding’. Here we will take a brief 
excursus to briefly interrogate Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship and Aquinas’s attempts at 
Christian friendship. I will then settle on the Johannine account of friendship as we re-learn how 
                                               
6 Verhey, ‘The Body and the Bible’, 17. 
7 Hilde Lindemann, ‘Holding Well, Wrongly, Clumsily’, in eds., Eva F. Kittay and Licia Carlson, Cognitive 
Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 161-169. (Hereafter 
Cognitive Disability). 
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to ‘hold’ one another’s personhood in loving care. After hearing from the theological voices of 
among others John Zizioulas, Christos Yannaras and Karl Barth, we are in a better position to 
rethink the enabling conditions required for the care and flourishing of those with profound 
intellectual impairment and disability in general. Let us now turn and consider these conditions.  
5. Familial and Societal Care in Cognitive Impairment 
 
Care is one of the central activities of human life. However its importance, according to Joan 
Tronto, is usually degraded by society in order to maintain the power of those who are 
privileged.
8
 In this section I argue that inherent in this thought is an order that needs to be 
reversed, so that the appropriate goals of care enable those with cognitive impairment to develop 
a flourishing life.
9
 In chapter 5 we considered the questions of justice which need not be opposed 
to the questions of care. In fact Kittay thinks they are complementary, each providing a 
foundation for the other.
10
 So, a just society that fulfills the requirements of each citizen to 
flourish needs good social technologies of care. Additionally, a truly caring society must be one 
in which resources and the fruits of social cooperation are fairly distributed.
11
  
In this section I investigate what good care requires in a society that treats all its citizens 
with justice. People with significant cognitive impairments are often dependent on others for 
help in caring for themselves and negotiating their way in society. Although the financial, 
medical, and professional cost to care givers is enormous, they will be the first to acknowledge 
that the deep and binding relationships they form with people with cognitive impairments gives 
their task a heightened sense of meaning. Such significant relationships demonstrate one way 
people with disabilities enhance their communities in ways that cannot be measured by economic 
standards. Everything which we should say about the right way in which individuals should be 
treated within the healthcare system rests on the human dignity of those individuals. So just as it 
is the dignity of the human person, created in the imago Dei, which should undergird the 
person’s life in the womb and at the end of natural life; so also it is dignity which determines our 
attitude to the human person’s needs during life.12 The model for this reverence for the human 
                                               
8 See Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
9 I shall return to this point below. 
10 See Eva F. Kittay, ‘Introduction’, in Kittay and Carlson, Cognitive Disability, 10. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical letter on peace in the world wrote: ‘Man has a right to live. He has a right to 
bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper development of life, particularly food, clothing, shelter, 
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person’s health care needs is Jesus Christ himself, who makes manifest the coming of his 
kingdom through his miracles of physical healing in the gospels. So we attempt to reverence the 
human person in the same way as Jesus did, and hold that all individuals are fully human and 
fully person from the time before birth to the natural end of their mortal life. As I have pointed 
out, some contemporary theories of the person are not only gravely inadequate but positively 
dangerous as a basis for forms of care. This is already implicitly (and sometimes overtly) seen 
whenever an elderly person with Alzheimer’s is not given the respect due to human persons, for 
example when his or her healthcare needs are not taken seriously. Poor care, then, is always a 
failure to acknowledge the dignity of the patient as a person. Recall it was on the basis of this 
dignity of the human person that we developed our theory of human rights in chapter 5. It is also 
on this dignity that I now consider a form of care that models itself on Jesus Christ’s embodied 
healing ministry of touch and ‘breaking bread together’.  
The form of care I propose is practiced among many cultures around the world, but 
particularly among African communities. Among some African communities, this care is 
anchored on a philosophy called ‘Ubuntu’. Hilde Lindemann has called it ‘holding one in 
personhood’.13  This form of care has not been much discussed in bioethics, but can aid us to 
rethink caring in cognitive impairment. In her account, Lindemann is particularly concerned with 
the obligations that fall to the caregivers or guardians to represent appropriately the needs and 
capacities of those whose cognitive disabilities result from Alzheimer’s disease and other forms 
of progressive dementia. Again for our present purpose, I intend to expand Lindemann’s 
proposal of ‘person-to-person holding’ to include what I am calling ‘society-to-person holding’ 
undergirded by the ubuntu philosophy of ‘I am because you are’. The underlying belief of my 
proposal is that an individual’s identity is ‘constructed’ and ‘held’ in and by society and that the 
family is a microcosm of society. Families, then, are the primary sites for identity formation, but 
societies too are responsible. In the sense in which I am using the term, an identity is a 
representation of a self. Lindemann sharply angles the bulk of her investigation on the 
responsibility of families in holding one another’s identity. She argues, and I agree, that this 
particular kind of care is best provided by family members rather than professional caregivers.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                       
medical care, rest, and finally, the necessary social services.  In consequence, he has the right to be looked after in 
the event of ill-health, disability and old age (See Pacem in Terris, 1963, section 11). 
13 Lindemann, ‘Holding Well, Wrongly, Clumsily’, 161-169. 
14 Ibid., 161-162. 
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However, she rightly adds (but does not pursue the point) that societies too have a role to play in 
holding one another.
15
 This is the path I want to direct my proposal, i.e., the role of society in 
holding an individual’s identity in care. But why society? The answer to this quest ion is practical 
and I believe it emanates from healthcare allocation.  
In a push against institutionalization, home care of cognitive impaired persons is held to 
be the best. However, as Lindemann says, when home health care is left almost entirely to 
families, the familial resources for care may be exhausted well before, for example, the 
demented person’s social benefits come to an end. So, for example, in the United States (and I 
suppose the developed West), a nursing home becomes the only option for many people, as 
Medicare
16
 covers home health care only on a part-time or intermittent basis.
17
 Furthermore, 
most private health insurers offer only very limited coverage as well. This state of affairs is not 
inevitable. Persons with intellectual disability can remain at home where they are cared for best, 
and where it is ‘less expensive, more convenient, and just as effective as care one gets at the 
hospital or skilled nursing facility’.18 This is clearly currently not the practical reality. Thus I am 
proposing that societies can be structured to ‘hold the personhood’ of these persons by providing 
adequate professional help, and a carefully structured daily routine. I will not delve into these 
two recommendations. Instead, I want to examine a component that is crucial to the whole 
enterprise of care – friendship.  
These proposals are not possible without one crucial relationship – friendship. Friendship 
is mostly taken for granted, and the blessing of intimacy not available to all people, particularly 
those whom society labels with all manner of terms. As Reinders is all too aware, skepticism 
about friendship with such people is not strange. Thus it is common to hear questions like: Why 
would we desire to claim such people as friends? What can cognitively impaired people give that 
we might desire to receive? And yet, the Scriptures are clear that God desires to befriend human 
beings, not for what we are, no for what we have done, or for what we will do, but simply 
because we are. Cognitively impaired people are humans with capacity to be befriended and an 
ability to reveal our relationship with God. The ways in which ‘holding’ (friendship) and/or 
                                               
15
 Ibid., 168. At this point those with Hauerwasian instincts might automatically say ‘church’. 
16 Medicare is the social insurance program administered by the United States government to provide coverage to 
people aged 65 and over; and to those under 65 but permanently physically disabled or have a congenital physical 
disability or those meeting other special criteria. 
17 Medicare 2007. ‘Medicare and Home Health Care’.  http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/10969.pdf 
(Accessed 16th October, 2011)  
18 Ibid. 
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physical touch or ‘breaking bread together’ can heal were brought home to me during my 
attachment at the Mississippi State Hospital where a teenage man had been hospitalized 
following a drug overdose that left him with near-total paralysis. The teenager was quite 
depressed about the disastrous turn of events in his life. He became increasingly impatient and 
uncooperative with the medical professionals and his family. The first several days we started to 
visit him, he exhibited the same uncooperativeness until we started to bring his favorite snacks 
and listen to his story. We returned the next several days, and after some time we were on the 
journey to become friends, who were now even discussing his future plans. ‘Holding’ each other 
in friendship is the embodied action that the Gospels recurrently stress in Jesus’ healing ministry.  
6. Person-to-Person ‘Holding’: Learning to ‘Hold’ in Families19   
 
The core of  Lindemann’s form of care is based on the narrative activity at the person-to-person 
holding.
20
 For her, families are primarily responsible for identity formation, which of course 
begins before birth with family members ‘calling the baby-to-be into personhood’.21 Lindemann 
says that families achieve this through material practices and by weaving stories that form the 
expected infant’s protoidentity.22 Mostly, these are stories of relationship, and narratives that 
identify the child to come as a member of this family, the son or daughter of these people. 
Lindemann argues that as the child grows out of infancy she becomes who she is through the 
mutual process of accommodating herself to her family and being accommodated by it. 
However, there seems to be a gap in Lindemann’s account because it does not seem to account 
for individuals who are congenitally cognitively impaired. While she is right to say that later the 
child will almost certainly challenge some of these third-person stories,
23
 Lindemann does not 
seem to indicate what happens to children who will never attain the ‘critical skills’ she says are 
necessary for challenges of that sort. While some children grow to contribute more and more to 
this process of constructing their identity, as do the environment around them, some will never 
be able to contribute towards their own identity. It is here that specifically families, and society 
                                               
19 See generally Lindemann, ‘Holding Well, Wrongly, Clumsily’, 162-164.  
20 Ibid., 164. 
21 Ibid.; see also Hilde Lindemann, ‘But I Could Never Have One … : The Abortion Intuition and Moral Luck’, 
Hypatia 24 (2009): 41-55. 
22 Lindemann, op. cit., 162. 
23 Ibid. 
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in general, as we will see below, have the special task of ‘holding the person’ to maintain their 
sense of self. 
7. Society-to-Person ‘Holding’: Learning to ‘Hold’ in Society  
Societies too have a role to play in ‘holding’ and maintaining the person’s sense of self. This is 
particularly so when families of people with cognitive disability exhaust their resources for home 
health care and the nursing home becomes the only option. It is also true for, for example, 
families of profoundly intellectually impaired individuals. In this form of caring, societies have 
two responsibilities: (a) to learn to become friends with cognitively impaired persons,
24
 and (b) 
to integrate the goods of home into societal holding of Persons.
25
  We only have space to sketch 
the contours of the first responsibility. Recall I mentioned a reversal that needs to be instituted to 
enable those with cognitive impairment to flourish. Well, the art of learning to become friends 
with disabled people, and particularly cognitively impaired persons, requires a ‘reversal in the 
order of giving and receiving’.26 The Johannine account of friendship is particularly crucial for 
our purpose here, for it emphasizes this reversal. Whilst I will say something about this concept 
of friendship later, it is helpful in the first instance to situate this claim in the broader thematic 
movements of friendship in the history of ethics. Our examination will be three pronged: First, I 
shall take an excursus to focus chiefly, though briefly, upon Aristotle’s account for he, unlike 
any other philosopher in the history of ethics, has paid the most attention to the practice of 
friendship albeit with limitations. Second, I shall briefly consider Aquinas’s attempt at 
articulating Christian friendship and finally settle for the Johannine account of friendship as most 
suited to ‘hold’ the personhood of especially the most vulnerable in society in loving care. 
                                               
24 I closely follow Hans S. Reinders. (See id., Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological 
Anthropology, and Ethics (Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2008), 350-378. 
25
 For lack of space we will not delve into this second responsibility. However, in summary, integrating the goods of 
home into the societal holding of persons evokes the controversial topic of healthcare allocation. The truth is that it 
is not easy to apply principles of justice to the question of how to share our resources when there are not enough to 
satisfy every need for integrating the goods of home into societal ‘holding’. Furthermore this study is critical of 
utilitarian approaches of allocation. For further explication on this issue, a good starting point would be to consider 
Catholic social thought on healthcare allocation.  
26 See Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 352. 
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8. Excursus: Aristotle’s Friends 
For the purposes of our study, Aristotle’s account of friendship between ‘equals’ is particularly 
troublesome for he does not make it easy to include friendship with persons with cognitive 
impairment. According to Aristotle, friendship is a ‘virtue, or implies virtue, and is most 
necessary for living’.27 Without friends, Aristotle says that ‘no one would choose to live, though 
he had all other goods’.28 Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship based on utility, 
pleasure and goodness.
29
 Perfect friendship for him is based on goodness. So for Aristotle, only 
the friendship of those who are ‘good, and similar in their goodness, is perfect’.30 This is because 
these individuals each alike wish ‘good for the other qua good, and they are good in 
themselves’.31 This is a human function, which early on in the Nicomachean Ethics he tells us is 
‘activity of soul in accordance with reason’.32 The human good, then, is the ability to do this well 
(i.e. ‘virtuously’).33 However we read Aristotle’s sentiments here, it is impossible to include in 
this view people whose activities do not seem to display a rational principle. Thus, since perfect 
friendship is possible only between people of good conduct whose lives imply a rational 
principle, it must follow that persons with cognitive disability cannot partake of such friendships.  
To his credit, ‘perfect’ friendship does not exhaust Aristotle’s account for he adds that 
true friends are those who ‘desire the good of their friends for their friends’ sake’ and not 
because the other possesses any ‘incidental quality’.34 A friend loves another for who that friend 
is.
35
 Such friendship lasts so long as the individuals ‘remain good; and goodness is an enduring 
quality’.36 Such friends ‘please one another too; for the good are pleasing both absolutely and to 
each other ….’37 Aristotle says friendships of this kind is ‘permanent’, because in it are ‘united 
all the attributes that friends ought to possess’.38 Presence and activity, then, are necessary for 
friendship though they are not sufficient. Furthermore, for Aristotle, if friends of this nature 
                                               
27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.1. (Hereafter NE). 
28 Ibid. 
29 For further explication see Aristotle, NE 1156 b13-, 35-. 
30 Ibid., VIII.iii. (1156b2-23)  
31 Ibid. (1156b5f). 
32
 Ibid., I.VII. (1098a6-7).  
33 Ibid., 1098a16-7. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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‘please one another’, friendship must be reciprocated, and mutually acknowledged. Indeed he 
says: ‘people cannot be friends unless they first come to feel good will’.39 In other words a 
friendship is viable only if both parties are ‘proportionally compensated’.40 In short there must be 
reciprocity. For the good person, Aristotle concludes, ‘his friend is another self’.41 Thus a kind of 
identity exists between true friends, in that they recognize themselves in the other person. 
Aristotle’s claim to equality as the mark of perfect/true friendship appears right on target. It 
seems unlikely that a person who is cognitively impaired is proportionally compensated in a 
friendship. So can we ‘really’ be friends with cognitively impaired people and thus ‘hold’ and 
maintain their sense of self? In sum, Aristotle’s account suggests that the skepticism some hold is 
warranted. But should it be? As Reinders says, we can respond to Aristotle’s account in two 
ways: we can reject Aristotle’s account because it marginalizes people with cognitive 
impairment from being part of true friendships or we can appropriate it to highlight tensions that 
are inherent in such friendships.  
9. “I Have Called You Friends”: On Christian Friendship  
9.1 Aquinas’s Friends  
I want to begin this last leg of our journey with Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s extensive discussion 
of friendship in his Summa Theologica occurs in questions 26-28 of section I-II, and in questions 
23-46 in section II-II. The former is within a discussion of love as a passion and the latter is more 
theological than philosophical. But does Aquinas accommodate the difference between our 
above mentioned responses to the Aristotelian account? The quick answer is that it seems not. 
Indeed Reinders faults him for drawing what he calls ‘far-reaching, and ‘embarrassing’, 
implications from Aristotle’s intellectualist conception of friendship.42 Aquinas says, and I quote 
him at length:  
no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer 
in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because 
friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish 
good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess 
good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its 
disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Physics, II, 6) that we do not speak 
                                               
39 Ibid., IX.v. (1167 a8). 
40 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 360. 
41 Aristotle, NE, 1166a31. 
42 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 352. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, II, 25, 3. (trans. 
Fathers of the Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), (Hereafter ST) 
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of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship 
is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together," as 
the Philosopher proves (Ethics, VIII, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human 
life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except 
metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the 
fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we 
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
43
 
  
Two comments are in order. The wider context of the passage shows that in speaking of 
‘irrational creatures’ Aquinas has in mind nonhuman creatures such as animals and plants. 
However, Reinders thinks that since Aquinas cannot avoid excluding people with intellectual 
disabilities in his conception of friendship because his understanding of rational creatures, 
‘which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses’,44 is clearly 
enough to exclude human beings with impairments affecting the powers of reason and will. 
Second, these claims cannot be sustained theologically.
45
   
Two main points emerge from Aquinas’ account: First, for Aquinas, friendship with God 
as the state of fulfillment of human is not a state at all but an activity of the soul. Consequently 
Reinders argues that it is not immediately clear how the condition of cognitive impairment would 
be compatible with friendship as the ultimate end of human being, when friendship is supposed 
to be an activity of a rational soul’.46 Second, for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, friendship with God 
entails a kind of likeness. ‘Charity’, Aquinas says, ‘is based on the fellowship of everlasting 
happiness’. It seems then that for Aquinas, ‘“irrational creatures” do not share in the gifts of 
grace’.47 Aquinas must be wrong, so says Reinders, ‘theologically speaking’, for if he were right, 
‘God’s friendship is only promised to some, but not to all human beings’.48 But given the 
profound inequalities involved in holding a cognitively impaired person’s identity in friendship, 
how could Aquinas not be correct that ‘friendship’ in their case is impossible, properly speaking? 
                                               
43 Aquinas, ST, II, II, 25, 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 353. See also Aquinas, ST, II, II, 24, 2.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 354. 
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The answer lies in discarding Aristotelian friendship masquerading as Christian friendship, and 
embracing Christian friendship proper.
49
    
9.2 The Johannine Account  
Let us now consider the distinctively Christian vision of friendship presented by the gospel of 
John, which unlike the Aristotelian account escapes the tensions channeled by Aquinas above. 
To make our examination as sharp as possible, I propose to focus in upon one particular 
distinctive feature of the Johannine account, that is, the reversal in the order of giving and 
receiving. In our friendships we like to affirm ourselves in our self-sufficiency rather than in our 
capacity to receive. We said that this is, perhaps, because society is keen to maintain the power 
of those who are privileged. The crucial statement for our present purpose is found in 15.15 “I 
have called you friends because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from my 
Father” and in 13.35 “by this [your love] everyone will know that you are my disciples” (see also 
14.15-24, 15.8-9). The Johannine account assumes a strong connection between identity and 
actions (3.18-21, 8.31-59, 9.31-41, and 10.25-39). The identity of the individual and community 
is sustained by an account of love and indwelling. Thus I am because you are. Even the identity 
of the Father and the Son are not self-sufficient and exclusive but ‘the Father is the Father 
precisely as the one who indwells the Son and is indwelt by the Son … the Son is the Son 
precisely as the one who indwells the Father and is indwelt by the Father. Analogously, the Son 
is in the believers, and they are in him’. Thus, ‘believers are what they are on account of the 
Son’s indwelling them’.50 An individual’s identity, then, becomes a matter of trust. If the true 
person is to be identified with the love that the Son has for me, then to be myself I must trust that 
love which is not in my power to control. In this way to be oneself becomes a sort of relational 
task. 
In 15.15, John’s account joins the above themes to emphasize the kind of life that the Son 
opens for his followers. A contrast is struck between the relationship of the master-slave and that 
of friend to friend. One could look at the passage and suggest that in the former case the slave 
                                               
49 Elsewhere, Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches reject the Aristotelian account because it leaves no space to 
appreciate the friend as an ‘other’. See id., Christians Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient 
and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). 
50 Miroslav Volf, ‘Johannine Dualism and Contemporary Pluralism’, in eds., R. Baukham and C. Mosser, The 
Gospel of John and Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 46. 
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performs the proper actions, but without understanding.
51
 So the slave relates to the master in a 
context that is dictated by an external force. Contrast this with friendship, where there is an 
internal draw to love and serve the other. This means that when members of the family and 
society ‘hold’ a person with cognitive impairment in their identity, they do so not out of 
compulsion but out of ‘abiding love’ (see John 15.9-12). The agent’s actions are not merely from 
respect but from knowledge and understand the reasons for the action. Thus John, referring to 
Jesus: ‘I have called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard 
from my Father’ (Jn.15:15).  
A Christian conception of true friendship, I suggest, should remind us that Christian 
friendship is not the friendship of great people who are praised for their good character by their 
peers. True friendship is about committing ourselves to ‘holding’ those who are despicable in the 
eyes of the world. True friendship, then, is friendship under the cross.
52
 As Hauerwas and 
Pinches point out, Christians believe that ‘the God of the universe, who has extended Himself to 
us in the Jewish people and in Jesus, invites us to become His friends by sharing in his 
suffering’.53 But that is precisely what some of us want to avoid. Most of us do not want to be 
affiliated with suffering, nor with poverty, nor with abnormality.
54
 As Reinders points out, this 
explains why people in marginalized positions suffer from our self-images, that is, we are 
constantly affirming ourselves in our self-sufficiency rather than learning to receive from those 
society has labeled ‘Other’.  
The Christian community should seek to distinguish itself in seeking to ‘hold’ those who 
suffer from poverty, or abnormality. We do not choose our friends for their virtue, that is, in 
order to extend acts of good will to them, particularly not when these friends are despised in the 
eyes of the world. Instead we are called to be their friends. Thus Jesus to his disciples: ‘I have 
called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from my 
Father. You did not choose me but I chose you’. (John 15.14-16). To hold cognitively impaired 
people is our vocation because of what we have heard about the love of God, the forgiving 
Father. These comments are merely an introduction into the Johannine account of friendship. 
                                               
51 Aristotle himself presents the slave’s activity in this very manner. See Politica I.5.1254a,b (ed., W. D. Ross, trans. 
Benjamin Jowett, The Works of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921). 
52 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 365. 
53 Hauerwas and Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues, 44. 
54 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 365. 
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However, they are sufficient to reflect upon the nature of the contrast with Aristotle, whose 
account fails to resolve the tension of self-sufficiency and friendship.  
As the Christian community struggles to think and live the story of creation, covenant, 
Christ, and eschaton, it exercises discernment concerning who counts as a person and what it 
means to count as a person. A discerning judgement concerning who counts as a person will be 
suspicious not only of reductionistic accounts of ‘person’ but also of the question itself when it is 
used to discount the responsibility to care.
55
 In short, the story suggests that an answer to this 
question comes indirectly, that the theoretical task depends on the practical one, that discernment 
comes by way of a readiness to care for another (or not) as though they were worthy of it. Those 
whom Jesus declared fit for the kingdom of God cared for ‘the least of these’ in their flesh and 
discovered, to their surprise, the image of Jesus in the ones they cared for (Matthew 15.34-40). 
The Good Samaritan was a neighbour to the one left for dead by the side of the road, and in that 
care he, and all who hear the parable, discovered an unexpected answer to the question: ‘Who is 
my neighbour?’ (cf. Luke 10.29-37).56  
What does it mean to ‘hold’ my neighbour in love and respect her as an embodied self? 
Surely it means to respect her freedom, but it also means to respect her embodied integrity and to 
attend to her needs as an embodied self. I agree with Allen Verhey that attending to the needs of 
embodied selves will require care-givers to sometimes ‘objectify the body, to think of it and to 
treat it as manipulatable’.57 However, we must also always recognize and respect the body as an 
embodiment of a person and care for the whole person whose body it is.
58
 When we ‘hold’ each 
other, then, we should be attentive to a person’s suffering as well as their pain, for persons suffer 
not as ‘ghostly minds nor as mere bodies but as embodied selves’.59 To ‘hold’ one another as 
embodied persons we must be committed in advance to treat all human beings as persons, even 
when their humanity is ambiguous. Moreover, Paul said that ‘God chose things despised by the 
world, things counted as nothing at all, and used them to bring to nothing what the world 
considers important’ (1 Cor. 1.28). Surely is it not impossible to learn to love another human 
                                               
55 Stanley Hauerwas et al., Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further Investigations in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame Press, 1977), 127-131. 
56 See also Oliver O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who Is a Person?’ in Stephen E. Lammars and Allen Verhey, eds., Moral 
Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1998), 380-386. 
57 Allen Verhey, ‘The Body and the Bible: Life in the Flesh According to the Spirit’ in Lisa S. Cahill and Margaret 
A. Farley, eds., Embodiment, Morality and Medicine (London: Kluwer Publishers, 1995), 19.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
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being at all if we are not committed to ‘hold’ those whose humanity is in doubt and uncertain to 
us, with the expectancy and hope that we shall discern how God ‘holds’ them out of nothing into 
personal being.
60
 Respect for an individual as an embodied self is to respect and care for the 
whole embodied person as a member of community, some of which are not of his own choosing. 
It is to love and ‘hold’ the neighbour as a friend with a history and a community, as an individual 
with an identity, as one who, like oneself, was by God’s grace and power made ‘image of God’ 
in the flesh and who in the flesh may depend on God’s grace and future. And finally to love the 
neighbour is to live in the flesh according to the Spirit, to glorify God in the body.  
                                               
60 See O’Donovan, ‘Again: Who Is a Person?’, 66. 
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